The private credit market of the Cape Colony, 1673-1834 : wealth, property rights, and social networks by Swanepoel, Christie
The Private Credit Market of the Cape
Colony, 1673-1834: Wealth, property rights,
and social networks
by
Christie Swanepoel
Dissertation presented for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics,
Faculty of Economic and Management Sciences
at the University of Stellenbosch
Supervisor: Prof. Johan Fourie
March 2017
Declaration of Authorship
By submitting this dissertation electronically, I declare that the entirety of the work contained
therein is my own, original work, that I am the sole author thereof (save to the extent explicitly
otherwise stated), that reproduction and publication thereof by Stellenbosch University will not
infringe any third party rights and that I have not previously in its entirety or in part submitted
it for obtaining any qualification.
Signed:
Date:
Copyright © University of Stellenbosch 2017
All rights reserved
i
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Abstract
A well-developed financial sector is important for economic development. Historical evidence
has shown financial transactions have been around for more than 5 000 years. This research
into historical financial markets often shows that, contrary to popular belief, these markets
were a sign of prosperity, rather than of struggling growth and poverty. Yet, only scattered
evidence exists on the historical financial market of South Africa. This is the main aim of this
dissertation: to investigate the historical financial market of the Cape Colony, specifically the
private credit market. The main database used for the research is the probate inventories, also
known as the MOOC 8 series. These inventories listed all the assets of the individual, as well
as their debts and credits. The second chapter is focused on the descriptive statistics and char-
acteristics of borrowers at the Cape and looks at various historical results to be tested using
the complete series. The first research question is focused on describing the market and inves-
tigates previous historical claims in light of recent international literature. Conclusions from
this chapter are that the role of the Company (the government at the time), church and Or-
phan Chamber has been greatly overestimated. Also, rather than borrowing for survival, debt
was made for productive investment, specifically land purchases. The strongest characteristic of
borrowers at the Cape was wealth. The richest thus had more debt than their poor counterparts.
The long period over which these probate inventories were captured presents an opportunity to
study intergenerational wealth mobility at the Cape for this pre-industrial period. Literature on
intergenerational wealth in developing regions and their history is scarce due to data limitations.
But this dissertation gives new insight into this literature. For this early period of development,
high wealth mobility (measured through land, slaves, and debt) existed at the Cape, disput-
ing claims that development at the Cape was limited to an elite few. It is also contrary to the
assertion by historians that the system of partible inheritance were detrimental to development.
Another aspect important for private credit transactions is the social network an individual
formed part of. Two separate chapters look at the role of social networks and trading on credit,
with specific reference to homophily and centralities. By using network analysis, the basic hu-
man interactions which determine not only development but also the formation of institutions
can be studied. The centrality measures show that wealth had little influence on an individual’s
position in the network and that central families tended to stay central for much longer than in-
dividuals. There was also a central role for the three main institutions in connecting individuals
into the larger network. Modern literature suggests that people bind together in groups with
ii
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similar backgrounds – known as homophily. With this long series, I test how long it takes for
integration between groups to take place. High levels of homophily, i.e. trading with someone
from a similar European background, continue throughout the first century. The high level
of homophily observed in the Cape’s private credit network can be explained by the increase
in familial trading, rather than wealth. This remains an unexploited research methodology in
economic history.
The final research question is to investigate the role of property rights in determining debt at
the Cape. The second chapter concludes that overall wealth was strongly correlated with debt
at the Cape, yet theory and the historiography suggest land was still important for debt. The
aim of the sixth chapter is to investigate this using an instrumental variable approach. The two
main systems of property ownership at the Cape were freehold farms and loan farms. Between
these two systems existed distinct de jure and de facto property rights: freehold farms had
both secure and well-defined de jure and de facto property rights, while the loan farms had less
secure de jure property rights, but secure de facto property rights were enforced by settlers. I
exploited this difference and used an instrumental variable of being the eldest son to test the
assumption. The eldest son was more likely to own a freehold farm than sons born later, but
no differences in debt exist between the two groups. The results suggest settlers relied more on
de facto property rights, i.e. the perceived rights and how rights were used, rather than de jure
property rights, i.e. formal laws defensible in court.
iii
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Opsomming
’n Goed ontwikkelde finansie¨le sektor is belangrik vir ekonomiese ontwikkeling. Historiese be-
wysstukke stel ook voor dat finansie¨le transaksies alreeds vir 5 000 jaar uitgevoer word. Navors-
ing oor historiese finansie¨le markte toon dat die bestaan van ’n kredietmark eerder ’n teken van
‘n welvarende ekonomie as ’n teken van armsaligheid en stagnerende groei was. Ondanks die
groeiende literatuur is daar steeds nie sistematiese navorsing oor die historiese finansie¨le markte
van Suid-Afrika nie. Dit is die doel van hierdie verhandeling: om die historiese finansie¨le mark
van die Kaapkolonie te ondersoek, spesifiek die private kredietmark. Die databasis wat gebruik
is vir die navorsing is die boedelinventarisse, ook bekend as die MOOC 8-reeks. Hierdie inven-
tarisse is ’n samestelling van alle bates van die individu, sowel as die skuld wat aan en deur
hulle onderskeidelik geskuld is. Die tweede hoofstuk is gefokus op die beskrywende statistieke
en eienskappe van skuldenaars aan die Kaap en toets verskeie kenmerke van die mark. Dit is
die eerste navorsing wat die hele inventaris-reeks gebruik om die finansie¨le markte te ondersoek.
Die hoofresultate van die hoofstuk was dat die rol van die VOC (die owerheid aan die Kaap),
kerk en Weeskamer se rol grootliks oordryf is deur historici. Ook, eerder as wat skuld gemaak
was vir oorlewing, was skuld gebruik vir produktiewe beleggings, veral in plase. Die sterkste
kenmerk van skuldenaars was rykdom. Die rykste mense aan die Kaap het dus die meeste skuld
gehad.
Die lang periode waaroor hierdie inventarisse opgeneem is bied die geleentheid om intergen-
eratiewe rykdomsmobiliteit aan die Kaap vir die pre-industrie¨le era te ondersoek. Literatuur
oor intergeneratiewe rykdomsmobiliteit in ontwikkelende areas en hulle geskiedenis is skaars
as gevolg van databeperkinge en -tekorte. Hierdie verhandeling gee nuwe insigte op hierdie
literatuur. Die resultate wys dat hoe¨ ryksdomsmobiliteit (gemeet deur aantal plase, slawe en
skuld) bestaan het in die Kaap vir die vroee¨ koloniale periode en betwis vorige bewyse van swak
ontwikkeling aan die Kaap. Die hoe¨ rykdomsmobiliteit bied ook teenbewyse dat die stelsel van
verdeelbare erfenis nadelig was vir ontwikkeling vir almal behalwe die elite.
Nog ’n aspek wat belangrik was om toegang tot privaat krediettransaksies te kry was sosiale
netwerke. Twee hoofstukke ondersoek die rol van sosiale netwerke en handel op krediet onder-
soek, spesifiek homofilie en sentraliteit. Deur gebruik te maak van netwerkanalises kan basiese
menslike interaksie beskryf word, wat kan bydra tot hoe instansies in ’n ekonomie ontwikkel. Die
sentraliteitsmaatstawwe toon dat rykdom nie ’n invloed op ’n individu se posisie in die netwerk
gehad het nie en dat sentrale families langer sentraal gebly het as individue. Die moderne
iv
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
literatuur stel voor dat individue en groepe met dieselfde agtergrondeienskappe neig om meer
met mekaar te handel. Die lang tydperk waaroor die inventarisse bestaan kan gebruik word om
te toets hoe lank dit neem vir groepe om met mekaar te integreer. Daar word gesien dat hoe¨
vlakke van homofilie bly bestaan in die eerste eeu van ontwikkeling aan die Kaap. Dit wil seˆ
groepe met dieselfde agtergrond bly handel dryf met mekaar. Die hoe¨ vlakke van homofilie in
die Kaap se privaat kredietmark se netwerk kan verduidelik word deur ’n toename in familiehan-
del eerder as rykdom. Hierdie metodologie bly ’n onontginde area binne ekonomiese geskiedenis.
Die laaste navorsingsvraag het ondersoek ingestel na die rol van eiendomsreg aan die Kaap
en die effek daarvan op skuld. Eiendom is ’n belangrike bate en inset in produksie, en die
teorie voorspel dat grondeienaarskap belangrik is vir skuld. Die artikel het ’n instrumentele
veranderlike te gebruik om die hipotese te toets. Daar was twee hoofstelsels waarop grond gee¨is
en besit kon word aan die Kaap: vryplase en leenplase. Tussen hierdie twee stelsels bestaan
verskillende de jure en de facto eiedomsregte. Vryplase het versekerde en gedefinieerde de jure
en de facto eiendomsreg gehad, terwyl leenplase se de jure regte nie verseker was nie, maar wel
versekerde de facto regte gehad het wat deur setlaars toegepas is. Deur gebruik te maak van
die eksogene verskil in geboorte-orde, gebruik ek die oudste seun as ’n instrument. Die oudste
seun was meer geneig om ’n vryplaas te besit/erf as sy jonger broers, maar daar bestaan nie ’n
verskil in skuldvlakke tussen die twee groepe nie. Die resultate bevestig dat die setlaars de facto
eiedomsreg in ag geneem het wanneer skuldtransaksies oorweeg is, eerder as de jure regte. Dit
wil seˆ die regte soos ondersteun deur die setlaars en wat waargeneem word in die gemeenskap,
eerder as die regte soos gedefinieer in die wet.
v
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Financial markets today and their history
Financial market development and economic growth are related. De Gregorio and Guidotti
(1995:445) found a positive causal link between financial market development and economic
growth, but warns that the relationship varies across time and countries. Despite the two being
related, there is no consensus on the direction of causality. Due to this lack of consensus, two
competing hypotheses have been put forward: the supply-leading hypothesis and the demand-
following hypothesis. The supply-leading hypothesis states that causality runs from financial
development to economic growth; the demand-following hypothesis states the opposite (Patrick,
1966). One study to test these hypotheses found that the demand-following hypothesis is sup-
ported in industrial countries, while the supply-leading hypothesis is supported in developing
countries (Caldero´n and Liu, 2003). This suggests that in industrial countries the supply of
financial services is important for growth, while in developing countries the demand for these
financial services is important. Merton and Bodie (1995:4) suggest another methodology: a
functional or an institutional approach. The functional approach studies financial functions in
a market, such as money as the medium of exchange, and has found these financial functions
are more stable over time. The institutional approach investigates innovation and competition
among financial institutions, like banks or stock exchanges, and whether this leads to greater
efficiency in the entire market.
A key limitation of studies on financial development is the focus on formal financial services
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offered by banks. In developing countries, informal financial services, outside the formal in-
termediation of banks, also play an important role. Informal financial markets often revolve
around microcredit, where loans are obtained with no or little collateral. Microcredit insti-
tutions are successful in solving asymmetric information with regard to the collateral of the
poor, which banks or formal financial institutions are unable to do. The prime example of a
microcredit institution is the Grameen Bank. Established in 1983 in Bangladesh, it provides
small loans to farmers and requires timely repayment to continue a relationship with the bank
(Khandker et al., 1995). With this new source of credit and capital, the poor are able to survive
or support productive enterprises (Van Bastelaer, 2000).
This contemporary evidence suggests that access to financial services and markets is important
for economic development. But both these markets, formal and informal, have their roots in
history. In fact, trading took place long before the monetary exchange system of today existed.
This is mainly known as bartering, but recent research has revealed that many of these ex-
changes were much more sophisticated than simply trading one good for another. Some of the
earliest credit transactions can be traced to 3000 BCE in Mesopotamia, where farmers traded
on credit due to seasonal differences. In this society, barley and silver served as medium of
exchange (Merton and Bodie, 1995:5). The phenomenon where trading happens in the absence
of money is described in more detail by Gelderblom and Jonker (2015), who call the medium
of exchange ‘ghost money’, a measure of settlement which can either substitute or complement
coin, or currency.
Formal financial institutions’ roots are found in twelfth century Venice, Italy, with Genoese
bankers. These banks took deposits and made loans to princes, merchants and towns. In me-
dieval Florence, the Medici family became famous bankers, consolidating financial power with
social standing. Ferguson (2008a) suggests their rise was due to ‘meticulous bookkeeping’ and
diversification rather than the size of their enterprise. Pagett and Ansell (1993) also show that
the Medicis’ position in the network of wealthy families was more important than their level
of wealth. The Netherlands, England, the United States and Japan often form the epicen-
ter of studies on financial institutions due to their well-developed financial systems today and
throughout history (Rosseau, 2002).
But research has also emerged on private credit transactions between individuals throughout
history. Much of this research has been focused on Europe and some of the New World colonies
of the United States. Lack of currency was often a reason why informal credit transactions
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were pervasive in these societies. Although the common belief was that this led to poverty, it
was in fact a source of income and wealth. Chapter 2 looks at this literature in detail and at
the effects of these credit transactions on the economy throughout history.
In this introduction, I focus on the environment in which many of these developments took
place. The sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth centuries witnessed great change in Europe
with colonisation spreading new ideas, settlements and technology. The next section provides
a brief European history of these centuries with a specific focus on the development of financial
markets.
1.2 Europe in the early modern period: Great change
and new possibilities
There are four major ‘events’ that shaped the modern era in Europe which I focus on here:
explorations of the Americas and the markets of the East, the Protestant Reformation and
its consequent ‘Protestant work ethic’, the Glorious Revolution and the Industrial Revolution.
These ‘events’ had significant influences on the long-term economic development of European
nations and the nations colonised by them. This section briefly sketches these ‘events’ and their
economic outcomes, although not all of these had direct effects on financial markets.
The Industrial Revolution was a turning point in economic development and production. In
Britain during the eighteenth century, a new mode of production was developed – the factory.
The rapid increase in the volume of goods produced also slowly resulted in an increase in in-
come per capita (Landes, 1998:200). From the British islands, it spread to Europe and America
and the divide in income and economic development created by the Industrial Revolution still
persists today. Allen (2009) suggests the reason for industrial take-off in Britain rather than
another region was the combination of low energy costs and high wages. He also agrees that the
Low Countries were similarly successful in moving to industrial production. Mokyr (2002:29)
suggests a large role for the Enlightenment Era or Scientific Revolution as a cause for the In-
dustrial Revolution. He writes that ‘the true key to the timing of the Industrial Revolution has
to be sought in the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century.’
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De Vries (1994:257) proposes an ‘Industrious Revolution’ was needed to promote the Industrial
Revolution. He suggests that the ‘Industrious Revolution’ reallocated the productive resources
of households ‘from direct consumption to marketed goods.’ Van Nederveen Meerkerk (2008)
and Allen and Weisdorf (2011) show support for this hypothesis in the Netherlands and Britain,
but both caution as the distinction between urban and farm workers is important in identifying
this ‘Industrious Revolution’.
The contribution of financial markets to of the Industrial Revolution is somewhat counter-
intuitive. The cost of capital and demand for finance were low during the initial period in
Britain (Kindleberger, 1984:193). An example of the low cost of capital is the spinning jenny
(Allen, 2002). He shows how the spinning jenny, a relatively simple technology and low-cost
capital input, contributed to the Industrial Revolution. However, as Europe tried to catch up
to Britain, the need for finance increased. Landes (1998:260) offers four places where the Euro-
pean elite and population would get the finance to industrialise: personal investment; financial
intermediaries and private credit; government assistance and international capital flows. As
shown later in this dissertation, the contribution of private credit has been underestimated
until recently. In fact, private credit happened so regularly during this period that Muldrew
(1998) calls it the ‘economy of obligation’.
Landes (1998:217) suggests political and social institutions had a significant effect on why the
Industrial Revolution took place in Britain. This includes property rights (which stimulated
saving and investment), enforcement of contracts, and a stable and responsive government. But
many of these have their roots in another historical event – the Glorious Revolution (1688/1689).
The Glorious Revolution was a set of changes to the English Constitution which would include
secure property rights, as well as private property rights (North and Weingast, 1989). North
and Weingast (1989:819) contend that the Glorious Revolution led to the English financial rev-
olution because the Crown could no longer manipulate repayments and ultimately, it decreased
interest rates. Secure private property rights also led to a growth in private credit markets in
England (Quinn, 2001).
But Britain was not unique in its financial revolution. In fact, William of Orange introduced
many of the financial instruments and institutions from Dutch markets to the English markets
after the Glorious Revolution. The Dutch colonial expansion, which had formally begun with
the establishment of the VOC in 1602, required more capital for the merchants who brought
goods from Asia. Gelderblom and Jonker (2004) show a similar decline in interest rates in the
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seventeenth-century Netherlands. Instead of government bonds providing the secondary mar-
ket, in the Netherlands, the VOC shares created this market and gave rise to the Amsterdam
securities market. Ferguson (2008a:75–76) writes that the new financial innovation found in the
Amsterdam market was the key to the Dutch’s continued fight for independence, but that the
combination of increased debt via these securities and decreasing interest rates meant capital
was abundant in the United Provinces, and that default was unlikely. Gelderblom and Jonker
(2011) postulate that to successfully complete a financial revolution, the credible commitment
of North and Weingast (1989) is a necessary condition, but not sufficient. The ‘vital ingredient’
is private savings. They state that ‘...[u]nless such institutions coincided with growing riches,
unless they enabled the authorities to tap private wealth efficiently and timely, they achieved
little or nothing’ (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2011:666).
What was the source of such private saving? The Dutch and English had another aspect in
common – a Protestant faith. The Protestant Reformation started in the mid-sixteenth cen-
tury, with Martin Luther advocating against the moral decay of the Holy Roman Catholic
Church. The Reformation had as many economic outcomes as it did theological. The first of
these economic outcomes was an increase in human capital and educational attainment. The
literacy rates in Protestant regions increased with schooling so that ‘all Christians [could] read
the Gospel by themselves’ (Becker and Woessmann, 2009:531). These literacy effects were still
present in 1816 Prussia, almost three centuries after the start of the Reformation (Becker and
Woessmann, 2010).
In Max Weber’s The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber focuses on the Calvin-
ist branches of Protestantism (Landes, 1998:174). The Protestant regions of Germany, the
Netherlands and also Switzerland and Britain, differed in work ethic to their Catholic counter-
parts. The Protestant faith placed a higher value on work over leisure, which is often associated
with more wealth and pro-capitalist values (Hayward and Kemmelmeier, 2011). Basten and
Betz (2013:89) provide empirical support for the ‘Protestant work ethic’ in Switzerland, where
Protestant regions have later retirement and higher incomes today. However, the relationship
between economic growth and Protestantism offer differing results. Cantoni (2015) found no
effect of Protestantism on economic growth in Germany, and Blum and Dudley (2001) found
the effect of Protestantism on economic growth was through information networks. Arrun˜ada
(2010) argues the difference between Protestant and Catholic regions was due to a ‘social ethic’
where Protestants supported institutions more, were less bound to close friends and family and
5
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
held homogenous values.
But the Reformation also had an effect on savings and private credit transactions and trad-
ing. Muldrew (1998:132) writes: ‘Protestant theology’s emphasis on faith was mirrored by an
increasing emphasis on trust within everyday social relations. As the number of broken obliga-
tions grew, the development of the theology of the covenant of grace introduced a metaphor as
applicable to the ethics of moral economic exchange within the more active credit based mar-
ket...’ This transference to trust in society also meant that the trustworthiness of the individual
or household became key in securing wealth through secure debt relations.
The church, Protestant and Catholic, was also involved in the credit market, not only as a
creditor and source of credit, but also through the laws it enacted. Through usury laws, the
church prohibited the charging of interest above 5% on loans. If the interest rate is fixed, capital
markets will adjust to the risk of credit through another channel, like the use of more collateral
(Hoffman et al., 2000) and the exclusion of the poor from the French credit market. In other
cases, the market’s depth was adjusted (Van Zanden and De Moor, 2012). But control of the
market opened opportunities for ‘outsiders’ like Jewish lenders in medieval Italy who were not
compelled by the church to conform to these usury laws (Botticini, 2000).
From the sixteenth century, missionary work also expanded and many believers were sent to
the four corners of the world to spread their respective religions. Before the Dutch dominated
trade across the oceans, the Portuguese and Spanish had large empires of their own. Christo-
pher Columbus (1451–1506) was commissioned by the Spanish crown to explore and discover
new routes to India. Instead of finding a new route to India, he arrived in the Americas. This
‘discovery’ led to the permanent settlement of European colonies on the east coast of what
today is the United States and Canada. Similarly, it was Vasco Da Gama (1460–1524) who
first reached India by ocean. India was especially important for European traders in search
of spices, while the Far East, like China and Japan, became important for its silk. The route
found by him would later come to dominate world trade, with colonies settled all along it by
different European powers, including at the southern tip of Africa, then known as the Cape of
Good Hope (Israel, 1995:938).
The Spanish and Portugese did not continue to dominate world trade in the seventeenth cen-
tury. Toward the end of the sixteenth century, the Dutch became a new power in world trade.
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In 1602, the Dutch East India Company (VOC or the Company hereafter) was established by
the States General in the Netherlands. The Company resembled a modern-day company with
tradable shares and a split between management and ownership. However, Gelderblom et al.
(2013) and Gelderblom and Jonker (2015) argue it had three additional features: permanent
capital, limited legal liability for its directors, and legal personhood. The combination of these
features fortified the Company’s position in its formative years. The Company was granted a
monopoly for trade with Asia from the States General, and from the outset the Company was
determined to become a dominant player in world trade. Their first true success came after
taking control over the Indonesian spice islands from the Portuguese in 1605. To protect this
trade, the Dutch made settlements along this route (Israel, 1995:322) and by 1624 the Euro-
pean settlement in Batavia stood at 8 000. The initial period for the Company was particularly
successful, with the Amsterdam stock exchange valuing the shares at five times the par value,
while profits later became more modest (De Vries and Van Der Woude, 1997:463).
The Company, with its monopoly on trade from the far East, played a crucial role in the estab-
lishment of the Dutch Empire. The Company, however, was not the only aspect of the Dutch
economy that made it a powerful economy during the seventeenth century. Another institu-
tion that would make a contribution to the Dutch economy, the Amsterdam Exchange Bank
(Wisselbank), was established in 1609. The motivation for the creation of this bank was the
vast number of foreign currencies floating in the Dutch economy (Quinn and Roberds, 2009:33).
The bank made more commercial trade possible; Quinn and Roberds (2009:65) put the daily
trading of the Exchange Bank at ten to twelve million florins per day. With the introduction
of receipts in 1683, the Exchange Bank became the template of modern central banks (Quinn
and Roberds, 2009).
The Dutch invented another financial institution during the seventeenth century – the first
modern stock market. With the establishment of the Company and its structure based on
shares, a market to transfer these shares from one person to another was needed. As early as
1607, only five years after the Company was granted its charter, traders began to trade share
derivatives on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (Beurs). These included forwards, options and
repos (Petram, 2011:20). This was alongside the commodities exchange. Petram (2011:59)
shows how in the 1630s and 1640s the market moved from trading Company shares to a com-
plete financial market, ‘characterized by a high level of market activity and a growing share of
speculative transactions with short-term investment horizons’.
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During this Golden Age of the Dutch economy, it was not only foreign trade that created
this thriving economy. The wider economy, especially the rural parts, was supported by se-
cure property rights. These rights allowed agriculture and fishing to flourish (De Vries and
Van Der Woude, 1997:161), while it also allowed average households to take part in financial
transactions (Van Zanden and De Moor, 2012). The Thirty Years’ War and other religious
prosecution taking place over the rest of Europe was a benefit to Dutch industry, which in-
cluded pottery, paper making and printing, and food processing (De Vries and Van Der Woude,
1997).
This Golden Age of development and industrialization did not last. De Vries and Van Der Woude
(1997:681, 685–686) write the following on the complicated decline of the Dutch economy in
the eighteenth century:
The integration of shipping, trading, and production that had been the hallmark
of the Golden Age now gave way to the separation of the shipping, trading, financ-
ing, insuring, and producing sectors... The declaration of war in 1780 ended the
protection that neutrality had given to Dutch shipping and mortally wounded the
VOC... The Revolutionary War and Napoleonic wars squeezed Dutch commerce
into illegal interstices of British blockades and the French Continental System... In
this long period of crisis, disinvestment from the commercial and industrial sectors
and the destruction of asset value through foreign and domestic default undermined
the remaining international stature of the commercial and financial sectors.
The end of the eighteenth century saw two new European powers vie for control over geographic
regions. The American War of Independence had an influence on both France and Britain. Af-
ter the loss of the Thirteen Colonies, Britain turned its attention to Asia, Africa and the Pacific
for new colonies. The French had accumulated much debt for their part in the American War of
Independence, and this became one of the many intricate causes of the French Revolution. Af-
ter the French Revolution, Napoleon Bonaparte became the French ruler. Napoleon as French
Emperor fought for and ruled over much of continental Europe and even invaded Russia. But
his defeat at Waterloo in 1815 left Britain unrivaled at sea (Saunders, 2004:9) and the British
Empire expanded to 9.5 million square miles in 1860 (Ferguson, 2008b).
The British Empire included the Cape Colony after 1806, but the colony was first settled by the
Dutch in 1652, not for settlement purposes but 1) to serve as a refreshment station for passing
8
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
ships to India and 2) to prevent the British from taking strategic control of the region (Israel,
1995:938). The Dutch brought with them many of their financial and institutional arrange-
ments. It is this colony which forms the base for this dissertation. The next section gives a
brief history of the Cape and its institutions before describing the research questions addressed
in this dissertation.
1.3 The Cape Colony’s Historiography and Economic
History
Before European settlers arrived at the southern tip of Africa, the region was inhabited mainly
by Khoikhoi. The Khoikhoi were a group of herders who had inhabited the southern Cape from
the first millennium. With cattle as their prized possession, they moved seasonally for grazing
land. Their nomadic lifestyle prevented them from accumulating land (Feinstein, 2005:14).
After Da Gama successfully sailed around Africa to India in 1497, the Portugese settled in St
Helena, an island in the middle of the Atlantic. Even before the VOC took an interest in the
southern tip of Africa, the British also thought of building a station there. In 1619, the English
Company approached the Dutch regarding the fortification of the Cape, but this never realized.
The Company took control of St Helena in 1645, but shortly after looked for a new provision
station. Table Bay seemed the most viable. De Kock (1936:xi) offered four reasons why the
Company decided to lay foundations at the Cape:
1. St Helena had become unsuitable as a refreshment station;
2. Ships between Europe and Asia needed a steady supply of fresh fruit, vegetables and
water;
3. The Cape offered a sheltered geographical location;
4. The shipwrecked sailors of the Haarlem in 1647 provided new information on the Cape’s
viability as a refreshment station.
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After the wreck of the Haarlem, the settlement at the Cape was pursued in earnest by the
Dutch. This was also partly because of souring relations between the British and the Dutch
(Robertson, 1952:214). Jan van Riebeeck was charged by the VOC to build a fort and hospital,
lay a garden for vegatables and to trade with the local population for meat (De Kock, 1936).
De Kock (1924:8) suggested that the decision by the Company to settle at the Cape was ‘en-
tirely practical and excluded any motives of political ambition or religious enthusiasm – factors
which have frequently determined colonisation schemes.’
The first years of settlement at the Cape featured many hardships and some successes for the
colonists. With the beginning of winter, the rain brought with it some growth for the vegetable
patches around the fort. The excitement was short-lived – soon after, the gardens were flooded
and crops spoilt. In summer, the gale force south-eastern winds scorched much of the crops
sowed during winter (Robertson, 1945a:6). The obtainment of cattle was also not as easy as
reported by the sailors of the Haarlem. The Khoikhoi within the immediate vicinity relied on a
shellfish diet rather than cattle. A week after their arrival, Van Riebeeck was able to buy only
a cow and a calf, and it was not until six months later that the cattle-owning Khoikhoi tribes
appeared (Robertson, 1945a:5). This was the first sign of improvement for the Europeans. Van
Riebeeck was able to barter for enough cattle, cows and sheep that by the end of the year
he was able to provide the passing ships with enough vegetables and meat. Other ventures
like whaling failed with the decrease in Antarctic whaling and the growth in Arctic whaling
(Robertson, 1945d:252).
In 1653, the stock of cattle and sheep increased, butter was regularly produced and grains were
planted in Rondebosch, sheltered from the harsh winds (Robertson, 1945a:10). Soon they had
enough provisions for the small garrison and the ships which arrived at the Cape. There was
a large increase in ship traffic at the Cape throughout the seventeenth and early eighteenth
century. Boshoff and Fourie (2010) found that the ship traffic at the Cape had a significant
impact on the demand for agricultural produce, especially wheat.
It was shortly after this that Van Riebeeck also started to write to his superiors in Batavia
and the Heren XVII, the board of the VOC, that more immigration was needed if the Cape’s
colonial settlement was to be successful. Although this was initially met with disregard, in 1654
after the conclusion of the First Anglo-Dutch War, the Company investigated the possibility of
further settlement. Van Riebeeck proposed that ‘freemen should be bound to remain for at least
ten years’ and that the Company ‘should maintain the monopoly of all trading’ (Robertson,
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1945a:16). In 1657, the Company released employees to become settlers. The first settlement
was built around the fort at Cape Town with a vision of small-scale farming similar to the
European model.
This free settlement was not without problems either. The burghers focused on the cattle trade
with the Khoikhoi to make as much cash as possible from the foreign ships.1 This disregard for
agriculture led to the ban of trading cattle with the Khoikhoi in May 1658. The burghers were
also restricted in what they could cultivate and were forced to focus on wheat, not vines or
tobacco. In December of 1658, the community at the Cape wrote to Van Riebeeck to petition
for better economic opportunities. They wrote about their high labour costs, the prohibition
to trade with the Khoikhoi and their limited access to foreign ships. Van Riebeeck, although
sympathetic to the concerns of the free burghers, had little to offer as compromise (Robertson,
1945b:90), and in 1664, the farming community experienced its first depression (De Kiewiet,
1941:6).
Despite the efforts of Van Riebeeck to establish large-scale colonisation at the Cape, this would
only happen under Simon Van Der Stel (1679–1699). More arrivals came from Europe, most
from the Netherlands and Germany, to escape the depressed economic situation after the Thirty
Years’ War. The population was also boosted by another group of immigrants from France.
The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes (1685) banned Protestantism in France and many French
Protestants fled to the Netherlands seeking protection. But due to the large influx of refugees
and inability of the Dutch government to ensure their employment, many of these refugees
moved to Dutch colonies, the Cape being no exception. The first group of French Huguenots
arrived at the Cape in 1688, where they quickly became part of Dutch society. De Kiewiet
(1941:7) notes the French assimilated to Dutch culture within two generations.
The new arrivals from Europe and the agricultural nature of the Cape’s economy increased
the demand for arable land. Van Der Stel expanded the colony to the mountainous region
around Stellenbosch. The expansion of Simon Van Der Stel was continued by his son, Willem
Adriaan (1699–1707). Willem Adriaan was especially known for his agricultural science and
the implementation of viticulture. This boosted the French Huguenots’ influence at the Cape
as well (Fourie and Von Fintel, 2014). These farms were all held under the freehold system,
1Ships which stopped at the Cape for provisions included ships from the Netherlands, France and Britain.
Boshoff and Fourie (2010) show that the number of ships increased from around ten annually to seventy in the
early eighteenth-century.
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but the limit on arable land was quickly reached and the freehold system was closed in 1717.
The closure of the system did not, however, deter colonial expansion. De Kock (1924:19) writes
that many young colonists were unable to successfully pursue agriculture in the settled region
and endeavoured to move across the mountains eastward. The Company’s inability to halt this
expansion led to the introduction of the loan farm system. Chapter 6 discusses these systems
and economic effects in more detail. This expansion was only slowed in the early nineteenth
century when the European settlers made contact with the Bantu-speaking Xhosa on the east-
ern frontier. De Kiewiet (1941:11) offers the following opinion on the expansion of the colony
and why the Europeans could easily move to the interior of South Africa in comparison to
Canada and Australia:
The hardships and hunger that dogged the steps of every explorer who plunged into
the Australian interior were all but unknown to the South African pioneer. In the
richest game country that the world had ever known food was easily obtained. The
rigours and agues of Canadian cold they never felt. Neither climate nor topography
halted their progress.
The Xhosa population was more numerous and had superior weapons technology to the Khoikhoi
and managed to halt colonial expansion (Fourie and Green, 2015). Figure 1.1 shows the Cape’s
official boundaries in 1682, 1705, 1731, and 1795. By the end of the eighteenth century, the
colony was sparsely settled, with only a few towns. In 1792, the Company also became con-
cerned about the economic development of the Cape. After the Commission of Inquiry in 1792,
changes were made to military establishments and the tax systems, but restrictions on trade
remained (De Kock, 1936:13).
The Cape’s development trajectory was influenced by various Company policies brought to
the economy from Europe by the VOC. The first was the fixed price setting of agricultural
produce by the Company in Cape Town. The prices for all agricultural products were set by
VOC officials, and farmers at the Cape were only allowed to sell to the Company in Cape
Town (Van Duin and Ross, 1987). Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2012) use these prices to show
how fixed prices caused deflationary pressure throughout the eighteenth century. Botha (1939)
showed that, despite complaints from farmers, the prices for these agricultural products were
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Figure 1.1: Map of the Cape Colony’s boundaries in 1682, 1705, 1731, and 1795 with modern
boundaries
Source: Fourie (2013)
remarkably stable over the century.
But with fixed prices came another Dutch institution – pachters or lease-holders. Many of these
pachters became influential and wealthy individuals, like Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, Martin
Melck and Jacob Van Reenen. The pacht-system was a monopoly on the provision of goods
to the Company in Cape Town. There were pachts, for example, for alcohol (Eksteen), and
meat (Van Reenen). Groenewald (2011) studied two groups of pachters, in the early 1730s and
later in the 1770s. He found that the pachters in the later period were more likely to become
prosperous. Chapters 4 and 6 look at this group of aﬄuent settlers in more detail and how they
used connections and marriage to move up the Cape’s social ladder. Groenewald (2011) further
asserts that the pachters at the Cape were different from their Dutch counterparts because of
the Cape’s unique economic structure. The Cape’s entrepreneurs used the various pachten to
establish their different ventures and improve their social mobility rather than the Dutch use
of pachten for land-holdings.
The Cape’s economic structure was also influenced by slavery. The lack of local labour and
the outlawing of enslaving the local Khoikhoi population, who often worked on settler farms
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(Fourie and Green, 2015), forced the Company to supply labour by importing slaves. In 1657,
Van Riebeeck wrote to the Heren XVII that slavery was essential to ensure the success of agri-
culture at the Cape (De Kock, 1936:7). The importation of slaves coincided with a Council
of Policy decision not to promote European settlement to the Cape in 1717. Although slav-
ery in the Cape never reached the levels of the sugar plantations in the New World, Worden
(1985:19) suggests the slaves were an important input for Cape farms, despite the seasonal
fluctuations of demand. Armstrong and Worden (1989:140) found the price of a male slave
fluctuated throughout the century, with an average of 200 rds, while Fourie (2013) followed
Guelke and Shell (1983) in the use of slaves as an accurate wealth measure at the Cape.
The Cape’s slavery never reached the levels of the New World and American colonies. Despite
this, slavery was an important aspect of the Cape’s economy and ‘it was generally accepted
by the colonists that slavery was essential to the economic and social well-being of the Cape’
(Armstrong and Worden, 1989:163). Armstrong and Worden (1989:109) investigate the number
of slaves imported to the Cape. They find that the number of slaves increased from zero in
1652 to 36 169 in 1834. The most dramatic increase in the number of slaves was toward the end
of the eighteenth-century. Fourie and Van Zanden (2013) show slaves compiled about 65% of
the population and had a significant impact on economic prosperity. They concluded that the
high proportion of slaves ‘increased productivity and caused a low dependency ratio’ (Fourie
and Van Zanden, 2013:484).
The Cape formed part of the British Empire from the early nineteenth century, which also
had implications for the slave trade and economy. The first step toward emancipation was the
abolition of the slave trade through the Slave Trade Act of 1806. Both Worden (1985:64) and
Armstrong and Worden (1989:163) note the intense response to these international events by
Cape farmers. The main concern was the effect complete emancipation would have on the econ-
omy, and even the Governor at the Cape, Jan Willem Janssens, feared that it would ‘plunge the
colony into misery’ (Armstrong and Worden, 1989:142). Slavery ended formally in the Cape on
1 December 1834 and many of the fears about the effect of the abolition of slavery were found
unwarranted (Armstrong and Worden, 1989:167).
Strong property rights, or at least the belief in strong property rights, were also imported from
the Dutch economy. Chapter 6 reconsiders the Cape’s property rights and their effect on the
Cape’s economy in detail. The freehold farm system was the first system of property ownership
brought to the Cape by the new European settlers. These were mostly restricted to the farms
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close to Cape Town and in the southwestern Cape. Later, the loan farm system was developed
to expand the colony even further in the northern and eastern directions. Loan farms were
introduced after most of the fertile soil in the region was claimed under the freehold system,
roughly by the turn of the eighteenth century.
The Dutch also brought financial institutions with them. Besides the Company, which itself
actively supported settlers through loans at the Cape, the church and the Orphan Chamber
were also established by the Dutch. In Amsterdam, both the Burgerweeshuis, similar to the
Orphan Chamber, and the church were already active institutional investors in the stock ex-
change by the sixteenth century (Gelderblom and Jonker, 2009). The Orphan Chamber at
the Cape was established to administer the estates of those whose heirs were absent from the
Cape, or where minors were involved. The Orphan Chamber was involved in the credit market
through the capital accumulated by the inheritances it was placed in charge of. It loaned much
of these funds to individuals for mortgages to purchase farms. The same was true of the church.
The main religious organisation at the Cape for the early period of settlement was the Dutch
Reformed Church (DRC, or simply the church), which had a monopoly on organised religion
until the establishment of the Lutheran Church in 1780.
Dutch control over the Cape Colony spanned 145 years until 1795. After France declared war
on the Republic of the Netherlands and Great Britain in 1793, Great Britain responded by
taking control of much of the Indian Ocean. This included an assault on the Cape and taking
control of the colony in 1795. The colony was returned to Batavian control for a short period
between 1803 and 1806, before Britain governed again from 1806.
Between 1660 and 1795, the settler population at the Cape expanded from a dozen to 14
000, including women and children. Due to the systems placed by the Company like its mar-
ket control, strong property rights, the pacht-system, high population growth, and continued
area expansion, historians described the Cape as a ‘social and economic backwater’ (Trapido,
1990:78). De Kock (1924:23–24) describes the Cape’s economic situation in 1795. He writes
that except for Cape Town and Stellenbosch, settlers barely made a subsistence living through
pastoral farming and hunting. The only sources of wealth were agriculture and stock farming
(De Kock, 1936:16). De Kiewiet (1941:26) suggests even after 150 years, the Cape’s exports
were ‘pitifully small’ and that the colony’s internal markets were underdeveloped. Giliomee
(2003:31) suggests the settlers lived simply with scanty furniture and a shortage of beds. Schu-
mann (1938:33) postulates that ‘the transformation of the country toward a market and credit
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economy would probably have been a gradual one.’ In Chapter 2, these views are challenged
through new theories about how credit has been a main driver of economic activity for much
longer than previously thought.
Scholarship by Ross challenges the views of poverty at the Cape. According to Ross (1986:87),
agriculture in the colony had ‘comparatively high levels of commercialization.’ He is supported
by Neumark (1956:36,37) who proposed migration to the frontier happened because of the prof-
itability of the loan farms. New scholarship using archival records mostly supports Ross’ view
(Fourie, 2013). One of the first aspects which has been challenged was the low levels of GDP.
Fourie and Van Zanden (2013) found the Cape’s GDP per capita for this period to be similar
to that of regions in Europe. They conclude that the divergence between South Africa’s growth
and the rest of the world only came much later in the nineteenth century, and not in the early
period of colonial expansion.
Inaccuracies in data are often a problem for comparing GDP across countries and time, which
leads economic historians to rely on different measures to study economic development. One of
these alternatives is wages. The first study on colonial wages in South Africa was undertaken
by De Zwart (2011). He found soldiers at the Cape were more than able to sustain themselves
above a bare-bones basket. He also found the Cape’s wages were higher than the comparative
wages in the Natal region. Similarly, Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2012) concluded that the
employees of the VOC at the Cape had high living standards that improved over the eighteenth
century.
These high levels of wage income coincided with high levels of inequality. Fourie and Von Fintel
(2010:259) studied inequality at the Cape using the tax censuses (opgaafrolle). They found that
‘the unequal Cape society developed not because of certain ‘initial endowments’, but due to
the policies enacted by the Dutch East India Company.’ In Fourie and Von Fintel (2011), they
compare the Cape’s inequality to other regions and found that the Cape’s inequality was even
higher that that of regions like Chile, the Netherlands, Nueva Espan˜a, England and Wales for
the same period.
Using the same probate inventories as throughout this dissertation, Fourie (2013) found high
levels of personal wealth at the Cape. In comparison to other regions in the world, personal
wealth was equal to those in the Netherlands, England and colonies in America. In fact, he
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described the wealth in these inventories as ‘remarkable’ and claimed that this wealth was often
related to slave wealth.
One aspect of the Cape’s economic development has been neglected – financial transactions.
The probate inventories not only list all the assets of the settlers, but also record the vast
number of transactions on credit between the settlers. This has thus far been ignored by not
only Cape historians, but also by the recent empirical studies. The financial development of
the Cape and these credit transactions are only briefly mentioned by Ross (1989), or hinted at
in Robertson (1945a), or ignored by Fourie (2013). Fourie (2014:144) only refers to ‘evidence of
an extensive credit network within the settler community’ without further investigation. This
dissertation is an attempt to fill some of these gaps. It focuses on credit transactions which
took place between settlers, the Company, the Orphan Chamber and the church. It makes use
of 4 120 inventories and over 25 000 credit transactions to study what the structure, extent and
characteristics of the private credit market were.
1.4 Summary of Chapters
The dissertation is divided into five chapters, with an overarching theme of private credit trans-
actions from the late seventeenth to the early nineteenth century – or specifically from 1673 to
1834. This section provides a summary of each of the chapters and the conclusions drawn from
them. The main data set used throughout the dissertation is the MOOC 8 series of probate
inventories. Appendix A describes this series in detail, as well as how the data was captured
from these inventories and how it was matched to the genealogical records.
1.4.1 Chapter 2: ‘Impending ruin’ or ‘Remarkable wealth’: The role
of private credit markets in a settler economy
The first chapter gives the first glimpse of the wealth of information available from the probate
inventories by using the entire series rather than a selection. It adds to the literature that
suggests widespread credit in pre-industrial economies was not a sign of poverty, but rather an
indication of the presence of assets. The Cape’s credit market has often been interpreted by
historians as a cause for concern and a situation that would lead to poverty. This chapter looks
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descriptively at the structure of the Cape’s private credit market, what settlers borrowed for,
and what the characteristics of borrowers at the Cape were.
The first conclusion and contribution of Chapter 2 is to show the relatively small role the
Company, church and Orphan Chamber played in the private credit market at the Cape. Tra-
ditionally, these institutions were described as the main sources of credit, but they were in fact
only involved in a small proportion of transactions. Most transactions happened between settler
men, with surprisingly many transactions also involving women. The second contribution found
is to show that instead of borrowing for survival and consumption purposes, the main reason
for borrowing was production and that this was supported by the many loans made to purchase
land. The third contribution is the strong correlation I find between wealth and debt. Wealth,
as reflected by the number of slaves, and credit are closely correlated even though few slaves
were purchased through debt transactions. The conclusions from this chapter are that many of
the historical concerns about the connection between debt and poverty were unwarranted, and
that the Cape’s credit market, similar to the European markets, was related to wealth, rather
than poverty.
1.4.2 Chapter 3: ‘Favoured children’: Intergenerational wealth, debt,
and credit in the eighteenth century Cape Colony
This chapter sets out to study intergenerational effects both in debt and in wealth for this
pre-industrial period at the Cape. Intergenerational wealth has been well-studied in economic
literature, specifically how the inheritance of wealth can influence successive generations and
how mobility influences the development of economies. Most studies find some intergenera-
tional wealth mobility, rather than high wealth persistence. Historical studies in developing
countries are often limited due to lack of data, and this chapter adds to both this historical
and contemporary literature on the relationship between parents’ financial decisions and those
of their children.
The first contribution of this chapter is to show positive intergenerational effects on three
wealth measures – land ownership, slave ownership and debt. The high positive intergenera-
tional wealth mobility shown here is contrary to previous evidence, which suggested economic
development at the Cape was limited to the elite, also sometimes referred to as the gentry. It
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also disputes claims that the system of partible inheritance at the Cape was detrimental to
growth. The second contribution is to provide further support for more contemporary litera-
ture, which claims that parents and children save and invest in similar patterns.
1.4.3 Chapter 4: ‘Webs of credit and obligation’: A network analysis
of credit transactions for the eighteenth century Cape Colony
Family was a key component in making connections at the Cape. This chapter studies the
effect of social networks and connections and their effect on debt. Networks have not only been
mentioned in history as important for access to debt, but contemporary evidence also supports
this hypothesis. Network analysis is a relatively recent methodology used by economists. The
high demand for micro-level data on individuals often limits its use to contemporary data, but
the probate records allow such a methodology to be used for the Cape Colony.
Applying this new methodology to the Cape’s credit market, I identify the most central in-
dividuals within the Cape’s credit market. I expand this methodology to also study families.
The results show that while central individuals tended to change over time, central families
tended to remain at the centre. The third and final contribution of this chapter is to show that
although the three main institutions at the Cape – Company, Orphan Chamber and church –
were not involved in as many transactions, they were important in connecting individuals to
the larger network at the Cape.
1.4.4 Chapter 5: Ties that bind: Family, background and credit
transactions in terms of homophily
Another aspect of social network analysis is homophily, or the observation in networks that
more connections are made with nodes who share a similar background characteristic. Empir-
ical evidence exists for homophily in networks like marriage patterns, friendships and human
capital investment. In this chapter, I offer another aspect of homophily – trading on credit with
individuals who share the same European nationality.
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The three main European nationalities which I focus on in the chapter are Dutch, French,
and German. The historiography of the Cape Colony suggests that cultural assimilation be-
tween these different cultures happened rapidly. However, I show that preferential trading with
individuals who share a European background remained for the entire century. The chapter
explores two possible avenues for this: wealth and familial trading. Wealth shows virtually no
homophily at the Cape, while familial trading increases at the same time as the overall levels
of homophily increase at the Cape. This suggests homophily between European backgrounds
was related to familial trading. A limitation of the study was the absence of marriage links and
how these influenced trading.
1.4.5 Chapter 6: Which property rights matter for debt – de jure
or de facto? Evidence from colonial South Africa
The final chapter returns to the correlation between wealth and debt in colonial South Africa.
Economic theory, as well as contemporary evidence, show land is a preferred form of collat-
eral for credit transactions. Secure property rights as an economic institution have empirical
support that they are important for economies and long-term development. This chapter in-
vestigated whether property rights in land mattered for debt transactions at the Cape Colony
for this early period.
I use the distinction between freehold and loan farms, in terms of de jure and de facto prop-
erty rights, in order to test whether more secure property rights mattered for debt. The first
contribution is to test an immediate impact of property rights on economic outcomes, and
the second, to provide empirical evidence on the Cape’s property right institution. In order
to find a causal link between debt and property rights, I use birth order, or being the eldest
son as an instrumental variable. The results support recent literature that de facto or the
underlying belief in property rights was more important when settlers considered debt trans-
actions. The null result also suggests other aspects of individuals were more important when
settlers transacted with each other. These include the overall productive capacity of the settler
(closely related to slave ownership), the net value of the estate or the immediate ability to repay
debt, and the familial and social connections an individual had. The question of when prop-
erty rights started to matter for debt transactions at the Cape remains open for future research.
20
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 2
‘Impending ruin’ or ‘Remarkable
wealth’: The role of private credit
markets in a settler economy
2.1 Introduction
In 1795, shortly before the British annexed the Cape Colony from the Dutch, a concerned
farmer wrote to the British government to describe the economic conditions at the Cape. This
man was Johannes Fredrik Kirsten. He wrote of widespread poverty and debt: ‘By far the
greater part of the Farmers and Inhabitants of the Town are Bankrupts [sic], the rest have
their property under Sequester, and every individual looks forward to impending ruin.’ In his
view, ‘the Farmer’ was in ‘every aspect a looser [sic], and had nothing to look forward to but
unavoidable poverty’ (Muller, 1960).
But a closer look at his personal life grants cause for suspicion on the part of his sentiment
and interpretation of the general economic conditions of the Cape. He was born in 1759 and
received a good education. He, in later life, used his father’s connections with Company of-
ficials, to obtain a position within the Company. His continued to climb the social ladder by
marriage to the widow of Marthinus Melck, son of Martin Melck, at the time the richest man at
the Cape. Using his Company connections he set up many lucrative private ventures, through
which he became wealthy as well. By the time of his death, he owned 100 slaves, 674 oxen, 130
horses, 1 400 sheep and 388 morgen of land. His gloomy outlook on the economy was influenced
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by his brother’s precarious position rather than his own. His brother, Jan Pieter Kirsten, was
on the verge of collapse, with a total debt of 6 000 gulden (2 000 rds, or 500 pounds).
Historians of the Cape have echoed Johannes Fredrik Kirsten’s view. Guelke (1989:81–82)
states poor, small farmers ‘were tied to wealthier ones by debts’ and Schoeman (2011a) says
‘most survied on the basis of debt, credit and borrowing’. But economic historians have recently
begun to challenge the traditional view of the Cape Colony. It is moreover timely that similar
literature on European capital markets has emerged, also disputing claims that personal debt
led to poverty. This chapter aims to add to both these strands of literature. First it adds
to the European literature by providing another case study analysing the correlation between
debt and wealth, and second, it revisits the Cape literature in view of a functional approach to
credit markets (Merton and Bodie, 1995).
The first contribution of this chapter is to consider the entire MOOC 8 series, the list of
eighteenth-century probate inventories of Cape settlers, and capture the debts and credits
within them. This means a total of 12 637 credit transactions and 12 580 debt transactions
are analysed. It provides a good description of who borrowed the most, what they borrowed
for and what the characteristics of the borrowers were.1 Confirming the European literature
and contrary to the South African historical literature, debt was not correlated with poverty in
the Cape Colony, but rather with wealth. In contrast to some regions in Europe, for example
Germany, the poor at the Cape were not excluded from the private credit market. Poor settlers
borrowed for different purposes than their wealthy counterparts.
2.2 Pre-industrial European markets
The primary function of the financial market in the economy is to allocate resources (Merton
and Bodie, 1995). But there are two strands of study when considering the historical develop-
ment of financial markets. The first is formal financial markets, or banking and stock market
history. The second strand of research emerged more recently, and refers to private credit
1The biographical sketches that exist, and the sample of probate inventories for studying debt at the Cape
are related to 1) computational ability and 2) historical methodology. The probate series was only digitised
in 2004 and before that it would not have been possible to study the entire series due to time restrictions.
Historical methodology also tends to use the individual as a focal point and study their debts and credit more
in depth than done here.
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transactions and their influence on economic outcomes. Private credit transactions are trans-
actions on credit between two individuals without formal intermediation from banks. This is
not to say these transactions were not formalised, and often involved legally binding contracts
(Van Bochove and Kole, 2014), but they generally did not involve a financial intermediary to
connect borrowers with lenders. Such transactions can be traced back as early as 3000 BCE in
Mesopotamia (Merton and Bodie, 1995). It is such informal (i.e. without a financial interme-
diary) credit transactions that form the basis for this study.
A golden thread of three reasons has been found to explain why pre-industrial private credit
transactions were plentiful. First, individuals in early economies used the private credit market
to smooth consumption. Many of these societies relied on agriculture for survival, and with
large seasonal variations (Holderness, 1976), credit became a conduit for trade. This was true
for the medieval and early modern period. Second, with development, trade over distances and
long-term capital investment, especially in land, were made possible by the same credit markets.
The third problem solved by the private credit market was that trade became possible without
cash (Schofield and Lambrecht, 2009). Western Europe, especially the Low Countries, France
and the British Isles, was plagued by chronic coin and cash shortages in this period, where Mul-
drew (2012) states ‘most market transactions involved the extension of informal credit because
of the lack of ready cash.’ This informal credit culture also gave rise to what Gelderblom and
Jonker (2015) term ‘ghost money’, a generally accepted measure of account which can replace a
real currency or work hand-in-hand with an existing currency. The culture of informal lending
in Amsterdam from the fifteenth century also enabled the market to function without deposit
banks for much longer than in Paris (Gelderblom et al., 2016).
The extent to which private credit transactions contributed to poverty or improved productive
capacity depended on the local context. For example, inland and coastal medieval Flanders had
two very different credit markets, even though the cultures were similar. The coastal region
experienced high taxes on land and the loss of property rights, which limited peasants’ credit
opportunities, while inland Flanders continued to subdivide land among peasants, which led to
a thriving credit market (Thoen and Soens, 2009). In medieval Italy, Jewish lenders were an in-
termediary for rich and poor borrowers alike. Rich borrowers used the credit obtained from the
Jewish lenders to invest in capital, while poor borrowers used the credit for survival (Botticini,
2000). In eighteenth-century Nuits St. Georges, in eastern France, a highly concentrated credit
market emerged with notaries and merchants as intermediaries, as a response to the outside
threat of government intervention. The concentration of the market also excluded the poor
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from the market, and most borrowers and lenders came from the social elite (Rosenthal, 1994).
Those who participated in credit transactions thus in some way or form had collateral. It is
this that drove Spufford (1990) and Jones (1980) to conclude that high levels of indebtedness
is not a sign of poverty, but rather of the presence of assets. This was also true for medieval
Holland, where land titles and secure property rights led to financial sophistication of house-
holds (Van Zanden and De Moor, 2012).
In a study of early modern Germany, Ogilvie et al. (2012) challenge the view that borrow-
ers mainly came from the destitute. They found that the inhabitants of Wildberg, a town in
the Wu¨rttemburg region, used credit to rebuild productive capacity after the Thirty Years’
War, rather than for consumption purposes. These authors used both marriage and probate
inventories to discover who took part in credit transactions. They further show that borrowers
came from many socio-economic backgrounds and that they were tied together through guilds,
churches, charitable foundations, hospitals and even groups of heirs and children in guardian-
ship. Guilds, churches and militias also played a role in the credit market in Amsterdam. The
same network was used by notaries, who designed a standard loan form which lowered trans-
action costs and greatly increased the volume of credit transactions (Van Bochove and Kole,
2014). In eighteenth-century France, notaries were key to linking borrowers and lenders in Paris.
Here, they used their inside knowledge of the social elite to reduce asymmetric information and
thus were able to successfully complete more transactions (Hoffman et al., 2000:299–300).
Across the Atlantic, a positive correlation between economic growth and credit markets in a his-
torical context has been established. Rothenburg (1985) found that credit market development
and growth preceded economic growth in the Massachusetts region. In a similar vein as Ogilvie
et al. (2012), Rothenburg (1985) used the American Revolution as a break in the emergence of
the capital market. In another case, Lamoreaux et al. (2003) found networks were important
for the establishment of credit, and that these networks were built on repeated interaction be-
tween settlers. This repeated interaction and mutual dependence ensured repayment of debts.
However, this was not only the case in America, but Zuijderduijn (2009:214) suggests creditors
would use peer pressure, and sometimes resort to threats to ensure repayments in the Low
Countries. This ensured more transactions, but also repeated interaction between individuals.
There was also a role for charitable institutions. During the seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies, charitable institutions like the Orphan Chamber and church were ‘welcome sources of
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credit’ (Sutherland, 2009). McCants (1997:174) show the large role of debt as a source of in-
come for the Orphan Chamber. These institutions were brought to Makassar and Batavia by
the Company. The Company itself also had an important role in credit provision and often
provided credit against other sources of collateral like slaves and jewellery.
This literature suggests that individual country effects will be different, and local institutions
and cultures will have an effect on the development of the private credit market. In this light,
I analyse the Cape Colony’s credit market of the late seventeenth to early nineteenth century,
specifically 1673–1834. The period was chosen for two reasons: first, for data availability; it
coincides with when the probate records were kept by the Orphan Chamber in this format.
Second, it provides a long period for which these transactions are observed, to determine the
growth of the market and extends even over a change of government in the late nineteenth-
century.
2.3 The Cape Colony and the market for credit
Already in 1657, the Company released Company workmen to become farmers close to the fort
in Table Bay. The initial plan for these free farmers was to have small-scale farms around Cape
Town, similar to those of Dutch agriculture, and for the Cape only to serve as a refreshment
station. However, less fertile soil and harsh weather patterns made the region unsuitable for
this type of agriculture, and the settlement expanded toward the fertile mountainous regions.
Due to the richer soil quality, the farmers that would settle here invested in wheat and barley
cultivation and later also produced wine - especially after the arrival of the French Huguenots.
A new problem arose with this successful cultivation: labour shortages. The Company forbade
the enslavement of the Khoikhoi, and soon started importing slaves (Baten and Fourie, 2015)
to increase the supply of labour.
The second problem with the expansion of the Colony was the lack of capital. Although the
Company provided loans for land and slave purchases, the settlers relied on each other for trade
and skills development. This trade often happened on credit and caused a mutual reliance be-
tween settlers. The result of this mutual dependence was a flourishing private credit market,
yet only snapshots of it exist in the literature. Muldrew (2012) observes a similar reliance on
credit for trade in early modern England, calling it ‘an advanced form of barter’. South African
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historians have described the Company, the Orphan Chamber and the church, as sources of
credit much like in Batavia and Java. Others argue large contributions to the capital market
came from Company employees like Joachim Von Dessin (Ross, 1989). The true nature and size
of these credit transactions, however, have remained hidden and this chapter aims to provide a
more detailed picture.
One reason for the reliance on each other and the volumes of trade which happened on credit
was the lack of currency. The location of the Cape in the global trade network of the Dutch
Empire caused various currencies to float in the Colony, from Dutch gulden and rijksdaalders,
and British pounds, to Spanish and Portuguese coins.2 The farmers resorted to using credit
for convenience. Yet, this was the case elsewhere as well, with Gelderblom and Jonker (2015)
stating ‘paying cash was a chore’ in the eighteenth-century Low Countries. Muldrew (2012:391)
argues ‘most buying and selling was done on credit’ in eighteenth-century England, while Vick-
ers (2011:425) noted that ‘cash never dominated trade in the settler community’ in colonial
Massachusetts.
Currency remained a problem at the Cape throughout the eighteenth century, and it became
most acute in 1792. After the British government took control of the Cape in 1795, the pound
became the dominant currency of exchange. After the second British takeover in 1806, the
rijksdaalder depreciated sharply against the pound and was finally fixed at one shilling and six-
pence to the pound. It coincided with the establishment of the Lombard Bank, which resembled
a modern-day pawnshop rather than a formal bank. It granted settlers credit against pledged
items and had a minimum loan of 100 rds. Yet even the establishment of this institution in
Cape Town did not replace or lead to a collapse of the informal credit transactions between
settlers. In fact, in the probate series only 45 transactions are observed with the Lombard bank,
while 5 738 are observed between settlers for the same period.
Until now, the extent, structure and characteristics of the private credit market have remained
hidden in source material. This chapter investigates these source documents to study the pri-
vate credit market at the Cape and what the relationship between debt, credit and wealth was.
Before this relationship is investigated, I detail the data and discuss its limitations.
2Appendix A provides more information on the exchange rates between these currencies, which appeared
most in the inventories, and how they were converted.
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2.4 The probate inventory series: settlers and their credit
transactions
A source often used by South African historians and economic historians to investigate the set-
tler living standards at the Cape is the probate inventories or MOOC 8 series. The households
or individuals included in these inventories were those with children younger than 25 years old,
those with no last will and testament, or those whose heirs were overseas or absent (TANAP,
2012). An example of how these debts were recorded and acknowledged in the inventories are
found in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1: Example of how a debt transaction were recorded for the inventories
Probate inventories have been used extensively as source documents. However, they are not
without limitations. Main (1974) explains three core problems with the use of inventories: in-
terpreting prices, an age-bias toward older males, and selection bias, i.e. whether the rich or
poor are excluded. Prices are of little importance here. Credit transactions would only have
taken place if the two parties involved mutually agreed on the terms, and in the regression
analysis I control for nominal price changes. The age-bias is also of little concern since 1)
our econometric results show little correlation between age and debt and 2) the distribution of
ages for the matched sample has a widespread distribution of ages (from 18 to 80). The final
concern remains whether there is an over- or under-representation of the poor or the wealthy
in the sample.
Fourie (2013) discusses the issue extensively. Because the probate series was collected by the
Orphan Chamber, only households without wills and testaments are included. This would
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exclude many of the wealthy households at the Cape. The comparison with wills from the
Stellenbosch region, transcribed by Krezensinkski-De Widt (2002), shows the Stellenbosch in-
ventories were much wealthier. The MOOC 8 series was thus biased toward a lower part of the
income/wealth distribution. This introduces a downward bias in the results.
Another downward bias is the timing of these transactions. The transactions are only observed
after the death of the individual. Some time has thus lapsed between when the transaction took
place, which means some debts may have already been paid back in part or in full. The data
does not allow an easy solution to this, but would again suggest the results presented here are
an underestimation of the true market. McCants (2006), however, suggests probate inventories
are ideal for studying small or rural localities, a description that fits the Cape almost perfectly.
Other studies like Ogilvie et al. (2012) and Rothenburg (1985) have also pointed to inventories
as being useful, and used probate inventories to discuss private credit markets.
The second source of valuable information on the settlers comes from the genealogical records
(Cilliers, 2016). From these I was able to find the age, occupation and household size for 2 100
of the individuals in the probate records. Appendix A provides information on the matching
process between the MOOC 8 series and the genealogies. Table 2.1 provides the descriptive
statistics between the full probate sample, the matched sample (those in both the probate se-
ries and genealogies) and the remaining unmatched (those found only in the probate series).
The main advantage of matching the two series is the addition of new variables like age and
occupation. A drawback is the loss of some observations and the possibility of mismatches.
As in all countries at this time, land was a valuable asset. At the Cape it most often took
the form of a farm, as Cape Town (1652), Stellenbosch (1679), Swellendam (1743) and Graaff-
Reinet (1786) were small and slow-growing during this period.3 I do not distinguish between
farm land and town properties in this analysis, simply because the distinction was not made
often enough in the probate series and therefore I refer only to ‘land’ and not to ‘property’ or
‘real estate’. In 37 percent of the probates some land is recorded. The average value of land
came to 1 882.03 rds and an average size of 6 180.35m2. The matched sample (40 percent) had
a higher proportion of individuals with land than the unmatched sample (35 percent), with
3Compared to Europe, the Cape’s population size of about 10 000 at the end of the eighteenth century
(Cilliers and Fourie, 2012), only resembled a town in Europe at the time and indicates how sparsely settled the
Cape was. In 1807, Stellenbosch consisted of 90 houses, while Swellendam had 20 and Graaff-Reinet only 18.
Although other towns, like George in 1800, were also established, the settlements did not significantly grow in
this period.
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics of wealth information of full and matched samples – ex-
cluding zeroes
Full sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of inventories 4 160
Land present 1 555 0.37
Value of land 854 1 822 4 874 3 100 000
Size of land 94 6 180 10 813 6 68 822
Number of slaves 2 073 6.45 7.72 1 73
Value of cash 1 516 334 1 373 0 36 652
Value of credit 2 020 2 540 12 645 2 256 425
Number of credit transactions 12 637 423 1 792 0 80 600
Value of debt 2 866 1 751 6 719 2 164 641
Number of debt transactions 12 580 411 2 098 0 110 188
Both lender and borrower 4 160 0.41
Matched sample
Number of inventories 2 117
Land present 839 0.4
Value of land 512 1 883 4 236 3 50 000
Size of land 56 7 202 12 320 6 68 821
Number of slaves 1 182 7.05 8.51 1 73
Value of cash 714 398 1 254 0 13 539
Value of credit 1 058 3 290 14 626 3 256 424
Number of credit transactions 6 706 549 2 165 0 80 600
Value of debt 1 544 2 021 6 991 4 135 755
Number of debt transactions 7 094 460 2 083 0 100 098
Both lender and borrower 2 117 0.43
Unmatched sample
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Number of inventories 2 043
Land present 716 0.35
Value of land 512 1 884 4 236 3 50 000
Size of land 38 4 673 8 022 17 34 379
Number of slaves 891 5.65 6.66 1 61
Value of cash 802 277 1 470 0 36 652
Value of credit 962 1 716 9 966 2 200 853
Number of credit transactions 5 931 280 1 226 0 44 950
Value of debt 1 322 1 436 6 373 2 164 641
Number of debt transactions 5 486 349 2 116 0 110 188
Both lender and borrower 2 043 0.4
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: Full sample: probates; matched sample: probates and genealo-
gies; unmatched sample: probates only.
higher values and larger sizes as well. However, because no distinction is made, it remains a
problem to use land ownership as a proxy for wealth. This is exacerbated by the infrequent
reporting of the size and value of land.
The zero values are also important to consider for three reasons. First, a zero debt value can
mean the individual was excluded from the market. This forms part of asymmetric information
problems in the private credit market. The second reason relates to choice. The individual
could have made the choice not to engage in credit activity, even if they did have access to
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the market, which would indicate a preference for certain individuals. And third, the debt and
credit values and the transaction itself could simply not have been reported in the probate
inventories, which would cause measurement error in the sample. All of these contribute to the
downward selection bias mentioned before. Table 2.2 gives the same descriptive statistics with
the zero values included.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of wealth information of full and matched samples – includ-
ing zeroes
Full sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of inventories 4 160
Land present 4 160 0.37
Value of land 4 160 374 2 327 0 100 000
Size of land 4 160 140 1860 0 68 822
Number of slaves 4 160 3.21 6.33 0 73
Value of cash 4 160 122 844 0 36 652
Value of credit 4 160 1 234 8 901 0 256 425
Number of credit transactions 12 637 423 1 792 0 80 600
Value of debt 4 160 1 206 5 636 0 164 640
Number of debt transactions 12 580 411 2 098 0 110 188
Both lender and borrower 4 160 0.41
Matched sample
Number of inventories 2 117
Land present 2 117 0.40
Value of land 2 117 456 2 232 0 50 000
Size of land 2 117 191 2 298 0 68 821
Number of slaves 2 117 3.93 7.17 0 73
Value of cash 2 117 134 752 0 13 539
Value of credit 2 117 1 644 10 468 0 256 424
Number of credit transactions 6 706 549 2 165 0 80 600
Value of debt 2 117 1 474 6 037 0 135 755
Number of debt transactions 7 094 460 2 083 0 100 098
Both lender and borrower 2 117 0.43
Unmatched sample
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Number of inventories 2 043
Land present 2 043 0.35
Value of land 2 043 290 2 418 0 100 000
Size of land 2 043 87 1 251 0 34 379
Number of slaves 2 043 2.47 5.22 0 61
Value of cash 2 043 109 930 0 36 652
Value of credit 2 043 808 6 891 0 200 853
Number of credit transactions 5 931 280 1 226 0 44 950
Value of debt 2 043 929 5 174 0 164 641
Number of debt transactions 5 486 349 2 116 0 110 188
Both lender and borrower 2 043 0.4
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: Full sample: probates; matched sample: probates and genealo-
gies; unmatched sample: probates only.
Due to these problems, scholars of the Cape Colony have turned to slave ownership as a proxy
for wealth (Guelke and Shell, 1983; Fourie, 2013). Slaves were well-documented in the inven-
tories, and more often than not the slave’s name and gender are listed on the inventory. More
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than half of the inventories in the full and matched samples record some slave ownership, while
this declines to 40 percent in the unmatched sample. In households where slaves were present,
the average number of slaves owned was 6.45 in the full sample, 7.05 in the matched sample
and 5.65 in the unmatched sample. Following Armstrong and Worden (1989), I divided the
slave ownership into the following groups: 0 slaves, between 1 and 5 slaves, between 6 and 10
slaves, between 11 and 24 slaves, and more than 24 slaves. Table 2.3 shows the groups and
the proportions of each group found in the various samples. As with the averages in Table
2.1, more individuals in the unmatched sample owned no slaves, and less than 1 percent owned
more than 24 slaves. Of the matched sample, on the other hand, 44 percent owned no slaves
and 2.41 percent owned more than 24 slaves. The results presented throughout this dissertation
are not sensitive to these groupings of slave ownership.
Table 2.3: Slave ownership group – frequency and proportion by samples
Groups
Full sample Matched sample Unmatched sample
Obs. % Obs. % Obs. %
0 Slaves 2 087 50.17 935 44.17 1 152 56.37
Between 1 and 5 slaves 1 312 31.54 715 33.77 597 29.22
Between 6 and 10 slaves 389 9.35 232 10.96 157 7.68
Between 11 and 24 slaves 305 7.33 184 8.69 121 5.92
More than 24 slaves 67 1.61 51 2.41 16 0.78
Total 4160 100.00 2117 100.00 2043 100.00
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: Full sample: probates; matched sample: probates and genealogies;
unmatched sample: probates only.
Across both the assets (land and slaves) as well as the financial measures (debts and credits),
the unmatched sample appears to be poorer than the matched sample. The difference comes
from the discrepancies between the two data sources. The probate series is more likely to
capture individuals without heirs or children, while the genealogical records are more likely to
capture large families. The records that are not matched are the single male individuals at the
Cape, of whom there were many. The unmatched sample is therefore biased toward the poorest
population, while the full sample is biased toward the left tail of the wealth distribution. This
leaves the matched sample with an upward bias within the probate sample, but because the
probate inventories are themselves downwardly biased, the matched sample likely captures the
median individual in terms of wealth at the Cape.
Another measure to verify these biases is suggested by Lindert (1981). He argues that to test
the accuracy of probate inventories is to measure them against tax records. The Cape’s tax
records were known as opgaafrolle were digitised by Hans Heese in the 1970s and used by Fourie
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and Von Fintel (2014) to study settler skills. Table 2.4 shows the comparison between the pro-
bate records and the tax records. Here, I excluded the zero values from the table, because to
be included in the tax census at least some assets had to be accrued. It is clear from Table 2.4
that the matched sample is close to the tax censuses, supporting the claim that the matched
sample is a close approximation of the median settler at the Cape, and represents an accurate
picture of Cape society.
Table 2.4: Slave distribution of samples, and comparison with opgaafrolle
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. 25th percentile Median 75th percentile Max.
Full sample 2 073 6.4 7.7 1 2 4 8 73
Matched sample 1 182 7.0 8.4 1 2 4 9 73
Unmatched sample 891 5.7 6.7 1 1 3 7 61
Opgaafrolle 6 932 7.4 8.4 1 2 4 9 66
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations. Opgaafrolle from Fourie and Von Fin-
tel (2014)
Notes: Full sample: probates; matched sample: probates and genealogies; unmatched sample: pro-
bates only.
The financial measures included in the probate inventories are cash value, credit owed to the
individual and debt owed by the individual. Cash in the inventories did not distinguish be-
tween silver and coins, but mainly consisted of some silver and the coins and notes found on
the estate. The first indication of low reliance on cash is already seen in this poor recording of
cash. Only 1 516 inventories had some cash listed, or 36% of the whole sample – 714 in the
matched sample and 802 in the unmatched sample (see Table 2.1). The low levels of cash can
be attributed to three possible causes:
 the chronic shortages of the Dutch rijksdaalder, the main currency used for transactions,
at the Cape.
 the variety of different currencies that floated at the Cape and needed to be converted to
rijksdaalder before they could be used.
 family members’ ability to easily hide or conceal cash before the inventory was taken.
 the cash found was likely used to settle small debts immediately after death and before
the inventory was taken.
The first two situations have been shown to be accurate and there is ample anecdotal evidence
that chronic cash shortages existed. These low levels of cash can spur more trade to happen on
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credit. In the regression results presented later, I find a very low correlation between cash and
debt, supportive of the notion that credit was a ready alternative for cash at the Cape. Similar
results were found in England, the Low Countries and colonial Massachusetts (Muldrew, 2012;
Gelderblom and Jonker, 2015; Vickers, 2011).
Yet, the third explanation may be of interest as well. In fact, the lack of currency recorded in
probate inventories is not uncommon. Nicoloni and Ramos (2010) found that only 31 percent
of Spanish probate inventories listed cash, lower than the sample found here. They suggest a
new way to correct for this under-recording by imputing the cash values for those not recorded.
I chose not to do this because cash flow and the value of cash to the economy are not the main
focus of this study. In Nicoloni and Ramos’ approach, coins and their values also need to be
separated from silver in the household. At the Cape, this was not always the case. In the
regression analysis, the sample size was not influenced by cash values and was influenced more
by the number of children and age of individuals.
Across all three samples, more than 65 percent of households were involved in credit transac-
tions, with an average of 3 credit/debt transactions per inventory and more than 40 percent
of inventories involved in both borrowing and lending.4 The largest creditor in the inventories
was Pieter Johannes Petrus Serrurier (MOOC 8/33.2), with 256 425 rds owed to him. Given
the average price of a male slave at 345 rds between 1790 and 1793 (Armstrong and Worden,
1989:140), this is equal to 743 male slaves – an extraordinary number. He had mostly large
debts over 500 rds, but most was bonds at an average of 2 000 rds and some even larger at 6
000 rds. Serrurier, a minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, was born at the Cape in 1735,
married once, and had six children, and he died at the age of 84. Besides the large amount
owed to him, he also had cash valued at 7 198 rds and 29 slaves.
The individual who owed the most to others, and whose records could be matched to the ge-
nealogical records, was Johannes Paulus Eksteen (MOOC 8/38.61). He owed 135 755 rds, but
also had 10 300 owed to him, only 60 rds in cash and 73 slaves. He was the father of Hendrik
Oostwald Eksteen (MOOC8/3.93), whom Groenewald (2009) describes as an ‘early modern
entrepreneur’ at the Cape. The unmatched individual with the highest debt, is Thobias Chris-
tiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (MOOC 8/46.28), who owed 164 640 rds. He is discussed in more detail in
4A complication with this high proportion of inventories recorded as both borrowers and lenders means
‘quasi-bankers’ would be difficult to identify.
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Chapter 4.
To place these amounts into context, I compared them to wages. De Zwart (2011), who studied
soldier wages, and Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2012), who studied Company employees, found
wages above subsistence levels for settlers at the Cape. De Zwart (2011) found wage levels at
17.5 grams of silver per day for 1837, while Du Plessis and Du Plessis (2012) found wages of 3.5
grams of silver per day for 1730 and later 5 grams of silver per day for 1790. Taking the 1790
wages and the constant price of 9.61 grams of silver per gulden, the annual wage rate (assuming
300 working days) comes to 156 rds per year. Ro¨nnenkamp is an example of a Company em-
ployee who probably would have earned this salary, yet his debt stood at 500 times this wage
rate at his death. Even if the net position (credit value minus debt value) of Ro¨nnenkamp is
considered, it is 100 times more than this annual wage. This suggests an extraordinary level
of individual debt at the Cape. Despite this, private credit transactions appeared regularly in
most of the inventories. The question this study turns to next is what settlers borrowed for
and whether it was the wealthy or the poor that had the most debt.
The descriptive statistics already pointed to significant use of credit and debt transactions as
a basis for trade in the early Cape Colony. However, it remains to be seen if this borrowing
occurred for consumption purposes, was used most by the wealthy or the poor, and what the
characteristics of borrowers at the Cape were. These are the questions looked at in the following
sections.
2.5 Consumption smoothing or wealth creation: The
motives for debt
From the descriptive statistics provided above, the probate inventories have proven a valuable
source of information on financial interaction between settlers. But as Johannes Fredrik Kirsten
and the later historiography observed, the high volume of transactions recorded was an intoler-
able burden for the settlers. With this new, complete data set on credit and debt transactions,
this assertion could be tested empirically. These results show a robust correlation between
wealth and debt, rather than debt and poverty, and also that debt transactions occurred for
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long-term investment in capital rather than for consumption.
Another claim made by the historical literature is that the Company, church and Orphan Cham-
ber were dominant when it came to the capital markets and lending. This does not, however,
seem to be the case with the complete series of probate inventories. In fact, these three in-
stitutions combined were involved in less than 10% of transactions. Table 2.5 shows who was
involved in debt and credit transactions, sorted by gender or institution.
Table 2.5: Lenders and borrowers at the Cape
Full sample Matched sample Unmatched sample
Lenders Borrowers Lenders Borrowers Lenders Borrowers
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Male 5 834 95.59 4 993 83.79 5 001 95.22 4 374 83.58 4 444 95.92 3 341 83.99
Female 186 3.05 300 5.72 156 2.97 293 5.60 133 2.87 243 6.11
Company 36 0.59 196 3.74 6 0.11 90 1.72 2 0.04 82 2.06
Orphan Chamber 23 0.38 212 4.04 30 0.57 196 3.73 18 0.39 154 3.87
Other 16 0.26 48 0.92 20 0.38 33 0.63 15 0.32 28 0.70
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
This is already an important finding – it shows how the contributions of the Company, church
and Orphan Chamber have been overestimated by historians.5 Also, settlers would likely have
different motivations for borrowing from these institutions versus borrowing from a neighbour.
(I return to this issue with my regression analysis later in the chapter.) To investigate the
purpose of borrowing at the Cape, I closely follow the methodology of Ogilvie et al. (2012), but
adapt the categories for the Cape’s economy. The Cape’s economy relied more on agriculture,
while the Wildberg region was focused on the textile industry. For this reason, I remove build-
ings and cloth from the table, but add categories such as agricultural output, (e.g. bundles of
wheat) and slaves.
The descriptions are divided into three broad categories – consumption, production and mixed.
More than a third of the debt transactions contained some description of what the debt was for.
This is lower than the 45 percent found in Ogilvie et al. (2012), but still a significant portion
and enough to give a good indication of what borrowing was done for. The distribution for
the value of debt between the known and unknown purposes is shown in Figure 2.2. There
is no significant difference between these, and I assumed that the unknown purposes would
not be problematic for the purpose of my analysis. Table 2.6 shows the purpose categories for
5I return to the role of these institutions in Chapter 4.
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borrowing at the Cape.
Figure 2.2: Distributions between known and unknown purposes of debt
The first important observation from Table 2.6 is the small share of debt made for consumption
purposes. This finding challenges the claims by contemporary writers, and later by historians,
that the settlers mostly got into debt because they were poor and needed to borrow to survive.
As Table 2.6 shows, only 20 percent of debt was incurred for consumption (or non-productive
purposes). In fact, the highest proportion of debt incurred for this reason was in the household
expenditure category, which included consumables such as candles, a product that the settlers
often made themselves. It was likely also richer settlers who would buy candles on credit rather
than make them.
The second observation from Table 2.6 is that the debts with the highest average value per
transaction were inheritance debts.6 Under Roman-Dutch law at the Cape, the estate would
be equally divided between the surviving spouse and children. In the context of the probate
inventories, these debts would be inheritance owed to the minors, whose parents often died
before their adulthood. For example, Margaretha Gildenhuijsen owed each of her children 3
763 gulden, or 1 254 rds, for their portion of their father’s estate. At the time of her death,
6These are removed from the analysis below since they were incurred after death and were not made for
economic reasons. However, due to the structure and nature of the data, these debts should be mentioned.
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Table 2.6: Purpose of debt: Frequencies, proportions, and mean nominal values of debt by
samples
Purpose of debt
Full sample Matched sample Unmatched sample
Freq. % Mean Value Freq. % Mean Value Freq. % Mean Value
Child care 31 0.7 137.71 18 0.71 199.94 13 0.7 51.56
Clothing and shoes 31 0.7 35.37 17 0.67 49.15 14 0.75 18.63
Food 193 4.37 55.03 102 4 82.67 91 4.87 25.86
Funeral expenses 383 8.67 52.21 176 6.91 49.49 207 11.07 54.52
Household expenditure 203 4.59 220.94 86 3.38 346.9 117 6.26 124.48
Medical expenses 55 1.24 27.71 25 0.98 36.41 30 1.6 19.66
Wedding expenses 1 0.02 50 1 0.04 50 16 0.86 140.92
Other consumption 26 0.59 149.59 10 0.39 163.45 0 0 0
Consumption total 923 20.89 91.07 435 17.07 122.25 488 26.1 54.45
Land 1 139 25.78 1 206.85 717 28.14 1 334.31 422 22.57 988.9
Land bought with bond 826 18.7 1 398.85 527 20.68 1 557.24 299 15.99 1 120.75
Agricultural output 126 2.85 49.6 79 3.1 49.84 47 2.51 49.19
Cattle 366 8.28 83.75 214 8.4 81.58 152 8.13 86.85
Slaves 87 1.97 785.39 56 2.2 518.72 31 1.66 1241.29
Wages 222 5.02 55.14 121 4.75 57.95 101 5.4 51.71
Working capital 146 3.3 125.86 95 3.73 135.01 51 2.73 108.81
Other production 387 8.76 1 059.88 211 8.28 947.82 176 9.41 1 194.24
Production total 2 473 55.98 480.92 1493 58.59 585.31 980 52.41 605.22
Accounts 108 2.44 273.33 69 2.71 241.11 39 2.09 330.35
Auctions 102 2.31 1434.73 61 2.39 484.71 41 2.19 2883.5
Taxes 12 0.27 225.14 7 0.27 117.86 5 0.27 375.34
Wares 335 7.58 121.33 199 7.81 142.89 136 7.27 89.54
Donations 8 0.18 1 083.34 5 0.2 302.5 3 0.16 2124.44
Inheritance 238 5.39 1 788.12 155 6.08 2 083.46 83 4.44 1 229.87
Other mixed 219 4.96 165.05 124 4.87 111.52 95 5.08 234.92
Mixed total 1022 23.13 727.29 620 24.33 508.67 402 21.5 984.15
Specific purpose given 4 418 34.96 1 374.52 2 548 35.79 1 216.23 1870 33.9 1 643.82
General purpose given 651 5.15 469.71 399 5.6 471.51 252 4.57 466.86
No purpose given 7 567 59.88 289.9 4 172 58.6 332.86 3 395 61.54 237.1
Total 12 636 100 711.38 7 119 100 673.53 5 517 100 782.59
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
three of her children were younger than 16, and only one daughter was married. The Orphan
Chamber would have been in charge of the estate until these children came of age, when these
inheritance debts would be paid to them. Adult heirs could also not be resident within the
Colony, which forced the Orphan Chamber to take charge of the assets. Because seafaring was
dangerous, many of the individuals who traveled to the Cape from Western Europe would have
been young, unmarried men, or men who came without their families and once settled, brought
their families from Europe. For example, one inventory shows the case of the brothers Dirk and
Hendrik Olivier (MOOC 8/4.99), who died without any children7 and the heirs to the estate
were absent at the time. In these cases, the estate would be managed by the Orphan Chamber
until the heirs could be located.
Yet, although these inheritance debts were on average the largest, only 238 of them are recorded.
They are far outnumbered by land debts, with 1 139 transactions and an average value of
7This is according to the genealogical records.
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1 206,8 rds. Within these, 826 bonds were used for purchasing land, with an average value of
1 398 rds. These bonds were securitised loan contracts, witnessed by a third-party individual
and recorded by an official. Almost all bonds were used for land, although a few instances were
used for acquiring slaves or other agricultural goods.8 There are four types of bonds in the
inventory series: mortgage bonds (schepenkennisse), notarial bonds (notarieel obligaties), sec-
retarial bonds (secretrieel obligaties), and private bonds (onderhandsche obligaties). The bonds
offer the most information on interest rates, which clustered between four and six percent. Hoff-
man et al. (2000:44) found similar levels and clustering in France for the seventeenth century.
They conclude that this ceiling on interest rates led to a rationing of credit. The limited data
here presents a hurdle if one were to try to determine whether similar rationing happened at
the Cape, and more systematic information would be required to make the conclusion. How
much these interest rates were adhered to should also be investigated.
The bond market offers a perfect illustration of the way settlers at the Cape adopted the Dutch
credit institutions. By 1620, the bond market in Amsterdam was completely market-based, or
driven by personal contact between creditors and borrowers (Gelderblom et al., 2016). This
meant that individuals could buy and sell bonds such as schepenkennis and obligaties, as long
as they had some form of collateral – often shops or a general mortgage on all the individual’s
possessions. The same was true at the Cape: credit transactions were market-driven and per-
sonalised; most were unique in terms of creditors, debtors and amounts with most owners of
bonds having it as both a debt and a credit. For example, Jacob Minnaar (MOOC8/24.56)
had three bonds as credits in his inventory, with three different individuals, but he also had
two other bonds as debts committed to two other individuals. The biggest difference between
the Cape’s bond market and the Amsterdam market was the form of collateral. At the Cape
this was mainly farm land and sometimes slaves, not shops or general mortgage on personal
possessions like in Amsterdam.
The bonds were generally larger loans and contained information on the interest rate at the
Cape. The average size of a loan with a bond was 1 024.14 rds, while the average for all the
other loans was 314.17 rds. In Western Europe, bonds and debt were correlated with private
wealth, including real estate and merchandise (Gelderblom et al., 2016). This was the case at
the Cape as well: richer individuals were more likely to have the capital needed to secure the
bond. As Figure 2.3 shows the number of bonds relative to the number of slaves. There were
8These were recorded in their appropriate categories.
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more bonds in inventories with more slaves.
Figure 2.3: Relationship between the number of bonds and slaves owned
If land ownership was important for the type of transactions in the credit market, were land
and bonds also the most important determinants for an individual’s overall level of debt? Next,
I look at the characteristics of the individuals in the matched sample, that is 2 117 probate
inventories. Other empirical studies, including Ogilvie et al. (2012), found some demographic
characteristics as important predictors of debt, like the age and gender of the individual. These
assumptions and theories are tested for the Cape using a Tobit regression model used (because
of the left truncation of the distribution). The left truncation is due to no negative debt val-
ues being observed. To investigate the relationship between debt and wealth, I ran the Tobit
regression with controls for demographic variables, wealth variables, and decade controls, but
also controlled for price changes by looking at the real levels of debt. This is shown in Panel A
of Table 2.7. In Panel B of Table 2.8, I ran an OLS regression with a wealth index. The wealth
index was generated from the value of cash, the number of farms, slaves, sheep, cattle and
horses.9 The index values were then divided into percentiles to make the interpretation similar
to that of Panel A. With this OLS regression, I continued to control for the demographic and
9The results are robust whether the value of cash is included or excluded here.
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decade controls.
The first observation from Table 2.7 is the non-significance of the demographic variables, with
only females borrowing significantly more using the real values of debt. Previous research has
shown that widows at the Cape used their inheritance from estates to improve both their fi-
nancial position and social status.10 Also, the farmer dummy is insignificant throughout, not
supporting previous hypotheses that the farmers at the Cape were highly indebted and had
the most debt by occupation. Other occupations included in the regression included doctors,
Company employees, and soldiers.
To further investigate impact of demographics on debt, the transactions were divided into vari-
ous sizes: small, medium and large loans. Small loans included any debt transactions worth less
than 100 rds, medium loans were between 100 and 300 rds and large loans included transactions
of more than 300 rds. These were correlated to the 25th percentile and 75th percentile of the
full sample. Armstrong and Worden (1989:140) found the price of a male slave to be between
195 rds and 345 rds in the late eighteenth century at the Cape, which correlates to these values
as well — a medium loan would equal the value of a male slave. Figure 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show
the proportion of each debt size by age group and occupation.
Both these figures show no significant difference between the various groups. Older individuals
had similar debt patterns as younger individuals, supporting the assumption that there is little
age bias in the sample. Occupation does matter to some extent: sailors have more small debts
than the other occupations, but this is to be expected. Sailors were only at the Cape for short
periods. Physicians, on the other hand had lots of large debts, likely due to the fact that they
were wealthy and trusted individuals.
But when the same transactions are clustered according to slave ownership group (Figure 2.6),
a pattern emerges. The individuals with no slaves had significantly more small debts than
individuals with more than 24 slaves. The individuals with more slaves tended to have more
large debts. This suggests that capital was a signal of riskiness for creditors, especially the
number of slaves given their relative importance to farms and other assets. The regressions
also support this hypothesis. Slave ownership seems to be the only significant characteristic to
determine debt, even when controlling for other production inputs. It is now important to note
10Young males also married these widows to improve their social standing (Von Fintel et al., 2013).
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Table 2.7: Tobit and OLS model of determinants of settlers’ borrowing at the Cape
Panel A: Tobit regression results
Dependent variable: Value of individual debt in rijksdaalders
Nominal values, 1673—1834 Inflation-adjusted values, 1699—1793
Age -0.005 -0.000
(-1.310) (-0.050)
Male -0.233 -0.474*
(-0.799) (-1.884)
Spouse also listed on inventory -0.041 -0.122
(-0.088) (-0.384)
Number of children -0.007 0.012
(-0.365) (0.478)
Farmers 0.199 -0.242
(0.945) (-1.134)
Number of slaves 0.087*** 0.081***
(5.852) (5.947)
Number of properties 0.193*** 0.045
(5.225) (0.516)
Cash in inventory 0.0001** 0.0001
(2.380) (0.219)
Bonds present in inventory 1.072*** 1.310**
(2.642) (2.522)
Both borrower and lender -0.273* -0.110
(-1.925) (-0.512)
VOC 0.271 0.341
(0.728) (0.966)
Church 0.679** 0.628*
(2.310) (1.956)
Orphan Chamber 1.253*** 0.818***
(5.452) (3.300)
Constant 6.209*** 1.100***
(8.195) (17.934)
Decade controls YES YES
N 570 178
Pseudo R2 0.1102 0.1356
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of debt recorded in the inventory (i.e. the total value of loans for the inventory) in
log-linear terms, but excludes inheritance debts since these were not made for economic reasons. Age was calculated using the
birth and death dates of individuals found in the genealogies; Male is a dummy variable for gender and equals 1 for males; the
spouse listed on the inventory equals 1 when both spouses are recorded on the inventory and 0 if it is only an individual. The
number of children is recorded from the genealogical records; Farmer is a dummy for when the individual has an occupation
recorded as ‘farmer’. VOC, Church and Orphan Chamber are dummy variables for if the person ever borrowed from these
institutions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The decrease in observations from the 4,160 probate inventories to
570 is mainly due to the missing information in the genealogical records for the early period, especially missing ages from
under-reporting of birth dates.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
the difference between this result and the results in Price (1991) and Dennison (2011). Price
(1991) showed how large slave plantations had much debt, similar to the result I found for the
Cape Colony. Price then quickly moves to the acquisition of slaves on credit. There is evidence
that slaves were bought on credit at the Cape as well, but Table 2.6 shows only two percent
of debt transactions concerned the purchasing of slaves. In this study, slaves are taken as an
indication of wealth. Dennison (2011), on the other hand, focused on serfs11 and their access
to credit. The focus here is on most of the free population, including freed slaves, but not the
debt of slaves itself.
11The serfs of Dennison’s work were farm labourers tied to their lord’s estate by the feudal system in Russia.
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Table 2.8: Tobit and OLS model of determinants of settlers’ borrowing at the Cape
Panel B: OLS regression results
Dependent variable: Value of individual debt in rijksdaalders
Nominal values, 1673—1834 Inflation-adjusted values, 1699—1793
Age 0.0066 0.0084
(0.0057) (0.0067)
Male 0.2970 -0.1777
(0.3298) (0.3247)
Spouse also listed on inventory -0.3616 0.2024
(0.4081) (0.4578)
Number of children -0.0446* -0.0262
(0.0243) (0.0310)
Farmers 0.002 -0.0787
(0.2965) (0.3178)
Percentile of wealth index 0.0185*** 0.0127***
(0.0039) (0.0046)
Bonds present in inventory 0.0756** 0.0650**
(0.0294) (0.0301)
Both borrower and lender 0.1358 0.1226
(0.1976) (0.2499)
VOC 0.1269 -0.0656
(0.3437) (0.3215)
Church 0.3994 0.4353
(0.4030) (0.04308)
Orphan Chamber 1.2203*** 0.7787***
(0.2776) (0.2907)
Constant 4.6886*** 6.597***
(0.8618) (0.7138)
Decade controls YES YES
N 251 174
R2 0.2991 0.2271
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: The dependent variable is the level of debt recorded in the inventory (i.e. the total value of loans for the inventory) in
log-linear terms, but excludes inheritance debts since these were not made for economic reasons. Age was calculated using the
birth and death dates of individuals found in the genealogies; Male is a dummy variable for gender and equals 1 for males; the
spouse listed on the inventory equals 1 when both spouses are recorded on the inventory and 0 if it is only an individual. The
number of children is recorded from the genealogical records; Farmer is a dummy for when the individual has an occupation
recorded as ‘farmer’. VOC, Church and Orphan Chamber are dummy variables for if the person ever borrowed from these
institutions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The decrease in observations from the 4,160 probate inventories to
570 is mainly due to the missing information in the genealogical records for the early period, especially missing ages from
under-reporting of birth dates.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
This also disputes the existing historiography on slaves and debt at the Cape. Robertson
(1945c:171) wrote ‘[a]nother reason the coming of the slaves was not an unmixed blessing was
that the purchase of slaves added to the freeman’s debt’. But Table 2.6 shows only 87 pur-
chases of slaves on credit. At the Cape, slaves were an important capital investment and asset,
like Guelke and Shell (1983) stated. It was also these assets that creditors relied on to gauge
a debtor’s riskiness, which explains the strong correlation between slave ownership and debt
shown here.
Table 2.7 also shows that the number of farms listed on the inventory are positively associated
with debt, but the significance disappears when real values of debt are used. Cash only has
a marginal effect on debt, but also loses significance with real values. The number of slaves
remains significant regardless of other controls, suggesting, like Guelke and Shell (1983), that
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Figure 2.4: Proportion of debt size by age group
slaves were an important indicator of wealth at the Cape and thus a more accurate means of
estimating wealth than farm land. This strong correlation between wealth and debt relates well
to literature on private credit markets of Western Europe, especially the Dutch, British, and
French cases where assets were important correlates of debt (Thoen and Soens, 2009).
To do a robustness check on this finding, I created a wealth index by including farm land, the
number of slaves, sheep, cattle, horses and cash value.12 I then divided the population into
percentiles for interpretation with the natural logarithm of debt. These regression results are
shown in Table 2.8 Panel B. The positive effect of wealth is clearly seen in the positive and
significant coefficient on the percentile of the wealth index. This result suggests that a one
percent increase in wealth is correlated with a 1.85 percent increase in nominal debt, while it
is associated with a 1.27 percent increase in real debt.
The results reported above do not support the suggestion that high debt levels were a result of
poverty, but rather suggest that they were used to invest in land and long-term capital. The
results also do not support the suggestion that farmers at the Cape were the most indebted
of all occupations, but it does suggest wealth (often measured by the number of slaves owned)
12The results are robust whether I include or exclude the cash in the inventory.
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of debt size by occupation
was an important determinant for debt. The same holds for other regions, like Western Europe
and the early colonies in America – it was the individuals with the most assets who had the
most debt. This supports the claim that debt was used for wealth generation rather than for
consumption smoothing.
If slaves were associated with wealth and larger debts, it was the wealthy individuals with
access to capital and slaves who would have had more debt. Settlers without slaves lacked the
capital to invest in large, long-term debts to improve productive capacity and purchase land.
The wealthiest settlers, those with more than 24 slaves, dominated the market in terms of the
size of their debt. They had the most debt (Figure 2.7), both in levels and spread, but also
extended more credit to others (Figure 2.8).
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Figure 2.6: Proportion of debt size by slave ownership
Figure 2.7: Proportion of debt size by slave group
45
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 2.8: Proportion of debt size by slave ownership
This raises the question: were the poor excluded from the market? The probate inventories do
not support this hypothesis, but they do suggest that the poor used the market for different
reasons. Figure 2.9 shows the debt sizes by slave ownership group. More than 60 percent of the
individuals with no slaves had at least some debt; of these 40 percent had debt below 100 rds
and some even had more than 500 rds of debt. The proportion of individuals with debt of more
than 500 rds increases to 60 percent for the groups with more than 24 slaves. This suggests the
poor were not systematically excluded from the private credit market at the Cape.
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Figure 2.9: Proportions of debt sizes by slave ownership
There are some explantions for a zero debt value, especially in the higher groups: the debt
might not have been recorded, the individual might have chosen not to transact on debt, or
they might have repaid all their obligations before their death. Unfortunately, there is no way
to determine which of these carries the largest weight, or to correct for this measurement error.
But there is also no evidence that this would have influenced the overall trend and conclusions
from these results.
The market continued to grow throughout the century. Figure 2.10 shows the total size of the
private credit market observed in the probate inventories for the period. There was little finan-
cial innovation at the Cape for much of the eighteenth century. The only financial innovation
was the invention of the slagtersbriefjes by the Van Reenen brothers (Havemann and Fourie,
2014), to whom Johannes Fredrik Kirsten’s brother owed a substantial amount. They describe
the slagtersbriefjes as uncollateralised loans and promissory notes. A vast number of these
loans, together with macro-economic and foreign conditions, led to a financial crisis between
1788 and 1793. The inventories, however, show less than ten of these promissory notes. What
is more, the private credit market emerged intact after the crisis, with the market continuing
well into the nineteenth century.
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Figure 2.10: Size of private credit market over eighteenth century, with en of crisis period
These results offer new insights into the Cape’s private credit market: the market was not
dominated by the three main institutions, the settlers borrowed for long-term investment in
land; and debt was correlated with wealth and not poverty. Although the high level of debt
at the Cape has been described by historians before, this chapter offered a different perspective.
2.6 Conclusion: The consequences of the private credit
market and further research questions
This chapter set out to use the wealth of information contained in the inventories to describe
what the private credit market at the Cape looked like. A strong and robust correlation with
wealth was established. It also found that large institutions like the Company, the Orphan
Chamber and the church did not play a dominant role in these transactions, but that settlers
traded much more with each other on credit. Farmers were also not the most indebted group,
and wealth was the best determinant of credit. Most debt transactions happened for long-term
investment in land, and not for survival and consumption.
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These contributions support new evidence by Fourie (2013), De Zwart (2011), Du Plessis and
Du Plessis (2012), and Fourie and Van Zanden (2013), that the Cape was far from the poor
colony described in previous historical literature. The private credit market helped to provide
settlers with loans to invest in long-term capital, and debt was incurred to purchase land rather
than for consumption items. The settlers used assets, especially slaves, to indicate riskiness.
The wealthy colonial settlers had the most debt, rather than the poor settlers as often described
by contemporary commentators and historians. A causal link between debt and wealth, though,
remains hidden.
Questions on the functioning of the market also remain. Despite the absence of a causal link,
was wealth transferred over generations, and what happened to debt? What was the role of
networks, and did wealth influence your position in the network? Did certain background char-
acteristics determine with whom one traded on credit? And finally, what was the role property
rights played in determining debt? The subsequent chapters will explore these issues.
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Chapter 3
‘Favoured children’: Intergenerational
wealth and debt in the
eighteenth-century Cape Colony
3.1 Introduction
‘Favoured children of respected colonists probably passed unobtrusively into the ranks of colo-
nial society,’ is what Penn (1999:94) wrote about children of European settlers and free black
or Khoikhoi women. But the children of mixed-race relations were not the only ones who were
able to use their family name or family connections to improve their socioeconomic status. Jo-
hannes Fredrik Kirsten used his father’s connections to embark on various investments (Muller,
1960). The Van Reenen brothers owed a debt to their father for their success (Havemann and
Fourie, 2014). Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen’s children all married into wealthy families (Groe-
newald, 2009). And Mitchell (2008) describes how Maria Vosloo’s children took part in the
local economy and made good marriages. The Cape’s history is littered with examples of how,
wealthy families in particular, experienced social mobility in the early period.
The transference of income and wealth across generations has long been subject to scrutiny by
economists and sociologists. This is mainly due to concerns about its effect on inequality. Solon
(1999), however, showed that these concerns were often raised without empirical evidence and
that actual mobility is much lower than expected. More recent literature on intergenerational
mobility has turned to the historical origins of mobility in developed countries. This interest
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in developed countries is two-fold: it aids our understanding of the roots of development, and
these countries can be conveniently studied due to the ready availability of large data sets
(Cilliers and Fourie, 2016).1 More recently, Piketty (2014:85) suggests that wealth inequality
is much higher, especially in developed countries, due to the lack of social mobility. He writes:
‘...growth can thus increase social mobility for individuals whose parents did not belong to the
elite of the previous generation... but in theory it does limit the reproduction and amplification
of inequalities of wealth.’
Historically speaking, intergenerational mobility, both positive and negative, has been measured
in various ways. Occupations between fathers and sons have been linked (Clark and Hamilton,
2006; Bogberg-Fazlic et al., 2011; Dribe and Svensson, 2008). Titles and the land ownership
that comes with them have also been the subject of the study of intergenerational economic
effects (Ergene and Berker, 2009; Campbell and Lee, 2003). These studies used indirect proxies
or measures for wealth. A more direct method is to use probate estate records, as done by Clark
and Cummins (2014) and Arrondel and Grange (2006). Both these studies found a positive
and significant persistence in wealth for England and France during the nineteenth century.
In a study comparing mobility between the US and England, Long and Ferrie (2013) found
American mobility was much higher, but this difference disappeared in the twentieth century.
Bleakley and Ferrie (2016) found little influence on financial resources in the human capital
development of successive generations. Feigenbaum (2015) found that the negative shock on
income from the Great Depression lowered intergenerational mobility.
Despite the existence of extensive literature on mobility, these studies are not without limi-
tations. For example, Clark and Cummins (2014) only focus on rare surnames in matching
probate records over centuries. Long and Ferrie (2013) have been criticised for not accounting
for structural change in the economy (Hout and Guest, 2013), or for the low mobility among
farmers (Xie and Killewald, 2013). To find information on both a father and a son’s wealth,
matching is often required across multiple historical sources, and match rates are often low (20
percent for Long and Ferrie (2013) and 26 percent for Abramitzky et al. (2013)). Problems also
arise when comparisons are made across countries and historical periods (Van Leeuwen and
Maas, 2010). This has spurred new research into how to correct for this measurement error in
historical sources (Olivetti and Paserman, 2015).
1Cilliers and Fourie (2016) offer a perspective on intergenerational occupational mobility in South Africa
after the discovery of diamonds and gold, and the industrial take-off in the late nineteenth century.
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This chapter aims to add to the debate on mobility in pre-industrial societies. Fourie and
Von Fintel (2010) showed how inequality at the Cape was high and persistent even within the
European settler community. They attribute this inequality to the ‘landed gentry’ and the rise
thereof. I measure the wealth mobility between fathers and their children (sons and daughters)
using three measures of wealth: land ownership, slave ownership, and debt. Across all of the
measures, the Cape’s settlers experienced significant mobility in their wealth. The settlers were
able to obtain equal, and even higher levels of land ownership, slave ownership, and debt levels
than their fathers.
3.2 Wealth measures at the Cape: What settlers consid-
ered important
There are two important wealth measures used in Cape historiography: land ownership and
slaves. Land ownership has been linked to the gentry of the Cape (Guelke and Shell, 1983;
Williams, 2013; Groenewald 2009). Many of these wealthy farmers would have been what
Mentzel (1925) described as landlords, either absent or resident on their respective farms.
Dooling (2005:161) focuses on many of the gentry’s farms and follows the profitability of these
farms over time. He concludes that the ‘stability of landed and slave wealth thus attained
meant slave-owners could increase agrarian output successfully as well as their slave-holdings
year after year.’
Another case which illustrates the importance of land ownership for settlers at the Cape, is
shown in Willem Adriaan Van Der Stel’s term as governor at the Cape, and the revolt he
faced after he abused his power to acquire land. During his father Simon’s term, the colony
expanded outward. Willem Adriaan owned vast amounts of productive land, notably his farm
Vergelegen, and at some point had the largest land-holdings at the Cape. Land ownership by
Company employees was prohibited by Company regulations, and spurred the free settlers of
the Cape to write to the Heren XVII. Despite many attempts to quell the settlers’ objections,
like arresting the burghers’ leaders Adam Tas and Hendrik Hu¨ssing, to keep the productive
parts of the colony for himself, Willem Adriaan’s term ended with his reputation in tatters. He
left the Cape for Amsterdam with his brother in 1708 (De Villiers, 2012). This illustrates how
the settlers were willing to fight for their rights to use and own land, and not have to compete
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unfairly with Company employees.
The Van Der Stel family legacy also included expansion into viticulture (De Villiers, 2012). This
expansion toward the mountainous regions of the Cape and the prohibition from the Company
to enslave the local population, encouraged the importation of slaves (Fourie and Von Fintel,
2014). The slaves arriving at the Cape mostly came from the East Indies, including modern-day
India, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where the Dutch had settlements, but also from Madagascar
and Mozambique (Baten and Fourie, 2015). They were sold from the slave lodge in Cape Town
and worked predominantly on farms. The average number of slaves owned by one household
was five in the early eighteenth century (Fourie, 2013). Despite this, many small-scale farmers
failed to catch up to the large slave-holdings of the more aﬄuent farmers (Du Plessis et al.,
2015). The accuracy with which slaves were captured in the probate inventories and other
sources indicates the value these slaves held for their owners. Another measure of their worth
for their owners is the vigorous way with which slave owners set out to find runaway slaves.
Penn (2005:94) writes of how the Company called on settlers to ‘send out a man everyday to
look for runaways,’ and the harsh punishment bestowed on these runaway slaves. The economic
benefit of these slaves should not be underestimated. Fourie and Van Zanden (2013) showed
that the GDP per capita for the economy of the Cape, based on this slave labour, was on par
with other European countries and American colonies for the eighteenth century.
The frontier farmers were not as wealthy as their counterparts in the southwestern region of
the Colony, where most land ownership was in freehold (Guelke, 1989). Many of these farmers
on the frontier were forced to take up loan farms on the expanding frontier after the freehold
system closed in 1717.2 The loan farms had lower values than the freehold farms. These farmers
relied on stock farming more than viticulture, and under this system the colony expanded east-
ward as far as the Kei River. This is where they met the isiXhosa-speaking population, which
halted their expansion, towards the end of the eighteenth century (Fourie and Van Zanden,
2013). Although the settlers on the frontier have traditionally been described as less profitable
than their freehold counterparts, Neumark (1956:45) suggests the turning point for loan farms
to become successful was in the 1740s with the first boom in the meat market.
I add another measure for wealth – debt. The preceding chapter showed how debt was strongly
correlated with wealth, robust even to price changes over the century. This is in line with the
international literature, which claims that private credit transactions and wealth (rather than
2Chapter 6 looks at freehold and loan farms in detail.
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poverty) went hand-in-hand in pre-industrial societies. To my knowledge, there has not been
an attempt to test the effect of debt over generations. More contemporary studies have found
evidence that financial transfers over generations are important. Charles and Hurst (2002), for
example, show that children in the United States tended to save and invest in the same patterns
as their parents.
There is also evidence in the Cape’s probate inventories that children borrowed from their par-
ents, either biological or in-law. For example, Marthinus Oosthuijsen (MOOC8/23.3) owed his
biological father 100 rds when he died in 1800, while Simon Faesen (MOOC8/3.83) owed his
father-in-law, Claas Laubster, 400 rds. Even a known member of the gentry, Hendrik Oost-
wald Eksteen (MOOC8/3.93), owed his father-in-law, Jan Meijnderts Kruijwagen, the sizeable
amount of 13 500 rds at the time of his death in 1718.
Recent historical scholarship on families at the Cape has shown the importance of intergener-
ational wealth. Hall (1994) showed how women, especially widows, were central to preserving
wealth, while Newton-King (1994) found that even in the frontier community, consolidation of
wealth over generations was important. Dooling (2005) contributes to the debate by showing
how marriage was a way to accumulate wealth and that, again, women were important in this
context. These studies all describe, using historical evidence, that intergenerational wealth was
an important aspect of Cape economic life. This study attempts to provide more quantitative
evidence of such intergenerational wealth transfers.
Before I continue, a note here on the system of inheritance at the Cape. A system of partible
inheritance was observed, which meant that the widow/widower of an estate received half of
the inheritance, and the rest was divided equally among sons and daughters. Although some
evidence exists that sons were inevitably favoured in the division of estates, I focus on both sons
and daughters and their fathers’ wealth in the regressions below. Although ideally mothers and
their wealth should also be added to the analysis, the matching of mothers to their respective
children in the genealogical records is problematic and remains open for future research.
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3.3 Wealth of fathers and children
There are two methodologies for measuring intergenerational wealth mobility. The first is to
use discrete measures of wealth, like the slave ownership groups used in Chapter 2. For discrete
measures of wealth, hierarchically ordered classes are needed. One concern with the latter ap-
proach is the interpretation of the results. For example, would it be the same effect moving from
owning zero slaves to owning 1–5 slaves than moving from owning 11–24 slaves to owning more
than 24 slaves? This movement is usually not linear, and for this reason, I chose to use the con-
tinual approach. With this, the correlations between the first and successive generation ranges
between 0 and 1 and can be interpreted as elasticities. Studies on intergenerational earnings
have found elasticities between 0.3 and 0.4 (Long and Ferrie, 2013; Clark and Cummins, 2014).
The continual approach is especially applicable to debt, a new measurement used in this chapter.
Historical studies to measure intergenerational wealth mobility have been limited by the amount
of information available for calculating income and wealth. This has led to many innovative
ways of either matching different sources to each other, like using rare surnames, or ways of
measuring wealth, like linking occupations to wages. The Cape is no different. The most influ-
ential source on families at the Cape is the genealogical records. These records trace families
by paternal lineage back to the seventeenth century, and have been used in many historical
and demographic studies. The information in the genealogies allows for calculations of age,
fertility, marriage patterns, migration and occupations, but also the links between successive
generations (Cilliers, 2016). Unfortunately, they contain limited information on wealth.
The probate inventories, on the other hand, contain rich information on the Cape settlers’
wealth. These inventories listed all the assets and debt of settlers at the time of their death.
Although they contain some information on children in the household, this was not sufficient to
apply to an intergenerational study. The matched records from both these sources do, however,
have enough information on both generations and the wealth of each to test the intergenera-
tional wealth mobility at the Cape in the eighteenth century. Appendix A provides information
on the matching process.
I use the same matched records (see Chapter 2 for details) to identify the fathers in the ge-
nealogical records. This left me with 282 pairs of fathers and children in the analysis. To use
the continual approach and to estimate the growth from the first generation’s wealth to the
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next, I used the log-linear terms of my wealth estimates. The estimation specifications are as
follows:
Yi,t = α + βYi,t−1 + Number of siblings + εit
Yi,t is the natural logarithm of the child’s wealth measures (land-holdings, slaves, and debt),
while Yi,t−1 is the father’s corresponding values for these wealth measures, also in logarithmic
terms.3 Before I measured these separately, I estimated the effect between the father’s and
the children’s wealth indices. The wealth index was created in the same way as in Chapter 2,
except that debt was also included in the index, and not used as the dependent variable. β is
usually interpreted as intergenerational persistence in society, while its complement 1−β is in-
tergenerational mobility. β is also referred to as the intergenerational elasticity of wealth. This
means the coefficients of between 0.3 and 0.4 found in Long and Ferrie (2013) and Olivetti and
Paserman (2015) indicate high mobility, but low persistence of wealth in the US. The number of
siblings was added as a control to the regressions, because of the system of partible inheritance
at the Cape mentioned before. The number of siblings is expected to have a negative effect
on intergenerational wealth transfers, since the portion of the estate which each child receives
would be smaller.
I ran six specifications for the wealth indices. The first was the simplest form, i.e. the child’s
wealth regressed on the father’s wealth with a control for household size. In the second and
third specifications, I added controls for the gender of the child and decade controls. Most
studies on the Cape’s intergenerational wealth have placed an emphasis on the large role of
slave and land ownership. To control for this, in the fourth specification I only looked at fam-
ilies where at least one slave or one farm is owned, and in the fifth specification both these
assets must be present. Finally, I interacted the gender of the child with the wealth index to
see if different partial effects are present for daughters and sons. Before I present the regression
results, some descriptive statistics on the father and child pairs.
Across all the wealth measurements, the children’s mean value is lower than the fathers’. This
was expected due to the the partible inheritance system. The average number of siblings, or
household size, of these families is much higher than that of the entire matched sample. This
is one explanation for the lower mean values of wealth in the children’s inventories. There are
3I replaced zero values with 1×10e−10 for positive logarithm values. The results are robust, even if I removed
the zero values.
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics: Father/child pairs used in regression analysis to match
sample
Children’s Wealth Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of farms 282 1.52 1.96 0 10
Number of slaves 282 5.21 7.47 0 44
Debt value 282 1174.54 3125.54 0 22 384.25
Number of siblings 160 6.11 3.97 1 23
Gender (1 = Male) 160 0.64 0.48 0 1
Fathers’s Wealth Variables
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Father’s number of farms 282 1.59 1.67 0 10
Father’s number of slaves 282 6.31 7.89 0 43
Father’s debt value 282 1301.45 3362.15 0 25 969
Matched Variables Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Number of farms 2 112 1.22 1.97 0 10
Number of slaves 2 112 3.93 7.17 0 73
Value of debt 2 112 1 475.03 6 043.54 0 135 755
Number of siblings 1 021 4.93 3.76 1 23
Gender (1 = Male) 2 108 0.68 0.47 0 1
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: The number of siblings is the same as the father’s total number of
children. I do not distinguish between children from different mothers.
also fewer women in this sample than in the matched sample. These descriptive statistics are
shown in Table 3.1.
These statistics do not shed light on the significance of these variables from one generation to
the next. This is the question I turn to next. Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 show the regression
results for father and child’s wealth measurements with the various controls. Wealth measured
through the wealth index was consistently positive and significant across the various specifica-
tions. The coefficients ranged between 0.15 in specification 1 and 0.226 in specification 5. This
suggests a high mobility and low persistence in wealth at the Cape (between 77.3 percent and
85 percent of a child’s wealth is not inherited from their father). The mobility effect was lowest
in specification 5, where the focus was on the father and child pairs with at least one slave and
one farm, i.e. the wealthiest. This suggests that, although the wealthy still experienced high
mobility, most mobility at the Cape was experienced by the poor.
These results hold even with controls for the father’s household size. The system of partible
inheritance would have meant that children in larger families inherited less. However, the
household size of the father was positively correlated with the child’s wealth. This suggests
larger families were wealthier in successive generations. Cilliers (2016:44) also found that larger
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families were wealthier at the Cape.
The gender control and interaction effect between gender and wealth was not significant in any
of the specifications, and the interaction effect was excluded from the regressions in Table 3.3.
This suggests that neither sons nor daughters had a partial effect over the other when wealth
mobility is considered. This is more support for Dooling (2005) and Du Plessis et al. (2015),
who found that rather than males being the dominant economic players at the Cape, both
genders could achieve economic stability.
Table 3.2: Regression results of intergenerational persistence in wealth
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5 Specification 6
Wealth index of father 0.150* 0.152** 0.156** 0.258*** 0.226*** 0.195*
(1.966) (1.995) (2.035) (3.275) (2.722) (1.779)
Father’s household size 0.975* 0.932 1.162** 0.919* 0.564 1.205**
(1.692) (1.607) (2.061) (1.666) (0.900) (2.106)
Male 3.411 2.744 1.565 4.599 6.407 8.236
(0.765) (0.634) (0.357) (0.894) (0.752)
Male × wealth index -0.074
(-0.499)
Constant 38.902*** 37.206*** 20.848*** 21.527*** 37.123*** 18.803**
(7.439) (6.541) (2.677) (2.837) (3.301) (2.132)
Decade controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.038 0.036 0.128 0.209 0.167 0.123
N 141 141 136 108 65 136
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: T-statistics in brackets.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
This already suggests that the Cape experienced high mobility throughout the eighteenth cen-
tury. But it is also important to consider the different wealth indices (land, slaves and debt)
separately. This is done in Table 3.3.
For the number of farms, the coefficient started at 0.227 and increased to 0.319 for the final
specification. This means between 22.7 percent in the first specification and 31.9 percent in the
third specification of the child’s wealth was from the father, while between 77.3 percent and
68.1 percent of the child’s wealth came from his/her own generation. One possible explana-
tion for this very high mobility in land-holdings is the open frontier during this period. The
official boundary of the colony expanded throughout the century. Figure 1.1 (page 12) shows
the Cape’s official boundaries in 1682, 1705, 1731, and 1795. However, many settlers settled
outside of this official boundary under the loan farm system (Neumark, 1956:17).4 There is
also qualitative evidence of this. De Kock (1924:19) writes: ‘Many of the younger colonists,
4Chapter 6 looks at the differentiation between freehold and loan farms in more detail.
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Table 3.3: Regression results of intergenerational persistence in different assets
Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 3 Specification 4 Specification 5
Log of father’s number of properties 0.227** 0.232** 0.228** 0.228** 0.319***
(2.346) (2.375) (2.376) (2.376) (2.902)
Father’s household size 0.006 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.009
(0.451) (0.451) (0.290) (0.290) (-0.531)
Male -0.055 -0.096 -0.096 -0.099
(-0.449) (-0.790) (-0.790) (-0.727)
Decade controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.270** 0.303** -0.117 -0.117 -0.188
(2.468) (2.286) (-0.467) (-0.467) (-0.561)
R-squared 0.035 0.028 0.133 0.133 0.205
N 113 113 108 108 75
Log of father’s slaves 0.179*** 0.180*** 0.132** 0.109* 0.018**
(2.974) (2.997) (2.229) (1.911) (2.122)
Father’s household size -0.142 -0.142 0.013 0.003 0.002
(-0.794) (-0.792) (0.074) (0.018) (0.088)
Male -1.362 -0.130 -1.685 0.173
(-0.920) (-0.089) (-1.192) (0.877)
Decade controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant -7.545*** -6.640*** -5.553* -3.431 1.127**
(-5.461) (-4.180) (-1.742) (-1.231) (2.331)
R-squared 0.027 0.029 0.110 0.222 0.029
N 282 281 275 202 104
Log of father’s debt 0.201** 0.199** 0.191** 0.183* 0.219
(2.500) (2.460) (2.388) (1.961) (1.551)
Father’s household size 0.046 0.046 0.059 0.073* 0.048
(1.270) (1.280) (1.608) (1.718) (0.750)
Male -0.110 -0.127 -0.252 -0.348
(-0.368) (-0.417) (-0.693) (-0.690)
Decade controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Constant 4.150*** 4.230*** 3.952*** 3.990*** 4.498***
(7.571) (7.157) (3.627) (3.455) (3.389)
R-squared 0.036 0.030 0.051 0.077 0.011
N 152 152 149 111 56
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: Zero asset values are replaced with 0.000000001 to find the natural logarithmic term. The results are
robust whether these are included or excluded. T-statistics in brackets.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
mainly the sons of established farmers, and to a smaller extent, the newly discharged servants
of the Company. . . resolved to cross the mountain ranges and settle on the inland plains.’ This
meant a new generation could easily move to a new area in the Colony and settle farms there,
explaining this high mobility in the Cape’s land-holdings.
The significant and high levels of mobility are also counter-indicative to many complaints against
the system of inheritance at the Cape. The system of partible inheritance ensured equal divi-
sion of the estates between the surviving spouse and the children. However, with fixed farm
sizes, farms were continually subdivided into smaller farms, eventually becoming unproductive
and incorporated into larger farms (Dooling, 2005). The evidence presented here, however,
shows that father’s land ownership was not a barrier to upward mobility. At least, it suggests
that for successive generations it was relatively easy to secure land-holdings. This lends itself
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more to the qualitative evidence found in Newton-King (1994) and Dooling (2005), who found
generations were often successful in consolidating wealth on the frontier.
The same was true for slavery at the Cape. The number of slaves at the Cape increased through-
out the eighteenth century, especially in the last quarter (Fourie and Van Zanden, 2013). Table
3.3 shows that for all five specifications, more than 80 percent of the second generation’s slave
wealth was not inherited from the father. This suggests low persistence and very high mobility
in slave wealth. Fourie and Von Fintel (2010:239) describe slaves as ‘an important predictor of
farming success and, as a result, [they] contributed positively to asset wealth in this period.’
But they further found that the introduction of slaves to the economy raised inequality between
the groups at the Cape and had long-term consequences. The continued use of slaves made
it possible for some farmers to become very wealthy, but others could not make use of the
opportunity (Du Plessis et al., 2015). My results contradict this hypothesis, and rather suggest
that mobility in slave wealth remained high throughout the eighteenth century.
This brings me to the combination of land and slavery. According to the Nieboer-Domar hy-
pothesis, slavery as an institution arises in conditions where land is abundant, but there is a
shortage of labour. Green (2014:67) analyses the Nieboer-Domar hypothesis and applies it to
the Cape Colony. What he found is that although the hypothesis is relevant to the Cape’s
economy, it needs to be modified from the original. He suggests the Company’s demand for
labour initially exceeded the farmers’ demand for labour. But as settlement at the Cape in-
creased and wealthy farmers rose to prominence, their demand for labour also increased. He
writes: ‘Slavery, which already existed as an institution in urban areas, became one of the
major forms of labour employed by these farmers.’ My results here support the claim that the
demand for labour, and therefore slaves, increased throughout the eighteenth century. The high
mobility in slave wealth suggests that later generations acquired more slaves through their own
ability, and slave wealth was not persistently inherited from their fathers. The combination
of high mobility in land and slave ownership suggests that successive generations could react
to the factor endowments available to them, and were not limited by institutional factors that
protected the privileges of the elite.
The mobility in debt between successive generations was significant, but this significance dis-
appeared when decade controls were added. Here, the number of observations dropped to 56,
which may explain the lack of significance. What should be noted here is that debt was not
inherited by children but subtracted from the estate before the inheritances were paid to the
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children. What I focus on here is the value of total debt for the father and the child. Around
80 percent of the value of debt for the children in the sample was from mobility rather than
persistence in the value from their fathers. This high mobility in debt is be expected, though,
especially given the high mobility in land and slave ownership and the correlation between
wealth and debt described in Chapter 2. These levels of mobility in debt is achieved, despite
the system of partible inheritance. Not only the debt levels are important when comparing
debt between generations, but also what the debts are made for, a topic I return to below.
These significant results are suggestive of high levels of mobility in the Cape’s economy. Taking
debt as a proxy for income, and comparing the intergenerational elasticities for debt found in
Table 3.3, it is higher compared to the US and England. Clark and Cummins (2014:73) found
an income wealth elasticity of 0.41 for England, while Olivetti and Paserman (2015) found a
0.35 elasticity for the US. The comparable elasticity for the Cape is only 0.24 for the eighteenth
century, although the studies on the US and Britain are for the nineteenth century. As far as
I know, no study has looked directly at slave wealth and debt mobility as I have done here.5
More comparable wealth indices can be found in Kearl and Pope (1986), although the period
differences remain. Kearl and Pope (1986) found intergenerational persistence at 27 percent for
the second half of the nineteenth century. Although my wealth measures are still less persistent,
this is closer to those who owned some wealth.
These results dispute the claims, at least for the Cape Colony, made by Smith (1776) on Dutch
colonies when he wrote: ‘The progress of some of them, therefore, though it has been consider-
able, in comparison with that of almost any country that has been long peopled and established,
had been languid and slow in comparison with that of the greater part of the colonies.’ The
low persistence in wealth at the Cape suggests there were plenty of opportunities for migrants
from Europe to improve their socioeconomic status. Mitchell (2007:247) indicates that many
of the settlers at the Cape came from the poorest socio-economic class in Europe. One aspect
in which my research falls short is that is does not study these immigrants’ social standing in
Europe before they migrated to the Cape. It also does not account for the possibility that some
of the very poor may have decided to move back to Europe.
Perhaps the most notable example of such mobility can be found in the story of Martin Melck
(1723–1781). Melck was a German immigrant who received training as a builder in Europe,
before joining the VOC and moving to the Cape. Once he arrived at the Cape, he worked
5For a more direct comparison using occupations and social mobility, see Cilliers and Fourie (2016).
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as a knecht, or overseer, before becoming a free burgher. Once he achieved this status, he
bought two freehold farms with cash and continued to improve economically by marrying Anna
Margaretha Hop, a wealthy widow. At the time of his death, he owned 204 slaves (Giliomee,
2003:29). He also invested in alcohol pachts (Groenewald, 2011) to become the richest man in
the Colony by the end of the eighteenth century.6
As I mentioned before, the value of a father’s debt level is not the only concern when consid-
ering children’s debt levels. Contemporary studies have found that children save and invest in
similar patterns to their parents (Charles and Hurst, 2002). As far as I know, there is no study
which has applied the idea and concept to history. I attempt to do so here by using the broad
reasons for borrowing – consumption, production and mixed – shown in Table 2.6. Before, I
showed that borrowing at the Cape mainly happened for productive purposes. Table 3.4 shows
a comparison between how often fathers and sons borrowed for each of these categories. In
Table 3.5, I show the mean values for the categories as borrowed by fathers, and children and
compare the means using a T-statistic. The T-statistic is calculated as follows:
T =
Dc−Df√
SDc2
Nc
+
SDf
2
Nf
Like in Chapter 2, borrowing for productive purposes happened most often. For fathers, 49 per-
cent of loans were made for productive purposes, while this decreased to 45 percent for children.
But within the groups, children were also more likely to borrow for production if their father
borrowed for production. Within the productive category, 48 percent of transactions were made
if the father also had productive loans, while this decreases to 27 percent for consumption.7
This suggests that, like in Charles and Hurst (2002), children in the Cape Colony borrowed in
the same patterns as their fathers and that financial literacy is transferred between generations.
Furthermore, children borrowed larger amounts for production than their fathers. In Table
3.5, I compare the mean values of these groups between fathers and children. Borrowing for
production is the only category where there is a significant difference between the borrowing of
fathers and children.
6I return to the various groups which existed at the Cape in Chapter 4 and 5.
7This is calculated by the diagonal divided by the father’s row total.
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Table 3.4: Patterns of borrowing between fathers and children
Child’s Borr. Pur.
Consumption Production Mixed Row Total
F
a
th
er
’s
B
o
rr
.
P
u
r.
Consumption
8 13 10 31
3.27% 5.31% 4.08% 12.65%
Production
18 59 45 122
7.35% 24.08% 18.37% 49.80%
Mixed
9 39 44 92
3.67% 15.92% 17.96% 37.55%
Column Total
35 111 99 245
14.29% 45.31% 40.41% 100.00%
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Table 3.5: Mean values of borrowing between fathers and children
Father’s Mean Value Son’s Mean Value T-statistic
Consumption
Mean 60.32 124.39 1.44
SD 312.55 758.07
Obs 187 399
Production
Mean 303.81 400.38 2.17***
SD 598.94 1011.61
Obs 468 847
Mixed
Mean 1103.43 823.67 -1.03
SD 5192.79 3961.15
Obs 486 863
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations.
Notes: T-statistic compares the mean value of the child’s debt to the
mean value of the father’s debt.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10%
level.
Ample examples of intergenerational borrowing and mobility can be found in the probate in-
ventories. I would like to share some here. The choice was made between various categories:
the first, was a poor father and a richer son to show the mobility captured in the regression.
The second is a wealthy father and son to show how mobility differed between the rich and
poor and finally, a father and daughter to show how gender was not an obstacle to mobility.
First, a slightly poor father and son pair — Johannes Fourie (MOOC8/12.47) and his son,
Louis Johannes (MOOC8/58.27). Johannes Fourie was born in 1733 in Stellenbosch. In 1760,
he married Cecelia Johanna Du Preez and had four children, three sons and a daughter. Louis
Johannes Fourie was the youngest of these and was only one year old when his father died in
1769. Johannes Fourie owed the small amount of 180 rds to Jurgen Spengeler, for what we do
not know. He only had two slaves. Louis Johannes was born in 1767, married Geertruij Maria
Wilhelmina Grobbelaar in 1790 and they had seven children. He died in 1809, aged 42. Louis
only had one slave and owed 396 rds to four individuals. One of these debts was the 300 rds
for his slave, Geluk Van Madagascar.
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The second family are the Lombards. Father Christoffel Lombard (MOOC8/21.35) was bap-
tised in 1726 and passed away in 1796. He had sixteen children from two marriages: first, to
Aletta Maria De Lange and second to Maria Johanna Walters. He owned three farms and 43
slaves. Although his debt was low at 739 rds, he had more than 6 000 rds owed to him. Daniel
Stephanus Lombard (MOOC8/23.1) was Christoffel’s third child and second son. He, in turn,
had 14 children when he died in 1800, as well as one farm and two slaves. He owed 1 200 rds in
capitaal (probably for land) to the Orphan Chamber and 25 rds for a summons from Johannes
Ackerveld.
Finally, a father-daughter combination. Cornelis Brits (MOOC8/14.29) married Maria Mag-
dalena De Peronne in 1724 and had 10 children.8 He only had one slave, and also had relatively
little debt, at 10 rds to the messenger of the Orphan Chamber, Jan Harmen Redelinghuijs. His
daughter, Sophia (MOOC8/19.65), died in 1790. She was married to Johannes Carstens in 1740
and again to Carel Joseph Kock, although the date of the second marriage is unknown. With
Carstens, she had three children, two sons and a daughter, and a fourth with Kock, a son. She
lived in Cape Town and owned a house there, with three slaves listed on her inventory. Most
of her debt (a total of 2 433 rds) was owed to the church for a mortgage bond. The other debts
were made to Frans Matthijs Carstens, her son, and one debt to Casper Morgendaal. Unfortu-
nately, I could not find more information about Frans Matthijs Carstens and these debts.
Although these are only a few examples of the debt patterns between fathers and their children,
these cases illustrate how the children of settlers owed more than their fathers, but that they
often made these debts for productive investments, like the capital debt of Daniel Stephanus
Lombard or the mortgage bond of Sophia Brits. The high wealth mobility found here suggests
resources were available for later generations to improve their socioeconomic standing. But it
also points to another key aspect of the credit market at the Cape: networks. This is studied
in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter investigated the claim that low intergenerational wealth mobility at the Cape.
The historiography of the Cape argues that the settlers at the Cape were highly indebted and
8The genealogies do not have information on his birth or baptism.
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therefore poor, but the results in this, and the previous chapter, suggest that indebtedness was
correlated with wealth. I found that debt was used mainly for productive purposes, rather than
consumption, and in this sense, debt was a source of potential future wealth.
Two significant wealth measures existed at the Cape – land and slave ownership. Many his-
torical studies have shown the importance of land ownership at the Cape. The inaccurate
measurement of land relative to slaves and the interwoven relationship between these two fac-
tors are reasons why both Cape historians and economic historians have turned to the use of
slave ownership as a proxy for wealth. The system of partible inheritance has been blamed for
low intergenerational wealth mobility and the same has been said of the Cape. I set out to
re-investigate intergenerational wealth mobility at the Cape and add quantitative evidence to
the ample qualitative historical evidence. I add to these wealth measures by also measuring
debt levels between fathers and children.
The results show significant mobility and low persistence in wealth at the Cape. Land ownership
showed significant mobility over time, although the effect was slightly less when the presence of
slaves was taken into account. The mobility in slave wealth is significant regardless of the other
wealth measures and also over time. In addition, there were significant correlations between
the levels of fathers’ debt and their children’s debt, but the significance disappeared when the
presence of slaves and farms were taken into account. In comparison with other regions, like the
US and England, there was therefore high mobility in the Cape. But a note of caution is the
difference in methodology between this study and others, as well as the difference in periods.
As far as I know, there has been no study which looks at the mobility and persistence of slave
wealth or debt.
Another part of intergenerational debt what these debts were made for, which is what I at-
tempted to investigate. I also find that children borrowed more for productive investments,
but it was often only if their fathers had also borrowed for production. This suggests that
children did tend to borrow in patterns similar to their fathers. I provided some examples from
the probate inventories of where children borrowed more than their parents for these categories.
But intergenerational mobility and similar patterns in debt between fathers and their children
make up only one part of familial debt relations. Another aspect is the networks a family forms
and how this makes them part of a wider network. This is the question I turn to next – who
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were the central individuals and families in the Cape’s debt network?
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Chapter 4
‘Webs of credit and obligation’: A
network analysis of credit transactions
for the eighteenth-century Cape Colony
4.1 Introduction
Intergenerational relations are not the only connections through which wealth is transmitted.
Another is the social network which a family forms part of and where families are linked to-
gether. In Chapter 2, I described Johannes Fredrik Kirsten’s letter to the British government
about the economic conditions at the Cape. His brother, Jan Pieter Kirsten (MOOC8/46.62),
was deeply indebted and even owed his brother 3 333 rds at the time of his death in 1820. His
brother was not the only influential individual whom he owed a debt to. He owed 1 600 rds to
Jacob Van Reenen, father of the (in)famous Van Reenen brothers, and 1 600 to Willem Ferdi-
nand Van Rheede Van Oudtshoorn. The latter was the grandson of Baron Pieter Van Rheede
Van Oudtshoorn, who was destined to be governor at the Cape after Ryk Tulbagh, but he died
at sea on the voyage to the Cape. He was also the husband of Gesina Kirsten, sister of Jan
Pieter and Johannes Fredrik. This is only an example of how connections through family could
provide access to the credit market at the Cape. Robertson (1945c) showed that even under
Van Riebeeck, credit already played a vital role in the Cape’s society. Van Riebeeck organised
private lending to ‘create a more closely-knit society at the Cape, where people would be bound
together by their interlocking interest as debtors and creditors’ (Robertson, 1945c:175).
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Networks have always been an important element in debt and credit relations, especially in
the absence of the intermediation of formal banks. Pagett and Ansell (1993) showed that for
the Medici family in medieval Italy, it was not their pre-existing wealth that mattered, but
their position in a network of marriages and business connections which gave them their promi-
nence.1 Even in Renaissance Florence and Venice, the birthplace of banks, networks for credit
mattered, and a bad reputation could lead to ruin (Pagett and McLean, 2011).
This is only one example of the use of network analysis in a historical context. Other au-
thors have also pointed to the importance of connections in obtaining debt, without directly
measuring the networks. Ogilvie et al. (2012) provide evidence that even individuals from
outside the town of Wildberg were incorporated into the town’s credit network. Van Bochove
and Kole (2014) note how the Amsterdam market relied on networks to link supply and de-
mand through unstamped loan forms. Rothenburg (1985) shows how the number and average
creditors and debtors per inventory increased over time, leading to a wider credit network in
rural Massachusetts. And Lamoreaux et al. (2003) postulate that repeated interaction between
households, shops, and stores built mutual trust and discouraged cheating and defaulting on
debts. Vickers (2011) looks at the interaction between the Native Americans and the European
arrivals on Nantucket Island in the late seventeenth century. He shows how Mary Starbuck
provided goods and services to the Wompanoags, with little interaction in the 1680s but much
more in the 1700s. This is another case where networks meant continued trade over long periods.
Vickers (2011:1055) suggests that the wide participation in credit transactions was the result
of the high cost of enforcement, since ‘everyone dealt with everyone else’. Muldrew (2012:6)
describes the involvement of many different social classes in debt transactions for early modern
England:
Every household in the country, from paupers to royalty, was to some degree en-
meshed within the increasingly complicated webs of credit and obligation with which
transactions were communicated. Merchants traded on credit, tradesmen sold or
worked on credit; and many of these people were in debt to the poor for wages and
for small sales, or work done.
These studies all show how important networks were for debt and credit transactions in pre-
industrial societies. The measurement of these networks has, however, been neglected. With a
1Many textbooks and courses on social network analysis use this example for its simplicity in explaing the
basic concepts.
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new methodology and computational power available, these networks can be measured quan-
titatively. This chapter aims to investigate who the central individuals and families in the
Cape’s credit network were. Many of these identified families are already well-documented in
the Cape’s historiography, but my investigations puts forward some new prominent players.
Before the network is discussed and analysed, I provide a short overview of how social networks
can be measured, and why this measurement is important in an economic context.
4.2 Why are social networks important in an economic
context?
The recent rise in social media sites and the connections enabled through them have spurred
investigations into the role of social networks in decision-making. It has encouraged economists
to use social network analysis more in modeling and policy-making. Jackson (2014:3) offers
the following opinion on why social network analysis is increasingly being used in economic
modelling: ‘Humans are fundamentally a social species with interaction patterns that shape
their behaviours . . . the full network of relationships affects how people behave.’2 Goyal (2011)
provides an overview of the literature on the role of social networks in an economic context.
Two seminal papers by Granovetter (1973, 1985) deserve attention in this regard. In the first,
Granovetter (1973) builds and discusses the strength of weak ties or how informal ties are key
to networks. He concludes that more often informal connections, or those with whom we spend
little time, present economic opportunities, like acquiring job positions. In his later work, Gra-
novetter (1985) argues that human interactions are embedded in decision-making and that new
institutional economics underestimates the role of social decision-making. He suggests that ‘the
anonymous market of neoclassical economics is virtually non-existent in economic life and that
transactions of all kinds are rife with the social connections described’ (Granovetter, 1985:495).
Social networks are therefore important in the institutional view of economics, that sees norms
and values as part of the informal institutions which can influence economic outcomes such as
growth. Acemoglu and Jackson (2015) present a theoretical model for this. They suggest that
history anchors social norms, but that these norms can be changed by prominent actors in the
2Several studies have looked at the importance of social networks in economics. Banerjee et al. (2013) studied
diffusion and microcredit in India; Jackson and Nei (2015) studied international trade during wartime and the
role of alliances; Miniou and Reyes (2013) studied global banking; Elliot et al. (2014) studied financial contagion
and how networks can prevent or enhance contagion.
69
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
network.
In recognition of Granovetter’s embeddedness theory, Williamson (2000) acknowledges that in-
stitutional economics has yet to grasp the full impact of human decision-making on economic
outcomes. He proposes a four-level framework for institutions. The first level is embeddedness
and includes informal institutions that are slow to change. The second level is the formal ‘rules
of the game’, including property rights. The third is governance or ensuring the rules are abided
by, which is followed by the fourth level of resource allocation. Much is known about the last
three levels, but less is known about informal institutions on the first level. One way to answer
the questions on these informal institutions is to study social networks, their impact on the
decision-making of individuals, and networks’ formation and evolution.
The Cape Colony had specific informal institutions that governed interactions among settlers.
Marriage and economic partnerships became key in explaining the position of a family in a
network. Mitchell (2008:8) proposes ‘[s]ettlers and slaves moved through the region along a
network of farms linked by family ties and reciprocal obligations’ and that to optimise inheri-
tance, families used marriage and ‘intricate property networks’. Dooling (2007) presents further
evidence of how marriage and family were employed by the settlers to protect wealth. He ar-
gues that ‘familial and residential propinquity built local communities and an intricate web
of community relations. Undoubtedly, the landed elite was in the forefront of such networks’
(Dooling, 2007:40). He goes further and linked this to the culture among these settlers, saying
‘[s]tanding surety for kin and neighbours was an affirmation of community interdependencies
and represented a willingness to share in the risks’ (Dooling, 2007:130). This implies that the
connections made through social networks were key to families and their economic survival.
Fourie (2014:167) suggests ‘the roots of prosperity’ of Cape farmers came from these social
networks.
This chapter aims to add to this literature. It focuses on the Cape Colony by looking at the
central individuals and families in the network of the probate inventories’ credit transactions.
Centrality measures enable us to distinguish who the most influential individuals in the network
were, and whether the individuals identified in the network here are the same individuals iden-
tified in the existing historiography of the Cape. The results show that many of the individuals
identified by the existing historiography as important economic agents are also identified when
social network analysis is used. However, they are more often than not only ranked third or
fourth. I instead draw attention to some new individuals who should be investigated in future
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historical research.
The chapter makes three important contributions. First, it shows how social network analysis
can be used in a historical setting with a large number of transactions obtained from probate
inventories. Secondly, it expands our understanding of the evolution of credit networks. And
finally, it provides new evidence on the characteristics of the Cape credit network. It gives
the qualitative evidence from history quantitative support and shows how easily informal trade
withing these networks can be easily underestimated.
4.3 Data and methodology: Measuring networks in an
economic context
The role of social networks in an economic context has come into focus as research has moved
away from the anonymity of textbook market analysis, where people have perfect information
and many buyers and sellers exist in a market. The focus in network analysis is often on the
role connections play in labour market outcomes or in the spread of technological change. This
section describes the methodology behind network analysis and ways of measuring the central-
ity of individuals. Before the centrality measures are looked at, two general network measures
should be considered: the diameter of the network and the average path length. The diameter
of a network is the largest distance between any two nodes, while the average path length is the
average of these distances (Jackson, 2008:38). The distance between the nodes are the number
of connections it takes to move from one node to the next. For example, if Smith is connected
to De Beer, but not to Fourie, while De Beer is connected to Fourie, the distance between Smith
and Fourie is two. The network measures of the Cape Colony, as obtained from the probate
records, are presented in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of network of credit transactions
Diameter Diameter growth Average path length Average path length growth Population growth
Before 1700 3.000 - 1.495 - -
1700-1724 9.000 2.000 4.350 1.910 2.439
1725-1749 16.000 0.778 6.361 0.462 2.005
1750-1774 15.000 -0.063 6.223 -0.022 2.710
1775-1800 18.000 0.200 4.871 -0.217 1.575
1800-1824 23.000 0.278 8.174 0.678 2.142
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
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The diameter and average path length increase over the period observed. One concern with
considering only these two measures is the population growth over the period, as the network
is likely to increase in diameter and average path length if more nodes (defined below) are
added. If nodes are randomly added and connected to the previous nodes, the diameter should
increase at the same speed as the population. But the Cape’s diameter and average path length
increase at a much slower rate than the population. This means the network at the Cape was
becoming denser over time. A comparison between the growth in diameter, average path length
and population is found in Figure 4.1.3 It should be noted that the network measured here is
a directed network, because we know whether the transaction was a credit or debt. A credit is
therefore a flow into the node, while a debt is a flow to the oppposite node. It should be kept in
mind that this network may exclude some of the wealthiest individuals due to the nature of the
probate inventories. However, as discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 Section 2.3, the Cape’s
probate inventories tend to represent a median individual at the Cape. A possibility for future
research is to compare the network found in the MOOC 8 series and the Stellenbosch inventories.
Figure 4.1: Networks statistics over time
The three most commonly used measures for identifying the most central individuals are de-
gree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality. The aim, as described above, was to test whether
the existing historiography accurately identified the most connected individuals in the Cape’s
financial network. A second step was to check whether the individuals discovered through net-
work analysis are the same as those identified by historiography as central to the Cape’s social
3The population figures are from in Fourie and Van Zanden (2013).
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network. For this purpose, centralities are better suited than degree distributions, diameter,
average path length or clustering measures of a network.
Degree centrality describes how connected a certain node, in this case an individual listed in the
inventories, is. In the case of social network analysis, a node is defined as either an individual
or a household connected to others in the network, and is an element of N = 1, 2, 3, . . . n. The
degree of centrality for a node is di(g)
(n−1) , where g is an n × n matrix for individuals and gij are
all the possible relationships between i and j (Jackson, 2008:37,38). This measure would tell
us how an individual at the Cape was connected to other individuals at the Cape, but not how
important the individual was within the network. Degree is only an indication of the number
of connections or transactions an individual has or was involved in.
The second measure is betweenness centrality. For betweenness centrality, the shortest path
between two individuals (k and j) is calculated, and the number of paths on which individ-
ual i lies is counted. The betweenness centrality of individual i is calculated by CeBi (g) =∑
k 6=j:i/∈k,j
Pi(kj)
P (kj)
(n−1)(n−2)
2
. The closer this ratio is to 1, the more i lies on paths connecting others (k
and j defined here) to one another, and thus the more central i becomes to the network. It
is often an important node for information (Jackson, 2008:39). If an individual has a higher
betweenness centrality, they likely have more information about others and should be interme-
diaries in the market.
The next measure of centrality considered for the Cape’s credit network is eigenvector centrality.
Eigenvector centrality for individual i is proportional to the relative position of the connection
with j, or Ci = a
∑
jgijCj. Eigenvector centrality gives an indication of the relative impor-
tance of individual i in the network. Eigenvector centrality increases as the node is connected
to more influential and central nodes, i.e. i becomes proportionally more important if j is more
important (Jackson, 2008:39). Eigenvector centrality will give an indication of the nodes with
the most influence over others in the network. More influential individuals would likely have
more wealth, so eigenvector centrality and wealth are expected to be correlated.
Before the results on centralities are presented, some assumptions should be mentioned. Be-
cause of the long period over which the inventories were captured, it is illogical to assume a
single time period. Also, these inventories were observed at death, so no new transactions with
the person could be noted afterwards. But, it cannot be excluded that individuals at the Cape
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did not trade with individuals younger than themselves. The younger individuals’ transactions
would only be captured later in the inventories. It is also likely that individuals traded with
individuals older than themselves, who may have died before them. This transaction would
have been recorded before the individual’s own probate inventory was taken. For this reason,
the period is divided into 25-year intervals. This is likely to capture one generation of ‘trading
partners’.4 The periods are: before 1700, 1700 to 1724, 1725 to 1749, 1750 to 1774, 1775 to
1799, and 1800 to 1824. The last part of the entire probate period, 1825 to 1834, is not included
here. It is likely that a large proportion of the individuals who lived at the Cape and traded
with others was then not yet captured in the inventories.
A few limitations and biases of the data should also be mentioned before I continue. The first is
sample selection and the exclusion of the wealthiest individuals from the sample. As discussed
in Chapter 2, the probate inventories are significantly poorer than the Stellenbosch inventories
(Fourie, 2013). That said, a rich group, like the ‘landed gentry’, would not necessarily be missed
by the network analysis done here. There are often individuals who transacted with the gentry
or even some of the gentry’s estates in the probate inventories. There are also some of the
gentry’s estates in these inventories. These include Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen (MOOC8/3.93),
Jan Meindert Kruywagen (MOOC8/5.19), and Johannes Groenewald (MOOC8/15.23). An-
other limitation is the limited information on familial connections and occupations between the
individuals. Groenewald (2011) and Baartman (2011) have shown familial and business links
as key to network building at the Cape. This would be possible to add in the future if more
sources and information on the individuals could be gathered.
4.4 Who were the central individuals at the Cape?
In the previous sections, I considered the network measures available to identify the individuals
who are central in a network. But the question remains: who were the most central individuals
in the Cape’s financial network, and are they the same individuals as identified by historians
before? The network of credit transactions found in the MOOC 8 series across the three mea-
sures are found in Appendix B, while Figure B.1 is shown here as an example. The first thing
4The ideal would have been to use a dynamic centrality measure, but the theory on dynamic centrality
measures is still being developed. For example, Lerman et al. (2010) built a dynamic centrality measure for
citations models. Another example is Braha and Bar-Yam (2006), who use email data, but their model skews
toward high-degree nodes. However, a problem with applying this to the Cape’s MOOC 8 credit network is
that it does not allow for the death of nodes. For the sake of simplicity, I decided to stay with a divided static
network. Future research can look at extending this work to include dynamic measures of centrality.
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to note is the growth in the network. As explained before, the network becomes denser over
time. The whiter nodes have lower eigenvector centralities, while the darker nodes have higher
eigenvector centralities. The same figures can be drawn for degree and betweenness centrality.
Figure 4.2: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1750 and 1774
What is immediately apparent is how few of the individuals identified by historians are iden-
tified in these networks as well. The more familiar Cape settlers include Jan van der Swyn
(one of the alcohol pachters identified by Groenewald), Jan Meindert Kruywagen (son of the
main creditor identified by Guelke and Shell, 1983), and Jacob Van Reenen, although his sons
are noticeably absent. Table 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4 respectively list the Top 10 individuals identified
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by the various measures. It also presents, where available, these individuals’ slave ownership
groups.
76
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 4.2: Top 10 Eigenvector Central Individuals
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Lucretia van de Caab (11-24 slaves) Pieter Meyer (11-24 slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
2 Fredrik van Zyl (0 slaves) Barend van den Brink (.) Jan De Wit (.)
3 Jacobus Conradie (.) Willem de Ruiter (0 slaves) Gerrit Olivier (11-24 slaves)
4 Matthys Bantjies (.) Wynand Bezuidenhout (1-5 slaves) Jan Meidert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
5 Dirk Trynten (.) Martin Godlieb Eckard (0 slaves) Jasper Raats (0 slaves)
6 Matthys Wigman (.) Joost Reinard Schenk (6-10 slaves) Jacob De Villiers (1-5 slaves)
7 Pieter Jans Louw (.) Jan Dirk De Beer (25+ slaves) Claas Kuyp (.)
8 Jan Holsmith (.) Christina Does (25+ slave) Gideon Slabbert (.)
9 Laurens Verbrugge (.) Johannes Bocklenbergh (6-10 Slaves) Susanna Joubert (6-10 slaves)
10 Martin Adriaans (.) Christiaan Bock (11-24 slaves) Geertruida De Wit (1-5 slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves)
2 Roelof Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Jan Jacob Meyer (25+ slaves) Johan George Stadeler (25+ slaves)
3 Michiel Smuts (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1-5 slaves)
4 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Christoffel Lombaard (25+ slaves) Christiaan Fleck (25+ slaves)
5 Johannes Henricus Blankenberg (25+ slaves) Johannes Matthias Bletterman (11-24 slaves) Hermanus Augustinus Vermaak (11-24 slaves)
6 Theodorus Kriel (1-5 slaves) Jacobus Scheepers (11-24 slaves) Johannes Petrus Serrurier (25+ slaves)
7 Frans Adam Carelson (.) Joseph De Klerk (11-24 slaves) Johanna Cloete (1-5 slaves)
8 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Anna Bock (1-5 slaves) Gerrit Van Schalkwyk (1-5 slaves)
9 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Francois Smit (.) Gerrit Van Emmenes (1-5 slaves)
10 Joachim Nicolaas Von Dessin (11-24 slaves) Johannes Mattheus Hartzog (6-10 slaves) Andries Brink (0 Slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the centralities were calculated.
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Table 4.3: Top 10 Betweenness Central Individuals
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Pieter Willem van Zyl (0 Slaves) Pieter Meyer (11-24 slaves) Jan Meindert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
2 Philip Snyman (0 slaves Wynand Bezuidenhout (1-5 slaves) Jacob De Villiers (1-5 slaves)
3 Jan Pieters Louw (1-5 slaves) Barend van den Brink (.) Jan Van Der Swyn (11-24 slaves)
4 Simon Groot (1-5 slaves) Willem Ruiter (0 slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
5 Roelof van Tonder (0 slaves) Johannes Bocklenbergh (6-10 slaves) Jan Christoffel Bek (.)
6 Nicolaas Walter (11-24 slaves) Jean Roy (1-5 slaves) Andries Bruyns (1-5 slaves)
7 Andries van Tonder (1-5 slaves) Engela Lambert (6-10 Slaves) Lukas Meyer (.)
8 Arie Lekkerwyn (0 slaves) Dina Willems (1-5 Slaves) Geertruida de Wit (1-5 slaves)
9 - Jacob Bisseux (1-5 Slaves) Johannes Ernst Heger (1-5 slaves)
10 - Anna Bockelenberg (1-5 Slaves) Jasper Raats (0 Slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1 - 5 slaves)
2 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Pieter Terblanche (.) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves
3 Roelof Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Joseph Nietsche (.)
4 Daniel Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Maria Johanna Hugo (11-24 slaves) Adriaan Louw (1-5 slaves)
5 Christiaan Victor (.) Stephanus Stroh (11-24 slaves) Godlieb Wilhelm Bekker (0 slaves)
6 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Gabriel Stoltz (1-5 slaves) Hester Pool (11 - 24 slaves)
7 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Daniel Hugo (.) Daniel Petrus Boshof (0 slaves)
8 Salomon Bosch (1-5 slaves) Jan Jacob Jarling (.) Andries Stockenstrom (.)
9 Jurgen Jansen (1-5 slaves) Hendrik Christiaan Herholdt (25+ slaves) Jacobus Slabbert (6 - 10 slaves)
10 Hendrik Ras (0 slaves) Jacobus Scheepers (11-24 slaves) Andries Brink (0 Slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the centralities were calculated.
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Table 4.4: Top 10 Degree Central Individuals
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Simon Groot (1-5 slaves) Pieter Meyer (11-24 slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
2 Philip Snyman (0 slaves) Wynand Bezuidenhout (1-5 slaves) Jan Van Der Swyn (11-24 slaves)
3 Pieter Willem Van Zyl (0 slaves) Barend van den Brink (.) Jan Meindert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
4 Francois Bastiaanse (0 slaves) Maria de Peronne (.) Hendrik Thomas Van Hoesum (6-10 slaves)
5 Adolf Daniels (1-5 slaves) Anna Retief (11-24 slaves) Aletta Van Der Storm (6-10 slaves)
6 Jan Pieters Louw (1-5 slaves) Jacques Pinard (0 slaves) Gelyn Van Gogh (0 slaves)
7 Nicolaas Walters (11-24 slaves) Jan Dirk De Beer (25+ slaves) Geertruida De Wit (1-5 slaves)
8 Roelof Van Tonder (0 slaves) Martin Meckelenberg (6-10 slaves) Jan Jacob Grandam (6-10 slaves)
9 Willem Jans De Wereld (1-5 slaves) Engela Lambert (6-10 slaves) Hendrik Hoppe (11-24 slaves)
10 Johannes Pythius (6-10 slaves) Maria Le Febre (25+ slaves) Emma Martha Van Der Byl (25+ slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves)
2 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Johan George Stadeler (25+ slaves)
3 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Johan Adam Raubenheimer (11-24 Slaves) Johannes Petrus Serrurier (25+ slaves)
4 Joachim Nicolaas Von Dessin (11-24 slaves) Abraham De Haan (25+ Slaves) Goris Janse Van Middelkoop (11 - 24 slaves)
5 Cornelis Van Rooyen (6-10 slaves) Andries Brink (1-5 slaves) Johan Heinrich Richter (6 - 10 slaves)
6 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Jan Martin Vogel (25+ slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1-5 slaves)
7 Johannes Henricus Blankenberg (25+ slaves) Johannes Albertus Laubscher (25+ slaves) Maria Johanna Jurgens (11 - 24 slaves)
8 Jurgen Jansen (1-5 slaves) Michiel Otto (11-24 slaves) Christoffel Coenraad Prediger (6 - 10 slaves)
9 Christiaan Ackerman (11-24 slaves) Johannes Matthias Bletterman (11-24 slaves) Hermanus Augustinus Vermaak (11 - 24 slaves)
10 Maria Knoetse (1-5 slaves) Jan Jacob Meyer (25+ Slaves) Christiaan Fleck (25+ slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the centralities were calculated.
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The apparent absence of the wealthiest does not mean none of the wealthy is identified here. A
key example of this is Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (MOOC8/46.28), whose inventory was
taken in 1793. He was an onderkoopman (junior merchant) for the Company, as well as the
secretary of the Orphan Chamber. At the time of his death, he owed 164 640 rds in debt, but
180 679 rds of credit was owed to him from more than 1 000 transactions. He furthermore had
37 slaves, two properties in Cape Town and volumes of books on religion, law and history. His
wealth is in no doubt, as his probate is over 100 pages long (transcribed).5 Although he may
be an exception, the results should not be disregarded as a network which excluded the gentry
or pachters.
The results also show the importance of women in the Cape’s financial market and economy.
No less than four of the top ten from the second period are female, as are three from the third
period and two from the fourth period. This provides further support for the literature on the
role of widows within the Cape. For example, Von Fintel et al. (2013) found widows often used
their share of inheritance to become socially mobile and were often very wealthy. Although be-
yond the scope of this dissertation, these centralities identified several individuals who warrant
further biographical attention. One example is Johanna Siekermans (MOOC8/7.48). She was
the mother of Jacob Van Reenen, yet is not mentioned when the legacy of the Van Reenens is
discussed. She had no less than nine properties in Cape Town, 19 slaves and the net value of
her estate stood over 10 000 rds when she died in 1756.
The final question from these centralities is whether these individuals benefitted from their
wealth in terms of the network. A word of caution, though: no causation can be determined
here. Jackson (2014:15,16) discusses the problem of endogeneity in network analysis and eco-
nomics. He, however, says that ‘rather than giving up on research in these areas, or waiting
for some lucky source of exogenous variation or a powerful instrument, we must still make
progress.’ The centrality is determined by the number of debt and credit transactions and
how the individuals are connected. But this is also influenced by their wealth and the second
chapter of this study found a strong correlation between wealth and debt. The express purpose
here was to to determine whether there is also a positive correlation between connectedness and
wealth. An OLS regression was run on centralities, controlling for wealth with the following con-
trols: number of farms, groups of slave ownership, whether an individual was both creditor and
debtor, their gender, as well as period controls. The regression results can be found in Table 4.5.
5He was also an active member of the Lutheran community, and a portrait of him can still be found in the
Lutheran Church archive.
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Table 4.5: OLS Regression: Determinants of centrality measures
Dependent variable Degree Centrality Betweenness Centrality Eigenvector Centrality
Control variables
Number of farms -0.650 -0.098 -2.665
(-1.514) (-0.762) (-1.278)
Slave ownership
0 Slaves (ref.) (ref.) (ref.)
Between 1 and 4 slaves -0.438 -0.108 4.051
(-0.692) (-0.421) (0.733)
Between 5 and 10 slaves 4.428 1.512 23.074**
(1.262) (1.635) (2.077)
More than 10 slaves -0.343 -0.357 20.793*
(-0.373) (-1.070) (1.839)
Both creditor and debtor 1.593 0.267 -3.136
(0.777) (0.528) (-0.490)
Gender (1 if male) 1.785 0.653* 8.241
(1.637) (1.949) (1.309)
Period controls YES YES YES
Constant 4.214*** -0.000 89.257**
(2.974) (-0.000) (2.096)
R-squared 0.005 0.026 0.009
N 1 926 827 1 165
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: *** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
It is interesting to note how little influence wealth, in terms of the number of farms and the
number of slaves, had on degree and betweenness centralities. None of the control variables
was significant in determining the degree centrality. The same lack of influence can even be
seen in the slave ownership groups presented in Tables 4.3 and 4.4. Very few individuals in
the Top 10 for betweenness and degree were in the group of owning more than 25 slaves, and
we see all the groups listed. Surprisingly, the coefficient on being both a creditor and a debtor
was also not significant for betweenness centrality. The theory suggests individuals with high
betweenness centralities are those who have information about others. This would mean that
high betweenness centralities would be close to those who act as intermediaries. An explanation
for the lack of significance between betweenness centrality and having both credits and debts, is
the large proportion of individuals who had both credits and debts – 36 percent. This suggests
intermediation on an official level was not important for credit transactions at the Cape, unlike
areas in France where notaries played a large role (Rosenthal, 1994). This also suggests the
nature of credit transactions remained personal throughout the period of investigation.
Men tended to have greater betweenness centralities than women – possibly due to the patriar-
chal society at the Cape. Ross (1995) gives a thorough analysis of patriarchy at the Cape in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. He suggests that despite the mobility of women in Cape
society, men were most likely to be the head of the household and responsible for financial deci-
sions. Groenewald (2011) also suggests men used their networks to build successful businesses.
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Higher male betweenness centrality is also supported by modern studies. Burt (1998) found
that men in entrepreneurial enterprises received direct benefits from their position in a network,
specifically their betweenness, while women only benefitted indirectly from their position.
There is a break with the pattern of wealth when eigenvector centrality is considered. As men-
tioned before, eigenvector centrality is a close measure of the relative influence an individual
enjoys in the network, i.e. the node becomes more important if it is connected to other impor-
tant individuals. Here, wealth, proxied by slave ownership, did seem to matter. The coefficient
was significant for individuals with more than five slaves. This result supports the idea that
the wealthy in terms of slave ownership were also those with influence. For example, Williams
(2013) concluded that the relative equality found in slave ownership in the Drakenstein district
during the eighteenth century led to ‘greater social standing and more political influence’. The
lack of strong evidence between an individual’s position in the network and wealth is contrary
to the evidence in Dooling (2007), when he stated that networks were dominated by the landed
elite.
4.4.1 The strength of weak ties applied
The previous section used the basic structure of the Cape’s network as captured by the credit
transactions in the MOOC 8 series. What it failed to take into account was Granovetter’s
strength of weak ties theory. In this section, I will attempt to introduce this idea, but adapt it
to the Cape’s credit network.
Granovetter (1973) suggests that the strength of a link between individuals would be determined
by three aspects: the amount of time spent together, the emotional intensity and intimacy, and
reciprocal services between the individuals. Applying the idea of tie strength to job search
models, he found that more than half the respondents who found a job through a contact,
found it with a contact with whom they only had occational interaction. He concludes with
the following: ‘weak ties [are] seen as indispensable to individuals’ opportunities and their in-
tegration into a community; strong ties, breeding local cohesion, lead to overall fragmentation’
Granovetter (1973:1361). Currarini et al. (2009) applied the strength of weak ties hypothesis
to high school students and homophily (explained and examined in Chapter 5) and found weak
ties formed bridges between social groups.
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In order to apply this hypothesis to the Cape’s MOOC 8 credit network, I adopted the def-
inition by Granovetter and calculated weights for each of the credit transactions. The two
aspects known about the credit transactions are the value of the transactions and the number
of transactions which took place between two individuals. There would therefore be a stronger
tie between individuals with more than one transaction between them, or one of a higher credit
value, than between individuals with only one transaction between them, or of a lower credit
value. However, individuals with more transactions should feature more prominently in the
network, which is why I normalised the individual’s number and size of transactions to the
network’s size and number of transactions by the various periods defined above. The formula
applied to the credit transactions is:
Weighti =
valueij
totalvaluei
totalvaluei
totalvaluei
×
transactionij
totaltransactionsi
totaltransactionsi
totaltransactionsn
=
valueij×totalvaluen
totalvalueij
2 × transactionij×totaltransactionsntotaltransactionsi2
where, valueij is the value of the transaction between individual i and j; totalvaluei is individ-
ual i’s total debt value and totalvaluei is the total value of all transactions for the period. The
same holds for the number of transactions: transactionij are the total number of transactions
between individual i and individual j; totaltransactionsi is the total number of transactions
for individual i and totaltransactionsn are the number of transactions for the periods.
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Table 4.6: Top 10 eigenvector central individuals with weights added
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Lucretia van de Caab (11-24 slaves) Jan Le Sage (1-5 slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
2 Fredrik van Zyl (0 slaves) Arnoldus Kruisman (25 + slaves) Jan De Wit (.)
3 Jacobus Conradie (.) Claas Prinsloo (0 slaves) Gerrit Olivier (11-24 slaves)
4 Matthys Bantjies (.) Joost Reinard Schenk (6-10 slaves) Jan Meidert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
5 Dirk Trynten (.) Jan Dirk De Beer (25+ slaves) Jasper Raats (0 slaves)
6 Matthys Wigman (.) Christina Does (25+ slaves) Jacob De Villiers (1-5 slaves)
7 Pieter Jans Louw (.) Johannes Bocklenberg (6-10 slaves) Claas Kuyp (.)
8 Jan Holsmith (.) Christiaan Bock (11-24 slaves) Gideon Slabbert (.)
9 Laurens Verbrugge (.) Dina Willems (1-5 slaves) Susanna Joubert (6-10 slaves)
10 Martin Adriaans (.) Maria Steyn (1-5 slaves) Geertruida De Wit (1-5 slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves)
2 Roelof Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Jan Jacob Meyer (25+ slaves) Johan George Stadeler (25+ slaves)
3 Michiel Smuts (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1 -5 slaves)
4 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Christoffel Lombaard (25+ slaves) Christiaan Fleck (25+ slaves)
5 Johannes Henricus Blankenberg (25+ slaves) Johannes Matthias Bletterman (11-24 slaves) Hermanus Augustinus Vermaak (11-24 slaves)
6 Theodorus Kriel (1-5 slaves) Jacobus Scheepers (11-24 slaves) Johannes Petrus Serrurier (25+ slaves)
7 Frans Adam Carelson (.) Joseph De Klerk (11-24 slaves) Johanna Cloete (1-5 slaves)
8 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Anna Bock (1-5 slaves) Gerrit Van Schalkwyk (1-5 slaves)
9 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Francois Smit (.) Gerrit Van Emmenes (1-5 slaves)
10 Joachim Nicolaas Von Dessin (11-24 slaves) Johannes Mattheus Hartzog (6-10 slaves) Andries Brink (0 Slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but considered when the centralities are calculated.
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Table 4.7: Top 10 betweenness central individuals with weights added
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Pieter Willem van Zyl (0 slaves) Arnoldus Kruisman (25+ slaves) Jan Meindert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
2 Jan Pieters Louw (1-5 slaves) Jan Le Sage(1-5 slaves) Jacob De Villiers (1-5 slaves)
3 Simon Groot (1-5 slaves) Johannes Bocklenbergh (6-10 slaves) Jan Van Der Swyn (11-24 slaves)
4 Roelof Van Tonder (0 slaves) Jan Jurgen Rose (6-10 slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
5 Nicolaas Walters (11-24 slaves) Joost Reinard Schenk (6-10 slaves) Jan Christoffel Bek (.)
6 Andries van Tonder (1-5 slaves) Nicolaas Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Andries Bruyns (1-5 slaves)
7 Arie Lekkerwyn (0 slaves) Arend Gildenhuis (1-5 slaves) Lukas Meyer (.)
8 - Jan Gerrit van Denventer (0 slaves) Geertruida de Wit (1-5 slaves)
9 - Christoffelse Styntie De Bruyn (6-10 slaves) Johannes Ernst Heger (1-5 slaves)
10 - Christiaan Bock (11-24 slaves) Jasper Raats (0 Slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1 - 5 slaves)
2 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Pieter Terblanche (.) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves
3 Roelof Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Joseph Nietsche (.)
4 Daniel Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Maria Johanna Hugo (11-24 slaves) Adriaan Louw (1 - 5 slaves)
5 Christiaan Victor (.) Stephanus Stroh (11-24 slaves) Godlieb Wilhelm Bekker (0 slaves)
6 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Gabriel Stoltz (1-5 slaves) Hester Pool (11 - 24 slaves)
7 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Daniel Hugo (.) Daniel Petrus Boshof (0 Slaves)
8 Salomon Bosch (1-5 slaves) Jan Jacob Jarling (.) Andries Stockenstrom (.)
9 Jurgen Jansen (1-5 slaves) Hendrik Christiaan Herholdt (25+ slaves) Jacobus Slabbert (6 - 10 slaves)
10 Hendrik Ras (0 slaves) Jacobus Scheepers (11-24 slaves) Andries Brink (0 slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but considered when the centralities are calculated.
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Table 4.8: Top 10 degree central individuals with weights added
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
1 Simon Groot (1-5 slaves) Arnoldus Kruisman (25+ slaves) Judith Kuyp (11-24 slaves)
2 Philip Snyman (0 slaves) Anna Retief (11-24 slaves) Jan Van Der Swyn (11-24 slaves)
3 Pieter Willem Van Zyl (0 Slaves) Jacques Pinard (0 Slaves) Jan Meindert Kruywagen (1-5 slaves)
4 Francois Bastiaanse (0 Slaves) Jan Dirk De Beer (25+ slaves) Hendrik Thomas Van Hoesum (6-10 slaves)
5 Adolf Daniels (1-5 slaves) Ferdinand Appel (6-10 slaves) Aletta Van Der Storm (6-10 slaves)
6 Jan Pieters Louw (1-5 slaves) Nicolaas Laubscher (11-24 slaves) Gelyn Van Gogh (0 slaves)
7 Nicolaas Walters (11-24 slaves) Maria La Febre (25+ slaves) Geertruida De Wit (1-5 slaves)
8 Roelof Van Tonder (0 slaves) Johannes Bocklenbergh (6-10 slaves) Jan Jacob Grandam (6-10 slaves)
9 Willem Jans De Wereld (1-5 slaves) Joost Reinard Schenk (6-10 Slaves) Hendrik Hoppe (11-24 slaves)
10 Johannes Pythius (6-10 Slaves) Jacob Vliet (1-5 slaves) Emma Martha Van Der Byl (25+ slaves)
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Hermanus Keeve (6-10 slaves) Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp (25+ slaves) Johan Adam Neumeister (25+ slaves)
2 Jacob Van Reenen (11-24 slaves) Josua Joubert (11-24 slaves) Johan George Stadeler (25+ slaves)
3 Fredrik Sparman (1-5 slaves) Johan Adam Raubenheimer (11-24 slaves) Johannes Petrus Serrurier (25+ slaves)
4 Joachim Nicolaas Von Dessin (11-24 slaves) Abraham De Haan (25+ slaves) Goris Janse Van Middelkoop (11 - 24 slaves)
5 Cornelis Van Rooyen (6-10 slaves) Andries Brink (1-5 slaves) Johan Heinrich Richter (6 - 10 slaves)
6 Johanna Siekermans (11-24 slaves) Jan Martin Vogel (25+ slaves) Johan Wiggerd Brummer (1-5 slaves)
7 Johannes Henricus Blankenberg (25+ slaves) Johannes Albertus Laubscher (25+ slaves) Maria Johanna Jurgens (11 - 24 slaves)
8 Jurgen Jansen (1-5 slaves) Michiel Otto (11-24 slaves) Christoffel Coenraad Prediger (6 - 10 slaves)
9 Christiaan Ackerman (11-24 slaves) Johannes Matthias Bletterman (11-24 slaves) Hermanus Augustinus Vermaak (11 - 24 slaves)
10 Maria Knoetse (1-5 slaves) Jan Jacob Meyer (25+ slaves) Christiaan Fleck (25+ slaves)
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but considered when the centralities are calculated.
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For the period before 1700, the addition of weights re-orders the individuals who are central
to the network. No changes occur after 1700, whether weights are added or not. The reason
for this is how the network is connected. Golub and Lever (2010) found that when a network
is well-connected, centrality measures are not affected by small changes in groups. The giant
component of a network is the largest part of the network with connected nodes and excludes
single connections.6 It is an indication of the connectedness of the network. When the giant
component’s visibility (the proportion of nodes and edges in the giant component) was com-
pared across the periods, the first period was markedly less connected than the periods after.
This is shown in Table 4.9. Two reasons for the high connectedness in later periods are the role
of institutions (many individuals are connected through the VOC, church or Orphan Chamber)
and how many individuals were connected to others through a central individual like Thobias
Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp.
Table 4.9: Proportion of nodes and edges in giant component of network
Periods Nodes Edges
Before 1700 67.34 74.9
1700-1724 93.29 97.63
1725-1749 92.27 99.24
1750-1774 92.32 96.4
1775-1800 94.85 98.03
1800-1824 86.78 93.38
Notes: Calculated by author using Gephi, giant component topology filter applied
This section focused on individuals’ centralities and asked whether the wealthy were the most
central. The results were two-fold: first, by using network analysis, some of the central his-
torical figures could be identified. Although the results presented several familiar names, it
also revealed unfamiliar individuals. Some of these were women. The results also showed that
slavery continued to matter at the Cape, as the correlation between eigenvector centrality and
slave ownership shows. But the link between overall wealth and centrality is generally weak.
The next section shifts the focus from individuals to families.
6The entire network includes single connections between nodes or small networks. The figure below shows
two such cases found in the first period. If these ‘disconnected’ nodes and networks are taken into consideration
for centrality measures it skews the measures to them. For example, the individual connected to the three others
in the small (star) network will have a very high betweenness centrality, but he/she is only connected to three
others. The giant component excludes any small star networks and single connections.
87
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.5 Families versus individuals: Central families and their
impact on centrality
As the previous sections have shown, the strength of weak ties has had little influence on the
Cape’s centralities, mainly due to the high level of connectedness in the Cape’s MOOC 8 credit
network. However, social networks are not only individual-based, but also determined by fa-
milial connections. For this reason, I present the most central families based on the surnames
of the individuals in the probate inventories.7
Figure 4.3 shows the network of surnames for period 3 (or between 1750 and 1774) with eigen-
vector centralities. There was a large decrease in the number of nodes due to the clustering
of names under one surname. Figure 4.4 shows how the network looks for borrowing within a
family.
The two families shown in Figure 4.4 who borrowed within their family are the Keeves and
the Ackermans. The transactions between the two Ackermans can be found in the probate
inventory of Christiaan Ackerman (MOOC8/7.18), who died in 1751. This is an example of
not only interfamilial debt, but also intergenerational debt. The debt was between Christiaan
Ackerman and his eldest son, also Christiaan, for a bond (onderhandsche obligatie) worth 1 229
rds. Christiaan senior was the burgher commissaris at the Cape, had many properties in Cape
Town and owned 18 slaves. Young Christiaan’s estate inventory was not in the MOOC 8 series.
Christiaan Ackerman also had a debt from Christiaan Godhard Ackerman (MOOC8/6.89), who
died in 1745. Christiaan Godhard Ackerman was probably Christiaan Ackerman’s father, but
there is some doubt. This debt was worth 808 rds according to the bond, with four months’
interest, and would have been paid in 1745 (before Christiaan Ackerman’s death in 1751).
The Keeve debt shown in the figure was between father and son for an inheritance owed to the
latter. Hermanus Keeve (MOOC8/10.71a) died in 1760 with a debt to his son Petrus from his
mother’s inventory worth 333 rds. But Hermanus Keeve also owed debts to Jacob Van Reenen,
who was part of the gentry, and Jan Serrurier, also part of a rich family which owned many
farms in and around Stellenbosch. These are two examples of how important familial networks
were in the Cape’s credit network – not only to gain access to credit, but also to form part of
7A limitation of the results presented here is that they do not take marriages into account, but with future
merging of the genealogical records and this network data, these links can be added.
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Figure 4.3: Network of families for 1725 to 1749, with eigenvector centralities
a larger network.
A concern when looking at large families in a social network context is that the analysis will
only identify the largest families – in this case, at the Cape. However, when I compared the
surnames that had been identified using social network analysis to those in the genealogical
records8, they did not correspond. In fact, few of the large families in the genealogical records
are present in the families identified through social network analysis. Cilliers (2016:44) shows
that larger families were wealthier than smaller families during this period at the Cape. But
as shown before for individuals, there is little correlation between wealth and centrality in the
Cape’s credit network. The same holds for families: wealthy families (in terms of slave owner-
ship) were not the most central.
8The list of large families in the genealogical records can be found in Appendix B.
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Figure 4.4: Examples of borrowing within a family
Table 4.10: Top 10 eigenvector central surnames
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Venter Laubscher Laubscher Keeve Ro¨nnenkamp Stadeler
2 De Beer Schenk Van Dyk Mulder Brink Smit
3 Kruywagen Van Dyk Pfeyl Serrurier Joubert Van Der Merwe
4 Knockers Kruisman Smith De Villiers Meyer Louw
5 Loos Bockelenberg Frits Van Reenen Laubscher Burger
6 Snyman Bothma Lekkerwyn Jansen Smith Coetzee
7 Pretorius Van Der Heide Van Der Merwe Blanckenberg Botha Van Wyk
8 Lessing Van Staden Van Staden Ackerman De Villiers Brummer
9 Maree Sanders Schenk Van Schoor Herhold Serrurier
10 Slabbert Van Der Merwe Bothma Artois Lombaard De Villiers
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the
centralities were calculated.
The next aspect to note when comparing the families in a social network context was the per-
sistence of the families who appear in the tables. The Laubscher family appeared in the top
of the eigenvector centrality over three periods. The Schenk, Van Dyk, Smith, Bothma, Van
Der Merwe, Serrurier and De Villiers are families which all appeared twice. This suggests once
a family became central it was more likely to stay central, even with changes in their relative
position.
But the fact that a central individual within a central family is important should not be un-
derestimated. For example, in period 2 (between 1700 and 1725 with weights added), Nicolaas
Laubscher (MOOC8/4.35) was the sixth most central individual (degree and betweenness). He
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Table 4.11: Top 10 betweenness central surnames
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Snyman Kruisman Schenk Mulder Ro¨nnenkamp Louw
2 Venter De Bruyn De Bruyn Van Reenen Joubert Smit
3 Van Zyl Bothma Bothma Keeve Smit Van Wyk
4 Morkel Laubscher Mulder De Villiers Botha Jansen
5 Bestbier Everts Laubscher Jansen Rossouw Du Plessis
6 Louw Coetzee Bissieux Eksteen Van Der Merwe Van Der Westhuizen
7 Walters Pfeyl Visser Beck Pienaar De Villiers
8 Hugo Bockelenberg Claas Van Rooyen Du Toit Vermaak
9 - Schenk Bock Blanckenberg Van De Caab Neumeister
10 - Bezuidenhout Van Wyk Van Wyk Gous Van Der Merwe
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the
centralities were calculated.
Table 4.12: Top 10 degree central surnames
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
1 Snyman Kruisman Laubscher Keeve Ro¨nnenkamp Smit
2 Groot Laubscher Schenk Mulder Joubert Louw
3 Van Zyl Retief Appel Jansen Botha Van Der Westhuizen
4 Daniels Pinard Retief Van Reenen Meyer Neumeister
5 Bastiaanse De Beer Visser De Villiers Brink Stadeler
6 Louw Appel De Bruyn Blanckenberg Raubenheimer Van Wyk
7 Van Tonder Schenk Mulder Van Rooyen Smit De Villiers
8 Walters Bockelenberg Bissieux Du Plessis Van Der Merwe Vermaak
9 Venter Gansvanger Van Staden Le Roux Du Toit Du Plessis
10 Cortje Vliet Gildenhuis Ackerman De Haan Van Der Merwe
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The three main institutions (VOC, Orphan Chamber and church) are not shown here, but were considered when the centralities
were calculated.
owned five houses in Cape Town, 18 slaves, had no less than 20 bonds owed to him and had
only one debt to the Orphan Chamber when he died in 1721. His son’s inventory was also in
the MOOC 8 series. Johannes Laubscher (MOOC8/4.5), when he died in 1720, was owed 650
rds by his father, but had two debts to doctors. In period 4, we find Johannes Laubscher’s son,
Roelof Laubscher. He had a net estate of 6 990 rds, with credit worth 8 815 rds and 1 825 rds
debt, much of it for bonds. Roelof was also central when considering the individuals for the
fourth period, ranking second for eigenvector centrality and third for betweenness centrality.
The Laubscher family likely owe their central status to these individuals.
A word of caution. While most surnames are of individuals that are related, some may have
had the same surname but be unrelated. Many former slaves took the surname ‘Van De Caab’.
The reason for the high betweenness centrality of the Van Der Caabs was because of a link
to Thobias Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp. He owed a debt to Silvia Van De Caab and her grand-
daughter, Sophia Christina Wilhelmina Van De Caab, but also extended credit to Eva Van De
Caab, widow of burgher Pieter Zeeger (MOOC8/19.22): a bond worth 100 rds for capital. This
connection between Ro¨nnenkamp and the Van De Caabs made the other connections of the
Van De Caabs, like that with the Kannemeyers, part of the bigger network without which they
91
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
certainly would have been excluded.
This is an illustration of how clustering at family level can bring intricate connections to the
fore in network. Based on this analysis, central families tended to stay central. What remains
to be discovered is what determined this position.
4.6 The central role of institutions
Table 4.9 showed how few nodes and connections are lost when we consider the giant component
of the network. I mentioned that this was because of the three major institutions at the Cape
– the Company, the Orphan Chamber and the church. The ‘church’ here refers to the Dutch
Reformed Church, which had a monopoly on organised religion until the establishment of the
Lutheran Church in 1780.
The Cape was not unique in that these institutions were involved in the provision of credit.
In other Dutch colonies, like Makassar and Batavia, these institutions also played a role.
Gelderblom and Jonker (2009) showed how institutional investors in Amsterdam were key in
Dutch financial development. At the Cape, they provided initial loans for capital (mainly farms)
and labour (imported slaves). Ross (1989) showed how large contributions to the credit mar-
ket came from Company employees, like Joachim von Dessin (MOOC8/10.76). But providing
credit on a large scale is not equal to being central and well-connected in a network. Pagett and
Ansell (1993) showed that the Medicis’ connectedness was more important than their wealth in
medieval Florence. I would like to show here how the connectedness of the Company, Orphan
Chamber and church was key to the credit market at the Cape. The Orphan Chamber’s capital
came from the inheritances of minors they were put in charge of.
Over the entire period, with the exception of period 2, at least one of these institutions was in
the Top 10 centrality measures. The degree centralities show that the institutions were often
involved in many transactions, but not in the most. Here, the Orphan Chamber appeared the
most. Whether this was because the probate inventories were taken by the Orphan Chamber,
which would have skewed the data, cannot be known for sure. But the precision with which
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Table 4.13: Position of the three main institutions at the Cape in the Top 10 centrality
measures
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
Degree 8 Orphan Chamber Not in Top 10 2 Orphan Chamber 2 Company 2 Company 5 Orphan Chamber
Centrality 4 Orphan Chamber 7 Orphan Chamber
Eigenvector
3 Company Not in Top 10 2 Orphan Chamber 2 Company 2 Company 1 Orphan Chamber
6 Orphan Chamber 3 Orphan Chamber 2 Church
Centrality 5 Government
Betweenness
5 Company Not in Top 10 1 Orphan Chamber 1 Orphan Chamber 2 Company 1 Orphan Chamber
6 Church 3 Church 2 Church 3 Orphan Chamber 4 Church
Centrality
4 Company 5 Church
10 Lutheran Church
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
many of the personal transactions were captured in the probate inventories suggests these mea-
surements are accurate.
More important for the structure of the network are the eigenvector and betweenness central-
ities. The Company and the Orphan Chamber both had high eigenvector centrality rankings.
A reason for this is that Company employees often borrowed from them. For example, Thobias
Christiaan Ro¨nnenkamp owed almost 13 000 rds to the Orphan Chamber and 3 200 rds to
the Company; Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen owed 800 rds to the Company; Nicolaas Laubscher
(mentioned before) owed 800 rds to the Orphan Chamber. These are just a few examples.
Borrowing from the Company happened almost exclusively to purchase land, again a case for
why it became influential in the market, while the Orphan Chamber and church were involved
in borrowing for production purposes.
The high rankings of these institutions in terms of betweenness and eigenvector centrality at
the Cape meant they were important for settlers to built connections through, and bound many
individuals in the network together, despite not always being involved in the most transactions,
as shown in Chapter 2.
4.7 Conclusion
Historians have long showed that social networks were important for the access to and use of
credit in pre-industrial economies, where formal intermediation by banks were absent. However,
the quantitative measurement of these networks has not featured prominently. This chapter
was an attempt to show how the methods of social network analysis can be used to view the
Cape’s credit market through its social interaction. I focused on three measures of centrality:
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degree, betweenness and eigenvector centrality, and on individuals, families, and institutions.
The network for individuals grew rapidly over time. The regression results showed that within
the patriarchal society of the Cape, men featured as conduits of information, while the wealthy
(in terms of slave ownership) were somewhat more influential. The weak support for the link
between networks and wealth was contrary to previous evidence that networks were dominated
by the wealthy. The high level of connectedness in the network due to the role of the Company,
church and Orphan Chamber was the reason for the small impact of the theory of the strength
of weak ties on the analysis.
When families were considered, the lower number of nodes in the network helped to better iden-
tify relationships and what their connections meant. Many of the central families stayed central
once they became central, and what remains to be determined is what caused this centrality.
The results also showed how the three institutions at the Cape – the Company, the Orphan
Chamber and the church – were central to the network. This meant many more individuals
became part of a single network because of borrowing from these institutions, and because of
the connections individuals made through them. This chapter was a basic illustration of how
the methodology of social network analysis can be used to quantify networks in an economic
context. It should be extended to other countries and periods, to compare how networks and
their structures differed across institutional arrangements.
94
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 5
Ties that bind: Family, background
and credit transactions
5.1 Introduction
In the sixteenth century, a new proverb was coined by William Turner. In ‘The Rescuing of the
Romish Fox’, he wrote: ‘Byrdes of on kynde and color flok and flye allwayes together’, better
known today as ‘birds of a feather flock together.’ The expression came from the observation
that people with the same characteristics, tastes, and background tend to associate more with
each other (Speake, 2008:58). More recently, social network analysis has provided empirical
evidence for this observation. Homophily is the occurrence in observed networks where more
ties are formed between nodes who share similar characteristics than would be predicted by
random networks. Empirical evidence of homophily was found by Fryer (2007), who calculated
significantly lower rates of interracial marriage in the US than would be predicted by theory.
Schrum et al. (1988) found that students in high schools tend to disproportionately form friend-
ships (strong or weak) with peers of the same race.
Centola et al. (2007) found three major reasons for homophily in a social structure: similar
beliefs, similar culture, and induced homophily, such as geography. Ruef et al. (2003) found
individuals tend toward similar individuals because of trust, attraction and understanding. Ho-
mophily also tends to be self-perpetuating. McPherson et al. (2001) found ‘homophily tends to
get stronger as more types of relationships (across race, for example) are introduced.’ Many of
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these causes are known by economists as informal institutions (Williamson, 2000).
This does not explain why it is important to study homophily in social contexts. Currarini
et al. (2009) built a model not only to measure homophily but also to present a prediction of
its effect on welfare. They found that the weight given to diversity will determine the benefit
or loss to general welfare if more groups are introduced to the society. Another important
aspect of homophily is its influence on communication. Golub and Jackson (2012) found that
as homophily becomes greater and closer to one, communication tends to zero and consensus
becomes infinite. They further found that communication is greatly influenced by a network’s
diameter. This has consequences for, for example, voting in democratic societies.
Homophily also influences choices in human capital. Calvo´-Armengol and Jackson (2007) dis-
cuss the labour market in terms of social networks. They show how different types of jobs
(which require different levels of educational attainment) determine the choice of educational
attainment. Specifically, if an individual has more educated friends, they are also more likely
to invest in education and find a more highly skilled job.
Another important aspect of networks influenced by homophily is diffusion. Diffusion refers to
the speed at which an idea, or a new technology, spreads through the network. Jackson and
Lo´pez-Pintado (2013) found that homophily can facilitate or hamper diffusion. This will de-
pend on the population and the relative desire for diffusion; for example, new technologies will
carry a higher desire for diffusion relative to disease. Halberstam and Knight (2014) similarly
found that information spreads more quickly in groups with similar characteristics.
I propose another aspect of homophily – trading among European settlers in a new colony.
In developed countries, inter-personal trading or lending is virtually non-existent today, while
in developing countries it still occurs regularly. An example can be found in Banerjee et al.
(2013), who studied microlending in India. Here, many households still borrow various goods,
like kerosene and rice, from each other. But research on social networks is data-intensive, as
micro-level information on individual interaction is needed. For this reason, I propose to use
historical data with detailed information on individual trading and connections to study ho-
mophily.
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The Cape Colony was a settler/slave economy where immigrants came mainly from three re-
gions in Europe: the Netherlands, Germany and France. Historical evidence suggests that
these cultures assimilated into each other within two generations. However, when I used social
network analysis and to analyse credit transactions in terms of homophily, a different picture
emerged. In this chapter, I show that these cultures only integrated toward the second half of
the eighteenth century. To explain this, I propose that familial trading on credit was low at the
start of colonial settlement and increased at the same time as the cultures started to integrate.
The chapter is set out as follows: I first discuss the historiography of the Cape and the various
groups which emerged with the development and expansion of the settlement. I then shift
the focus specifically to the regions in Europe from where the settlers immigrated from, and
how these cultures interacted with each other. I then show evidence of homophily in trad-
ing on credit between these cultures, with increasing levels over the entire eighteenth century.
A possible reason for this is increased trading within families, which I explain before concluding.
5.2 The Cape Colony’s wealth groups and their Euro-
pean nationalities
The Cape was first settled by the Dutch East India Company, not with the purpose of becoming
a full colony, but to serve as a refreshment station for ships between Europe and India. Cattle
would be traded from the local population and fresh vegetables and fruit would be produced
around the fort built in Cape Town. Demand quickly outstripped supply, and the Company
made the decision to release nine of its employees to become free settlers. It was well known
that the Company drew its employees from all over Europe, including Germany and the Scandi-
navian countries. But at the Cape, Dutch and German settlers remained the dominant groups.
In fact, with the release of the employees to become free burghers, it was only Dutch and Ger-
man immigrants who were considered (Moodie, 1960). The Cape saw as many as 4 000 German
settlers arrive during the eighteenth century (Shell, 2005).
Another group soon arrived at the Cape. After the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes,
Huguenots from France scattered across Europe, often fleeing to the Netherlands in search
of better economic opportunities or to avoid prosecution. In 1688, the first Huguenots arrived
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at the Cape. The Huguenots have been studied and recorded extensively in Cape history (for
example, Botha (1939) and Nathan (1939)). Fourie and Von Fintel (2014) found the French
used their wine-making skills to become a part of society, and many became very successful
and influential.
These three European groups are of interest here. The Dutch and German immigrants are
often seen as a contrast to their French counterparts. With the arrival of the Huguenots, the
plan for them was to be integrated as quickly as possible by scattering their farms between
those of the Dutch. But according to Whiting-Spilhaus (1949), the French wanted to remain
as close to each other as possible. The French also resisted efforts to assimilate into society –
they kept their language and complained about not understanding Dutch sermons, even though
a common Protestant faith was shared between the groups. These efforts seem to have been
in vain, with De Kiewiet (1941) saying: ‘In two generations or less, the two groups (Dutch
and French) had grown together and become one.’ This is the research question I wished to
investigate here: Did the French really assimilate this quickly, or did groups continue to trade
within their own European nationality rather than with others?
Another group, differentiated not by their European origin, but rather by their wealth, is of-
ten mentioned in the Cape’s history: the gentry. These were individuals who owned many
farms, often large in size, and also many slaves. Research into who these individuals were was
started by Guelke and Shell (1983). The gentry is described as socially mobile and they often
consolidated wealth over generations. One of the main individuals and key to the gentry was
Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen (Guelke and Shell, 1983; Groenewald, 2009). Johannes Kruijwagen
was another member of the gentry, described as the main creditor by Guelke and Shell (1983).
Groenewald (2009) suggests this title is an overestimation and was probably based on the large
number of debt transactions he was linked to at the time. Wouter de Vos and Martin Melck
are other members often associated with this group. Schoeman (2011b:276-277) suggests that
it was networks at the Cape that enabled a mutual dependence between the poor and the rich.
Dooling (2005:130) also suggests that ‘the extension of credit was closely tied to the dominance
of the gentry over Cape economy and society.’
A problem with a too-narrow focus on the gentry is that it ignores the largest part of the
population. Williams (2013) argues that ‘[a] focus on the wealthiest landowners in the Cape
and Stellenbosch Districts leaves out of the picture Drakenstein, where most of the farmers
lived and where more wine was produced than in either of the two other wine-producing areas.’
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Recent research has shown that although not to the levels of the gentry, the average wealth
at the Cape was relatively high (Fourie, 2013; De Zwart, 2011; Du Plessis and Du Plessis, 2012).
With regard to credit, the only financial innovation came toward the end of the eighteenth
century with the introduction of the ‘slagtersbriefjes ’. These were promissory notes given to
cattle and sheep farmers on the eastern frontier, which could be converted into cash upon de-
livery of their meat in Cape Town. However, this endeavour came crashing down with the first
financial crisis experienced at the Cape between 1788 and 1793 (Havemann and Fourie, 2014).
The individuals who took centre stage with both the invention and the subsequent crash, were
the Van Reenen brother and their father. Jacob Van Reenen, father to Dirk, Jacobus Gijsbert
and Sebastiaan, built a large estate in the meat and alcohol business of the Cape. His sons
continued this legacy by controlling a monopoly on the supply of meat to the Company and
invented the ‘slagtersbriefjes ’ (Havemann and Fourie, 2014).
The alcohol pachters, or urban merchants, were another prominent group of settlers at the
Cape. The main research on them has come from Groenewald (2007, 2011). These were alcohol
monopolies bought from the Company at auctions, but from which the Company also gained
the largest portion of its direct income. One distinction between the pachters and the gentry
was the nature of risk in their business – a large concern for the pachters was creditors calling
in loans. In fact, Groenewald (2007) calls these pachters a social group in their own right,
different even from the pachters traditionally observed in the Netherlands. Another aspect to
note of these pachters is that many of them were of German origin, including Martin Melck,
whom many consider as the wealthiest man at the Cape (Guelke and Shell, 1983).
The relationship between these groups shows how important networks were at the Cape, and
often these groups were interrelated with each other through marriage. For example, Hendrik
Oostwald Eksteen married the daughter of Jan Meindert Kruijwagen, also father to Johannes
Kruijwagen (Groenewald, 2009). But it also extended to friendships, for example, Martin
Melck was close friends with the Van Reenen brothers (Groenewald, 2011). Baartman (2011)
also acknowledges this integration of groups through networks. He studied a group of burgher
protestors in 1779 and concluded that networks were based on familial and business relations.
This presents the opportunity to apply the social network methodology to the Cape. It also
makes sense, then, to use the credit records in the probate inventories to explore social groups
and the connections between them.
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The short literature review provided here offered evidence that homophily is often present in
societies and its networks. Distinct groups existed at the Cape: Dutch, French and German.
But as discussed before, the Dutch, who were in the majority, wanted the French to assimilate
to their culture as quickly as possible, while the cultural discrepancies between the Dutch and
the Germans were negligible (De Kiewiet, 1941:6,7). This is the question this chapter turns to
next. Is homophily observed at the Cape and did it dissipate over time? Or more specifically,
did trading on credit happen randomly between the different nationalities, or was there a ten-
dency to trade with those who came from the same European region?
One aspect of trading on credit is trust, and a mutual reliance on each other (Muldrew, 2012).
But trust is also an important aspect of homophily (Ruef et al., 2003). If the two are combined,
homophily should be present in credit networks. Two arguments have been established in the
Cape’s historiography. The first argument is that the settlers of different European nation-
alities quickly drew to each other at the Cape and became similar (De Kiewiet, 1941). The
second argument, by contrast, is that some skills continued to be dominated by some groups
throughout the eighteenth century (Fourie and Von Fintel, 2014). This chapter adds to these
arguments by testing homophily in the Cape’s credit network. If the first argument is accurate,
less homophily should be observed over time, while more homophily should suggest that culture
and European background may have been more important than earlier thought.
5.3 Ties that bind: Homophily and trading on credit in
the Cape Colony
To identify which group an individual belonged to, surnames were first standardised in terms
of spelling and then traced back to their origin in Europe. Many of these were captured in the
genealogies, but others were added by Cilliers (2016:48). These surnames were then matched
to the credit transactions in the probate inventories. A transaction between someone with the
French surname Du Plessis and someone with the French surname Du Preez would therefore
be a French-French transaction, while a transaction between a Du Plessis and a De Beer would
be a French-Dutch transaction, and so forth. A transaction between two individuals with the
same surname was classified as a familial transaction. Although this latter strategy was not
completely accurate, since two first arrivals with the same surname were not necessarily re-
lated, it was the simplest way to identify transactions within families. At the time this research
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was done, the data did not allow for the tracing of marriages and intermarriage between these
groups. I return to why this is important later in the chapter.
If transactions occurred randomly between groups, the theory predicts that the proportion
of transactions within the same group would be the same as their proportion to the popula-
tion. So, if the Dutch constitute 28 percent of the population before 1700, and if transactions
happened at random, 28 percent of transactions involving Dutch should be with other Dutch.
However, a proportion higher than the proportion to the population would be an indication of
homophily. Throughout the period, there is evidence of homophily in all three groups, i.e. the
actual proportion of transactions between the groups are highter than the expected proportion.
The Dutch group moves from a negative of 4.95 percent in period one to a maximum of 24.17
percent in period four and 17.22 percent in the final period. The German group moves from
10.81 percent in the first period to 17.18 percent in the final period and the French group from
25.68 percent in the first period to 15.55 percent in the final period. A summary of this is
presented in Table 5.1, while Figure 5.1 shows the whole network for period 4 (between 1750
and 1774), and the seperate European origin groups’ networks.
Table 5.1: Homophily: Expected and observed number of transactions by origin groups
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
Dutch
Expected 28.38 15.08 20.77 26.68 19.90 33.42
Actual 33.33 20.00 33.33 50.85 47.83 50.64
Difference -4.95 -4.92 -12.56 -24.17 -27.93 -17.22
German
Expected 39.19 19.05 21.92 34.24 36.96 37.10
Actual 50.00 40.00 40.00 42.55 42.21 54.28
Difference -10.81 -20.95 -18.08 -8.31 -5.25 -17.18
French
Expected 24.32 65.08 55.77 38.03 42.40 27.55
Actual 50.00 86.84 64.47 57.32 68.82 43.10
Difference -25.68 -21.76 -8.70 -19.29 -26.42 -15.55
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
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Figure 5.1: Network between 1750 and 1774 and the respective European origin groups’ networks
102
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
It is clear that homophily was present at the Cape in terms of European background and trad-
ing on credit. The observed number of transactions between groups was consistently higher
than the expected number of transactions for the groups. Figure 5.2 presents the differences
for the various periods with a fitted polynomial (to the second degree) line. The groups who
experienced less homophily over time and therefore integrated into the other groups are the
French and German surnames, but the German trend was much stronger than the French. The
German surnames had an initial increase in homophily, followed by a long period of deterio-
rating homophily, before it increased slightly. The French initially experiences less homophily,
but this quickly returns to the initial high levels of homophily. The Dutch experienced more
homophily throughout the period, with slighly less homophily toward the end of the period.
At the start of the nineteenth century, the groups were at the same level – 15-17 percent more
transactions within the group than expected under random networks.
Figure 5.2: Homophily trends at the Cape Colony over time
To determine when the cultures moved toward each other, I calculated the turning points for
the various groups. The Dutch turning point was only in the final period, while the French and
German turning points were close to each other in the fourth period (the mid-eighteenth cen-
tury). This suggests that initially the French and German surnames experienced less homophily,
but turned and experienced more homophily in the second half of the eighteenth century.
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Although this should not be taken as evidence against the observed cultural assimilation, it is
evident that trading was at least reserved for those with the same background, as can be seen
through the high levels of homphily trends throughout the eighteenth century (the measure-
ment never becomes zero). This suggests the groups remained distinct when it came to credit
transactions. Settlers tended to trade with others who shared their European nationality, rather
than with groups from a different nationality. This is further support for studies like Fourie
and Von Fintel (2014), who found the French protected their skills, and showed divergent levels
of productivity between Huguenots and Dutch wine-makers. It also supports historians like
Whiting-Spilhaus (1949) who stated that the French ‘wanted to be together’.
If it is assumed that the final levels are the steady state, this raises questions on what will
happen if another group is introduced. In 1820, the Cape Colony experienced another influx of
immigrants, this time from Britain. This came after the British government took control of the
Cape for the second time in 1806 and promoted immigration to the eastern frontier. Tensions
between the British and Dutch settlers (given German and French assimilation) are notorious,
and even cited as a reason for the Dutch migration toward the north of the country in the
1830s. This is beyond the scope of this study, but it adds another dimension to the study of
homophily and how social networks evolve over time.
5.4 How do we explain this homohily at the Cape?
The evidence that trading on credit continued to occur between settlers of the same Euro-
pean nationality can be explained by two factors – wealth and family trading. Wealth has been
shown throughout this dissertation as an important determinant of credit and debt at the Cape.
The Huguenots became wealthy and influential through their wine-making skills (Fourie and
Von Fintel, 2014) and many of the ‘gentry’, like Hendrik Oostwald Eksteen, and pachters, like
Martin Melck, were of German descent. In this selection of probate inventories, however, there
were no significant differences in the wealth of individuals, measured by the number of slaves
owned. Figure 5.3 shows the proportions of origin groups by each of the slave wealth groups.
To test whether the homophily explained in the previous section is related to wealth homophily,
I present the levels of homophily for these groups in Figure 5.4. Only weak homophily existed
for the wealth groups at the Cape. Three of the five groups showed between zero percent and
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Figure 5.3: Proportion of each European background to the respective slave ownership
groups
Figure 5.4: Homophily proportions within slave ownership groups at the Cape
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ten percent trading within the same group while those with no slaves showed much more trad-
ing with the other groups. This was to be expected; the poorest borrowed from the wealthy
in many societies. Guelke (1989:81–82), for example, states poor, small farmers ‘were tied to
wealthier ones by debts’ at the Cape. This is, however, evidence against Dooling (2007), who
suggested the gentry dominated the market.
A second possibility is that my earlier results on homophily within European nationality may
encompass family trading. During the earliest phase of Cape settlement, when the settler pop-
ulation would have been small and tenuous, most of the trading would have happened between
settlers who share a common background. This would have been the case as long as new mi-
grants arrived. However, in 1717, immigration to the Cape was actively discouraged by the
Company. As families grew larger, it is likely that familial relationships replaced national ori-
gin. The Cape’s population continued to grow due to high fertility. Within the three groups
of interest here, the Dutch settlers experienced the lowest fertility (Cilliers, 2016:49). However,
even after 1717, I continued to observe new surnames and control for these when I considered
the number of transactions within families. Figure 4.4 shows an example of trading within
families in a social network context. A transaction was classified as within-family if the two
parties involved had the same surname.
To test whether increased trading within families can explain the pattern in homophily at the
Cape, I used the total number of transactions for the different periods, the number of trans-
actions classified as within a family and the number of surnames observed for each period. I
calculated the proportion of within-family transactions as follows:
%Within-family transactions = Number of within-family transactions
Total number of transactions×Number of surnames in the period
Table 5.2 shows the results from this formula, while Figure 5.5 shows these results with a fit-
ted polynomial line. Figure 5.5 shows the same turning point in the middle of the eighteenth
century as Figure 5.2, where the increased homophily among the three groups expanded in
the previous sections. This increased trading within-family was likely the result of larger and
more settled families, which was also the cause of more homophily between the three European
nationalities at the Cape.
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Table 5.2: Homophily: Expected and observed number of transactions by origin groups
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749 1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
Total number of transactions 323 994 1938 2154 4898 7518
Within-family transactions 14 20 42 101 195 601
Number of surnames 208 449 699 802 1205 1733
Proportion of within-family transactions 2.08% 0.45% 0.31% 0.58% 0.33% 0.46%
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Figure 5.5: Proportion of credit transactions classified as within-family over the period
One area where this research now falls short is the influence of marriage on integration and
homophily. Historians have suggested marriage was key to social mobility at the Cape and also
for cultural assimilation (Botha, 1939; Nathan, 1939). It would be possible for future research
to add information on marriages and business relations to the existing network data and re-
estimate these results.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter set out to test the implications of homophily in social networks for credit transac-
tions. Homophily is the observation in social networks that nodes with the same characteristics
tend to link together. Many modern empirical studies have shown evidence of homophily in
different settings in social networks, like marriages or friendships. A limitation of modern data
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sets is the limited micro-level data available on the individual connections, but history offers
rich information on such transactions. I used such a historical data set of the Cape Colony’s
probate inventories to test homophily over the eighteenth century.
I identified many of the groups described as important in the Cape’s economy and credit net-
work. These varied from different groups from Europe to distinct wealth or trading groups.
Historical literature suggests that within the Cape there was rapid cultural assimilation be-
tween the three main cultures: Dutch, French, and German. Yet, in this credit network of the
Cape’s probate inventories, high and constant levels of trading within groups were observed.
This suggests a level of trust was reserved for those with the same European background when
it came to providing credit. As an explanation for this increased homophily and trading with
those with the same background characteristics, I tested whether this can be explained by a
similar pattern in wealth or by within-family trading. Wealth homophily showed little support
and was almost non-existent at the Cape, while within-family trading first decreased and then
increased at the same time as the increase in homophily was observed.
As far as I am aware, there is yet to be a study done on long-term homophily and its evolution.
These results provide the first indication and support for Williamson’s assumption that infor-
mal institutions, like trust and culture, are notoriously stable over time (Williamson, 2000).
My results showed little change over a century. Future research should add more information
especially regarding marriage and occupational relationships within this network, and their
effect on homophily, and integration of cultures. This will lend itself to testing the cultural
assimilation at the Cape more directly.
This chapter was the first application of a new methodology to the Cape’s MOOC credit mar-
ket and the influence of social networks on these transactions. Yet it only touched the surface
of the possible questions that can be addressed by using social network analysis. These in-
clude more research on homophily and the slow-changing nature of informal institutions. My
research ignores marriages and how they related to credit transactions, like the Medicis’ case,
where marriage was important. Did occupations play a role in network formation, and how
do these differ between occupations. These are only a few of the questions which can still be
answered by using social network analysis.
108
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Chapter 6
Which property rights matter for debt
– de jure or de facto? Evidence from
colonial South Africa
6.1 Property rights: the theory and empirical evidence
In order for any transaction, including debt transactions, to occur, an economic system, ac-
cording to North (1989), needs ‘well-specified and well-enforced property rights’. Coase (1960),
too, concluded that without the delimitation of initial rights, no market transactions can take
place. Such property rights systems evolve, suggested Demsetz (1967), from the ‘laws, customs
and mores of society’. These authors formed the beginning of scholarship into property rights
as an economic institution, and how important these rights are for economic development and
transactions.
More recently, studies have focused on presenting empirical evidence for the long-run impact
of property rights on economic development. One such study was by Acemoglu et al. (2001).
They used settler mortality as instrument for the initial property rights systems installed by
colonial powers, and show that this initial system mattered for long-term development. This
research in turn has spurred research into how property rights systems developed and mattered
in different regions. The aim here is to add to this debate and consider the Cape’s land market
in the context of property rights literature.
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Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) compared different New World economies and found that regions
where land had been acquired with relative ease are more aﬄuent today. A key to their hy-
pothesis is land abundance and the unequal distribution of factor endowments. Fenske (2012)
studied land abundance in nineteenth-century Nigeria and found, similar to Sokoloff and En-
german (2000), that land abundance caused weak property rights in land. A weak property
rights system in land then caused slaves to be used as collateral for market transactions rather
than land. Yet, the outcomes are also affected by the region in which the system is observed.
In India, land abundance and the land tenure systems related to it, caused different long-run
outcomes in different regions. Banerjee and Iyer (2005) show that in the historical districts
where large landlords (equated with relatively weak property rights) were in control, less in-
vestment and productivity were observed post-independence. Dell (2010) shows the opposite:
large landowners in Peru had well-defined and secure property rights. They had the ability
to protect the workforce from the forced labour, and in the long run, these regions had more
public provisions like schools and roads. These cases show how the social environment (of laws
and norms) in which a property rights system develops will have different effects on it in the
long run. Land relative to labour was abundant at the Cape, but the focus here is on the laws
which governed land ownership rather than the impact of land abundance on property rights.
Although not the focus of their study, Dye and La Croix (2014) states the loan farm system of
the Cape was a way to quickly integrate the vast lands into production.
The social environment includes laws, which govern land ownership. The evolution of these laws
on land ownership was the subject of investigation in De Soto (2001) and Lamoreaux (2011).
De Soto (2001) studied how property right laws changed over time in the US and concluded
that property law was successful once it took the social norms of settlers on the frontier into
account. Focused on the effect of one particular law, the Homestead Act of 1834, Lamoreaux
(2011) showed that the allocation of land by government would be fruitful as long as individuals
continued to believe that the underlying property rights to land were secure.
The social environment includes laws, which govern land ownership. The evolution of these laws
on land ownership was the subject of investigation in De Soto (2001) and Lamoreaux (2011).
De Soto (2001) studied how property right laws changed over time in the US and concluded
that property law was successful once it took the social norms of settlers on the frontier into
account. Focused on the effect of one particular law, the Homestead Act of 1834, Lamoreaux
(2011) showed that the allocation of land by government would be fruitful as long as individuals
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continued to believe that the underlying property rights to land were secure.
These laws include two parts: the right to use land and the right to own land. These are often
defined in terms of de jure and de facto property rights. On the frontiers in the US, Brazil
and Australia, the enforcement of property rights became key to development due to continual
expansion. Alston et al. (2012) built a model to investigate de jure and de facto property rights
and enforcement. They found conflict can arise when there are opposing claims on the land,
and that often systems evolve from de jure to de facto property rights systems. When these
are aligned, the protection of the land also becomes important. Hornbeck (2010) demonstrated
that it is equally important to protect land from encroachment than it is to have legal ownership
over it.
Dye and La Croix (2014) expand this model by applying it to the colonial South African case.
They found the Cape’s case to be different to the US, Australian and Brazilian model studied
in Alston et al. (2012). Their conclusion is that a new form of land ownership evolved – the
loan farm. This system was a response to the declining threat of the Khoikhoi and was a system
going from de facto to de jure property rights. This was because the settlers moved outside the
official colonial border, where they did not have formal protection of their land. The settlement
outside the official border later became an opportunity for the Company to charge rents and
extract revenue.
This chapter builds empirically on Dye and La Croix’s model by applying tools to test whether
the type of property rights regime mattered for economic transactions. Feder and Feeny (1991)
suggest land is only valuable as collateral where uncertainty is absent with regard to the rights
on land. In line with Alston et al. (2012), this would mean the de jure and de facto rights need to
be aligned and enforced. If these theories hold, the freehold farms of the Cape, with their more
secure property rights, would be more valuable collateral and the owners should have more debt.
One problem with this theory is endogeneity concerns, especially reverse causality. More assets
with better property rights mean better collateral and more debt, but debt may have been
incurred to obtain these assets. To solve this problem, an instrumental variable, namely being
the eldest son, was used. In a patriarchal society like the Cape, eldest sons were more likely
to own freehold farms and other sons the loan farms, despite the Roman-Dutch law for equal
inheritance between children. The results support other scholars like De Soto (2001), who found
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that norms matter and that these are often more powerful than the prescriptions defined in law.
6.2 Land policies at the Cape
Land is an important asset for production and a valuable form of collateral for debt transac-
tions. When the European settlement started, farms were modeled on the small-scale farming
found in the Netherlands. The first farms were placed under the ownership of nine employees
of the Company, and were released when the demand for fresh produce outstripped the supply.
The weather patterns and low soil quality forced the Company, under the leadership of Simon
Van Der Stel, to expand European settlement toward the mountainous Stellenbosch region.
Under the freehold policy of the Company, farmers could claim any size of land cultivated
within three years – the only requirement was to relinquish one tenth of the produce as a tax to
the Company (Duly, 1968:14). Many of these large landowning farmers became known as the
‘landed gentry’ (Guelke and Shell, 1983). Besides the large swathes of land owned, they also
owned many slaves. Under the freehold policy, all rights to the land were transferred from the
Company to the individual - making them tradable and inheritable. The prices of these farms
increased throughout the first century of European settlement (Guelke, 1989).
The main determinant of claiming land was the soil quality, and although it is unlikely that all
the farms had the same soil quality, most had access to a river (Guelke and Shell, 1983). The
unavailability of more suitable soil in the region made new claims almost impossible, and the
policy was terminated in 1717. The settled farms, however, continued to be sold from settler
to settler or inherited over generations (Newton-King, 1999:18). Guelke created a map of the
freehold farms to show the extent of these farms up to 1750 (Guelke, 1987).
The second-most used form of farms, which emerged after 1717, was loan farms. Loan farms
were obtained with relative ease: they were loaned from the Company for three, six or twelve
months at a fixed, low rate. The size of each farm was determined by riding half an hour
on horseback in each direction. However, this new distinct land policy was different from the
freehold system in legal terms. Legally, the only parts of the loan farm which could be sold were
fixed improvements, while the ownership of land remained with the Company. Duly (1968:15)
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makes the observation that ‘the system was a form of legalized squatting’.1
Yet what happened in actuality was that the ownership between the two systems became in-
distinguishable. Guelke (1976:31) argues that ‘[i]n practice there was little distinction between
freehold land and leeningsplaatsen (loan farms).’2 In fact, he goes further by saying ‘the leases
became so secure that the fixed improvements (which could be sold)3 came to reflect the value
of the whole property.’ Newton-King (1999:99) comes to the same conclusion: the loan farms
were similarly secure to the freehold farms. In economic and property rights terms, this meant
the two land ownership systems at the Cape had distinct de jure property rights, but de facto
the property rights were considered the same.
A concern here would be the strength of the de jure property rights, especially of the loan farms.
The Company in de jure terms had the rights to reclaim the land at any time, despite the fact
that the settlers de facto saw them as the same. Gie (1963:153) says this rarely happened, and
would only happen if the government wanted to establish a town in the area. In this case, the
loan farm was not just claimed by the Company, but the farmer was fully compensated for the
land. This is more support that the loan farms were in fact as secure as the freehold farms in
terms of property rights.
In comparing the two systems, Guelke (1976) concluded that the freehold farms were more
valuable because of their relative closeness to Cape Town. The first-mover advantage of these
farms also secured more protection. Initially, the Company provided ample military protection
to the freehold farms, but as the colony expanded, the cost became too large. This coincided
with an ebbing threat from the Khoikhoi. The new farms on the frontier, the loan farms, en-
joyed less protection (Fourie et al., 2013).
But the European expansion also had a significant impact on land ‘owned’ by the Khoikhoi.
The Khoikhoi as a pastoral people had communal property rights. Schapera (1930:127) shows
how the Khoikhoi families banded together and lived on a stretch of land, with ‘equal right to
hunt and collect over any part of it and to use the water in it.’ The settlers often claimed to
1It should be noted here that the system which developed at the Cape was different from the leening system
found in the Netherlands. The system in the Netherlands was closer to a freehold system than the system at
the Cape (De Vries and Van Der Woude, 1997:160–162).
2parentheses mine
3parentheses mine
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have purchased land from the Khoikhoi. With their understanding of property and land own-
ership, these transactions were probably misunderstood by the Khoikhoi and rather seen as a
temporary arrangement (Boonzaier et al., 1996). But with continued pressure, the rights of the
Khoikhoi were often ignored, especially after the smallpox epidemic greatly reduced the number
of Khoikhoi, and with the introduction of the loan farm system their voices were drowned out
(Penn, 2005:42).4
This chapter looks more closely at the role of property rights in the Cape’s credit market.
Newton-King (1999) found a large role for land as a form of collateral at the Cape. However,
no study has looked at the differences between the freehold and the loan farms in terms of
property rights and their effect on debt. This study will focus on these differences in terms of
property rights to test whether they had noticeable effects on debt. In terms of property rights,
the freehold and loan farms were clearly distinct in de jure terms. In theory, the freehold farms
de jure had more secure property rights – they were tradable and inheritable, while legally the
loan farms were not. Despite this, there is ample anecdotal evidence that de facto property
rights were the same.5 The aim here is to exploit this difference between the two systems to see
which type of property rights, de jure or de facto, was considered when trading on credit. The
hypothesis is that if freehold farms enjoyed more secure property rights relative to loan farms,
they were more valuable as collateral and wealth indication, and should therefore be linked to
more debt. This study contributes to the existing literature in two ways. Firstly, by testing
the effects of property rights on immediate transactions and not long-run economic outcomes.
Secondly, by providing further evidence that the local context in which the property rights are
observed matters for debt.
6.3 The freehold and loan farm data
The data obtained from the genealogical records and the probate inventories combine assets
with demographic information. Important for this chapter, is the information on birth and
4These works and others have looked at the influence of European settlement on the Khoikhoi, but due to
data limitations, the focus here remains on the property rights of the European settlers and their debt. This is
not say private property rights were superior, only that it remains an area of future study on how communal
property rights influenced the Khoikhoi’s ability to produce and compete with the European settlers.
5The definition used for de jure property rights is the rights defined by law, while de facto property rights
are what is observed in society.
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death dates and occupations. Additional to this, the genealogical records can be used to in-
form birth order, the instrumental variable of choice. I explain this choice and assumptions
below. The probate inventories list all assets including land owned and under which policy
it was obtained. Although not without bias, these two sources are used extensively in Cape
historiography, for example by Newton-King (1994). She studied material life on the frontier
and found that poor farmers were in the minority. Mitchell (2008) also studied families on the
frontier using the probate inventories. Further support for this is found in Fourie (2013), who
found the wealth in the inventories to be ‘remarkable’. Additionally to this Schuurman (1980)
concluded that probate inventories ‘enable the study of property according to occupation, age
and number of children.’
The main concerns raised regarding the use of probate inventories for the study of wealth are
the exclusion of the poor, women and the young. None of these was a concern for this study.
By focusing on land ownership, the poorest and landless at the Cape were automatically ex-
cluded. But the probate inventories did not contain the wealthiest individuals at the Cape
either. Fourie (2013) compared the MOOC 8 series to a series of inventories from Stellenbosch
collected by Krezensinkski-De Widt (2002). The Orphan Chamber inventories were collected
for individuals without wills, or where minor heirs were involved. The individuals in the Stel-
lenbosch inventories were significantly more aﬄuent. Women were excluded from the current
study as well, since its focus is on sons, either the eldest or born later. Finally, age is not a
concern either. Chapter 2 showed there is no age effect on debt at the Cape. There are also
observations across various age groups, and no differences between ages of sons born first and
sons born later in terms of mean age or distribution. Chapter 2 also discussed the biases arising
from matching the probate inventories to the genealogies. The main conclusion was that the
matched sample, also used here, captured a median individual at the Cape, not the wealthiest
nor the poorest. The general occurrence of debt in the inventories also suggests land ownership
was not a prerequisite for entrance to the credit market.
The inventories offer information on the land owned, under which policy it was owned and in
some cases the value and size of the farms. But as discussed before, the size and value are
problematic to use. Firstly, due to the sporadic inclusion of these, and secondly, due to the
way in which these were determined. For example, the size was half an hour’s horse ride in
each direction for loan farms, but more often it was the case that farmers could use any land
as long as they did not intrude on their neighbours’ land. The recorded sizes on the inventories
often reflected these prescribed sizes, but the true size would almost certainly have differed.
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The land values included also do not reflect true market values and are often clustered and
rounded amounts. Here is an example of how land was recorded in the probate inventories:
Trijntjen Hillebrants (MOOC8/1.12) had one farm named Soetewijk situated in Drakensteijn,
which was 60 morgen (the standard prescribed size of farms) and valued at 600 gulden (200
rds), when she died in 1695. A more detailed entry would include under which policy the farm
was obtained from the Company. The two policies, which form the focus here, are the freehold
farms (eigendom, erfgrondbrief or transport) and loan farms (leeningsplaatsen or in leening).
Some inventories even show if and when both of these policies appeared in the inventory, like the
entry which states that Josua Joubert (MOOC8/21.32) owned one farm Welbedagt, situated
in the Wagenmakersvalleij in the Stellenbosch district, owned in freehold when he died in 1795.
He also owned two loan farms, Elands Jagt situated next to the Molenaars River in Du Toits
Kloof and another Varkens Kop situated in the Sneeuberge. Table 6.1 provides a summary of
the information available on land ownership found from the inventories.
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics on land ownership, with and without policies
Property category Number of farms % Farms with known policies % Loan farms Freehold farms
No land 1135 54.15 - - - -
One farm 621 29.63 362 64.64 272 90
Two farms 209 9.97 127 22.68 95 32
Three farms 58 2.77 33 5.89 19 14
Four+ farms 73 3.48 38 6.79 15 23
Total 2096 100 560 100 401 159
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Almost 54 percent of the inventories did not list any land. Looking across other measures of
wealth, we find further evidence of left truncation. Table 6.2 also provides summary statistics
on debt, credit, whether the individual was both a creditor and a debtor, the total number of
bonds observed and other household characteristics, by the type of land owned. The two groups
excluded from the analysis below were the individuals with no land listed, and the individuals
whose farms were listed, but of which the policies are unknown.
The individuals with no land listed were by far the poorest individuals at the Cape. They
were however not excluded from debt transactions. They owned on average one slave, while
the individuals in the other categories owned more than five slaves on average. The mean
debt value for those individuals were 368 rds, while their credit value was even higher at 692
rds. 43 percent of the individuals with no land were both creditors and debtors, while 12
percent had debt bonds in the inventory. More than three quarters had spouses listed (lower
than other groups) and they had a low 3.12 children. By the end of the seventeenth century,
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Table 6.2: Descriptive statistics on land ownership, with and without policies
No farms
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Number of farms 755 - - - -
Number of slaves 755 1.38 3.38 0 36
Value of debt 755 367.94 1 275.19 0 20 167
Value of credit 755 691.69 5 612.89 0 103 424
Both debtor and creditor 755 0.43 0.5 0 1
Debt bonds present 755 0.12 0.72 0 11
Spouse listed on inventory 755 0.76 0.42 0 1
Number of children 755 3.12 3.75 0 19
Farms with unknown policies
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Number of farms 281 1.73 1.27 1 9
Number of slaves 281 7.77 10.59 0 73
Value of debt 281 3 732.94 12 594.28 0 135 755
Value of credit 281 4 297.27 17 754.66 0 150 775
Both debtor and creditor 281 0.48 0.5 0 1
Number of debt bonds 281 0.46 1.39 0 13
Spouse listed on inventory 281 0.87 0.34 0 1
Number of children 281 3.01 3.49 0 16
Loan farms
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Number of farms 259 1.47 0.9 1 8
Number of slaves 259 5.68 7.75 0 45
Value of debt 259 2 318.19 6 967.87 0 85 922
Value of credit 259 1 076.98 5 945.41 0 92 246
Both debtor and creditor 259 0.52 0.5 0 1
Number of debt bonds 259 0.35 1.1 0 11
Spouse listed on inventory 259 0.8 0.4 0 1
Number of children 259 4.34 4.27 0 23
Freehold farms
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max.
Number of farms 113 2.06 1.72 1 12
Number of slaves 113 9.81 10.26 0 60
Value of debt 113 2 875.35 5 414.77 0 35 197
Value of credit 113 5 444.71 27 661.71 0 256 425
Both debtor and creditor 113 0.5 0.5 0 1
Number of debt bonds 113 0.55 1.07 0 6
Spouse listed on inventory 113 0.9 0.3 0 1
Number of children 113 4.26 4.19 0 16
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
the average household size was 6.92 (Cilliers and Fourie, 2012). There are two possibilities
for no land being recorded: either they did not own any land, or the land they did own was
not recorded. But they were excluded from the analysis. The focus on freehold and loan farms
made the exclusion of these individuals less problematic than for studies of overall wealth levels.
The second group of individuals that was excluded was more problematic. These were the
individuals for which some land was listed, but the policy under which the land was acquired
was not mentioned. From the other indicators, there was also no way of telling if these were
more likely freehold or loan farm owners. In terms of the wealth indicators (slaves and debt),
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their levels were higher than the loan farms, but less than the freehold farms. The proportion
of individuals with debt bonds was also between the freehold and loan farm levels. Due to the
uncertainty created by the lack of information on the policy, I decided to exclude them from
analysis rather than add them or create another group.
In short, the summary statistics show the freehold farmers were wealthier than their loan farm
counterparts.6 They owned on average more land and slaves, had more debt, extended more
credit, and a higher proportion of them had bonds. The differences were less pronounced when
the number of children and the proportion with spouses listed on the inventory were considered.
Figure 6.1 presents the distribution of the natural logarithm of debt for the two groups con-
sidered in the analysis.7 It provides further support that the freehold farmers were wealthier.
Before the instrumental variable results are presented, it is important to look at the correlations
between land ownership and debt. If no correlation exists, the instrumental variable would be
unlikely to carry value.
Figure 6.1: Debt distribution of freehold and loan farms
6If individuals owned both a freehold and a loan farm, the observation was added to the freehold farmers.
The results remain robust whether these are included or excluded.
7A zero debt was replaced by 1 × 10e−10 for positive logarithmic values, which caused the spike at the left
side of the distribution.
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6.4 Correlations between land ownership and debt
The descriptive statistics from the probate inventories suggest freehold farms were owned by
the wealthier individuals of the Cape. It was important to consider the correlations between
debt and land ownership, before the hypothesis that secure property rights cause debt could
be tested. The first correlation considered the number of farms on debt, and the second the
difference in debt between freehold and loan farms. It was important to consider these correla-
tions due to the general occurrence of debt at the Cape. Since many individuals had debt and
transacted on credit, land might not have been an important factor in securing debt. At this
time, the Cape Colony had almost no towns outside the fledgling community in Cape Town,
and farms were therefore a more important measure of real estate. Because of this, I did not
distinguish between real estate within towns and farms. The town properties captured in the
probate inventories were almost certainly also held under freehold.8
Additional control variables were added to remove wealth effects on debt. In Chapter 2, I
argued that the wealthy at the Cape, or those with some form of collateral, were most likely
to have debt. The controls therefore included are: the number of slaves owned, the number
of debt bonds, if an individual was both a debtor and creditor, and also if a spouse was listed
on an inventory. Gender was not considered here because of the instrument used later in the
analysis. These correlations were also only focused on inventories of males. Slave ownership
was divided into the following groups: 0 slaves, between 1 and 4 slaves, between 5 and 10
slaves and more than 10 slaves. The number of debt bonds was important to consider for two
reasons: because bonds are highly correlated with incurring debt to purchase land, and because
it was likely larger debt transactions. Bonds were more formal loan contracts witnessed by an
independent third individual.9 Individuals with both credit and debt were more likely to have
more collateral (either land or slaves) and their debt levels were expected to be higher. The
extension as well as the acquisition of debt would require some assets. If a spouse was listed
on the inventory, debt was also likely to be higher, as it was the debt accumulated by both
husband and wife before death and not just a single individual. Individuals with more children
were more prosperous; as Cilliers (2016) showed South Africa’s fertility decline happened after
the mineral revolution in the late nineteenth-century.
8See footnote 2 in Chapter 2 for more details on towns in the colony.
9More information on these bonds can be found in Chapter 2.
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The first regression – Table 6.3 – shows a strong correlation between the number of farms listed
on the inventory and the debt level of the inventory. One additional farm was associated with
a 58.1 percent increase in debt. The other wealth variables, slaves, number of debt bonds and
whether the individual was both a debtor and creditor were also strongly correlated with the
individuals debt level. Having a spouse listed on the inventory was also correlated with debt
levels. One consideration here was that if the spouse was also listed on the inventory, the two
individuals may have passed shortly after one another. This would have made them riskier bor-
rowers. However, considering the generality of debt at the Cape, it is unlikely that this would
have a significant impact on the results. The number of children did not have a significant
correlation with debt levels.
Table 6.3: OLS regression between the number of farms and debt
Dependent variable Natural Logarithm of Individual Debt
Coefficient Std. error
Number of farms 0.4578*** 0.0641
Zero slaves Ref. -
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0.3585** 0.1617
Between 5 and 10 slaves 1.0346*** 0.1997
More than 10 slaves 0.8551*** 0.2493
Number of debt bonds 0.6386*** 0.069
Both debtor and creditor 2.5466*** 0.133
Spouse listed on inventory 0.7352*** 0.1805
Number of children in household -0.0121 0.0185
Constant 1.7651*** 0.1711
N 1408
R-squared 0.3719
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals level of debt in log-
linear terms, that is, the total debt of an individual or household
listed on the inventory, not individual transactions.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant
at 10% level.
Table 6.4 shows the differences in debt for individuals with freehold farms relative to loan farms.
This is the first evidence to support the hypothesis that individuals with freehold farms were
wealthier, had better-protected property rights and more debt. The individuals with freehold
farms had on average more debt than individuals with loan farms. Slave ownership continued to
matter for the debt of freehold farmers, while being both a creditor and a debtor was correlated
with more debt, and inventories with both spouses listed also had more debt. When comparing
these two groups, individuals with more children had less debt.
These OLS correlations point to different outcomes for freehold and loan farms and debt, sug-
gesting there was at least some role for property rights to play in determining value for debt.
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Table 6.4: OLS regression between debt of freehold and loan farms
Dependent variable Natural Logarithm of Individual Debt
Coefficient Std. error
Farms owned under freehold policy (1 for freehold farms, 0 for loan farms) 0.8801** 0.3593
Zero slaves ref. -
Between 1 and 4 slaves -0.0241 0.3506
Between 5 and 10 slaves 0.6151* 0.3713
More than 10 slaves 0.8602** 0.3694
Number of debt bonds 0.5593*** 0.0796
Both debtor and creditor 2.5967*** 0.2547
Spouse listed on inventory 1.2711*** 0.4191
Number of children in household -0.1176*** 0.0348
Constant 2.9941 0.4811
N 327
R-squared 0.3457
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
Notes: The dependent variable is the individuals level of debt in log-linear terms, that is, the total debt of
an individual or household listed on the inventory, not individual transactions.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
At first glance, the individuals with freehold farms were more prosperous and had more debt,
supporting the hypothesis that they had better-protected property rights. There is also support
for this in existing historiography, which claims the wealthy individuals at the Cape lived in and
around Cape Town had at least one freehold farms and often also had loan farms on the frontier
(Groenewald, 2009). A concern with these correlations was reverse causality. Individuals with
freehold farms had more debt because they had more collateral due to better property rights,
relative to individuals with loan farms. But the reverse is also true: individuals with freehold
farms may have had more debt because they used debt to purchase these farms in the first
place. Because of this concern, and to remove the endogeneity caused by this, the next section
turns to using an instrumental variable.
Another possible channel for freehold farms to have more debt was the income channel. The
freehold farms may simply have been more profitable, because they did not need not pay the
rent the loan farmers had to pay. This seems unlikely – the cost of loan farms (24 rds per year)
was low relative to wages (156 rds per year) and average debt levels (mean of 2 300 rds). The
data lacks richness to test this in more detail, and would have to be matched to, say, the annual
tax censuses (opgaafrolle).
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6.5 An instrumental variable approach: Eldest sons, free-
hold farms and debt
Due to the possibility of reverse causality and endogeneity in estimating the effect of property
rights regimes on debt levels, an instrumental variable approach was used here to estimate the
effect of owning a freehold farm on an individuals debt level. The instrument of choice was
being the first-born son in a household relative to second-born sons or sons born later. Many
studies have used the random variation of birth order to study different economic outcomes,
including schooling or returns to education (Black et al., 2005b), income (Kantarevic and Me-
choulan, 2006), labour market outcomes like employment (Black et al., 2005a) and the decision
to migrate (Abramitzky et al., 2013). As far as I am aware, there have not been any studies
done on property rights using first-born sons. For the purpose of this research, birth order was
considered exogenous and a random event.
To estimate the instrument, a two-stage least squares regression was used. The first stage was
focused on the probability of first-born sons owning a freehold farms, and the second stage
looked at the relationship between owning said freehold farms, and the effect of this on debt (in
natural logarithmic terms). A vector of other wealth characteristics was also controlled for due
to the relationship between wealth and debt at the Cape established before. These included:
slave ownership, whether an individual was both a creditor and a debtor, and the number of
bonds owned by the individual. It further included whether the eldest son had a spouse listed
on his inventory, and his number of children. An additional controls which could be added in
future is the land ownership of the father, but the restricted data on father-son combinations
in the data did not allow for this in the current study.
My instrument for estimating the local average treatment effects (LATE) had to comply with
the following four assumptions: independence (exogeneity), exclusion restriction, first stage
(relevance) and monotonicity (Angrist and Pischke, 2009:153). The independence assumption
required that the instrument be as good as randomly assigned. This means first-born sons
should not have had an innate higher ability (which cannot be observed) which made them
more likely to own a freehold farm. Although not directly testable, there was no evidence that
first-born sons were innately better suited to own a freehold farm. Other studies have also
concluded that birth order is a random event, and I believe birth order was sufficient to pass
the independence assumption.
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The exclusion restriction required that birth order not have a direct causal effect on the level
of debt. In Chapter 2, it was shown that debt was a general occurrence at the Cape. The best
way to support the exclusion restriction was therefore to look at the debt distribution of the
eldest sons versus sons born after him. Figure 6.2 shows these distributions. Table 6.5 provides
the t-test for the size of the debts. This showed no significant difference between eldest sons
and sons born later. Since there was no significant difference in either the distribution or the
size of debt between eldest sons and other sons, the assumption cleared the first hurdle.
Table 6.5: T-test of eldest sons vs. non-eldest sons, debt size, owning a freehold farm and
age
Debt size Owned a freehold farm Age
N Mean N Mean N Mean
Non-eldest son 638 1535.01 169 0.1834 1152 48.6946
Eldest son 681 1692.86 179 0.4302 1238 49.8334
Combined 1319 1616.02 348 0.3103 2390 49.579
Difference -156.79 -0.2467 -2.4818
t -0.4110 -5.1443 -1.4662
p-value 0.6811 0.0000*** 1.4662
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at
10% level.
Figure 6.2: Debt distributions of eldest and non-eldest sons
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Two other channels through which the instrument may have had an effect on individual debt
were longevity and occupation, both characteristics that could be observed from the genealog-
ical records. For occupation, more highly skilled occupations may have presented less risky
borrowing and therefore the ability to obtain more debt. First-born sons may also have had
more opportunities to join these more higly skilled occupations. The occupations I observed
can be divided into different skill levels: unskilled or low skills, farmers, medium skilled, highly
skilled and professional. To test if elder sons had higher-ranked occupations, an ordered logit
was run (Table 6.6). The elder sons did not have a significantly larger share in more professional
skills relative to sons born later.
Table 6.6: Ordered logistic regression for eldest sons and sons born later
Skill level
Coefficient Std. error Odds ratio Std. error
Eldest Son 0.1165 0.2182 1.1235 0.2451
N 313 313
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calcula-
tions
A second possible channel through which being the eldest sons could affect debt was through
longevity. Individuals who were older when they died had a longer time over which debt and
more farms could have been accumulated. First-born sons may also have had higher longevity
because resources reverted to the eldest son rather than sons born later. However, there was no
significant difference in the ages of eldest sons relative to sons born later. Eldest sons expected
age for the period (conditional on reaching 16 years of age) was 49.83 years, while sons born
later lived an average of 48.69 years (see Table 6.5). Figure 6.3 shows the age distribution of
eldest and non-eldest sons. Neither the mean ages nor the distributions of ages between first-
born sons and sons born later differ significantly. Neither ages nor occupations show significant
differences between the eldest sons and sons born later: the strongest evidence that being the
first-born son was an appropriate instrument.
For the first stage assumption, the eldest sons needed to have a higher probability of owning a
freehold farm. The system of inheritance at the Cape was one of partible inheritance derived
from Roman-Dutch law, as mentioned before. This meant the individuals estate was divided,
with one half going to the spouse and the other half divided equally among the children. Most
often, the estate was sold in its entirety at auction and the proceeds distributed between the
heirs. Despite this, anecdotal evidence has been provided by Newton-King (1994) and Dooling
(2005, 2007) that the eldest son was favoured when it came to the inheritance of property and
freehold farms. Newton-King (1994) suggested that elder sons inherited freehold farms, while
124
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Figure 6.3: Age at death distributions for eldest and non-eldest sons
sons born later inherited loan farms. Dooling (2005) and Dooling (2007) refer to how, in this
patriarchal society, sons were inevitably favoured over daughters when it came to inheritance of
land. With this anecdotal evidence at hand, I tested the likelihood of elder sons owning more
freehold farms and indeed found a higher probability among eldest sons of owning freehold
farms, at 48 percent, while of sons born later, only 18 percent owned freehold farms (see Table
6.5).
Finally, monotonicity required that the instrument affect all the treated in the same direction,
that is, being the eldest son should always make one more likely to own a freehold farm rather
than less likely. The historical evidence presented above not only supports the first stage as-
sumption, but also the monotonicity assumption. Eldest sons were always more likely to own
farms relative to their brothers born later and not the reverse, across both time and districts.
Being the first born son appears to have been a valid instrument for the probability of having a
freehold farms relative to sons who were born later. Table 6.7 presents the regression results for
the instrumental variable estimation. The result support the hypothesis that the eldest son had
a 23 percent higher probability of having a freehold farm relative to sons born later, significant
at the one percent level. Individuals with more slaves were also more likely to own freehold
farms. Having a spouse listed on the inventory was also associated with higher probability
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of owning a freehold farm, but none of the other characteristics was associated with a higher
probability of owning a freehold farm.
Table 6.7: Instrumental variable results between ownership type and debt value
First stage regression Second stage regression
Owning a freehold farm Ln(Debt Value)
First son 0.2338*** Owned a freehold farm -1.6521
-0.0494 1.2138
0 Slaves (ref.) 0 Slaves (ref.)
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0.1595** Between 1 and 4 slaves 0.1034
0.0693 0.4329
Between 5 and 10 slaves 0.2344*** Between 5 and 10 slaves 0.7512
0.0704 0.506
More than 10 slaves 0.3469*** More than 10 slaves 1.0783*
0.0785 0.6346
Both creditor and debtor -0.0392 Both creditor and debtor 2.0072***
0.05 0.292
Total bonds present in inventory -0.0021 Total bonds present in inventory 0.6539***
-0.0225 0.1292
Spouse listed on inventory 0.1861* Spouse listed on inventory 1.3521**
0.0853 0.5636
Children -0.0069 Children -0.0348
0.0063 0.039
Constant -0.1003 Constant 3.5116***
0.093 0.5185
N 330
Under-identification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 21.519
Chi-square(1) p-value 0.000
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 22.392
StockYogo weak ID test critical value 16.32
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations. Dependent on son reaching
16 years of age.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
The second stage regression, however, revealed that, given the instrumental variable of being
the eldest son, owning a freehold farm did not matter for the individual’s debt level. The
coefficient of owning a freehold farm was negative – individuals with freehold farms had less
debt – and the coefficient was insignificant. These negative and insignificant effects were due
to two possible reasons: measurement error in the instrument, or the debt levels of loan farms
relative to freehold farms and the number of these in the sample. I found evidence for the
latter, but not the former. In the genealogical records, birth order were recorded from the birth
and baptism dates of the children. Unless the children had been baptised on the same day and
the birth order had been incorrectly recorded then, measurement error in the instrument was
unlikely. However, debt increased over time at the Cape (see Figure 2.10) and the number of
loan farms increased, while the freehold farms remained constant after 1717. The debt values
of loan farms grew exponentially, while the growth of debt related to freehold farms remained
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constant over time. Figure 6.4 shows this relationship.
Figure 6.4: Debt values of farm policies over time
As a robustness check, I included all the farms without information on policies as loan farms.
The result for freehold farms remained insignificant, and the negative effect was smaller with
this inclusion. This was further support for the instrumental variable analysis, and that the
results were not driven by the exclusion of these farms. These results are shown in Table 6.8.
In the property rights framework sketched in Sections 1 and 2, the debt market at the Cape
considered the de facto property rights of land more important for transactions. This means
the property rights observed by society, i.e. what was followed in practice, rather than what
was prescribed by law, was more important. This supports the existing historiography of the
Cape, in which authors like Guelke (1989) and Newton-King (1999) have provided evidence
that the property rights of freehold farms were similar to those of the loan farms. It also ad-
vances the international literature, by focusing on microeconomic information, and the recent
literature which suggests social norms and de facto rights are important when de jure rights
are established.
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Table 6.8: Instrumental variable results between farms status and debt value
First stage regression Second stage regression
Owning a freehold farm Ln(Debt Value)
First son 0.0915*** Owned a freehold farm -0.7871
0.0353 1.5310
0 Slaves 0 Slaves
Between 1 and 4 slaves 0.0759 Between 1 and 4 slaves -0.1065
0.0482 0.2211
Between 5 and 10 slaves 0.1428*** Between 5 and 10 slaves 0.5069*
0.04985 0.3002
More than 10 slaves 0.1961*** More than 10 slaves 0.9914***
0.0531 0.3723
Both creditor and debtor -0.0160 Both creditor and debtor 0.1419
0.0355 0.1419
Total bonds present in inventory 0.0024 Total bonds present in inventory 0.4632***
0.0141 0.0559
Spouse listed on inventory 0.0341 Spouse listed on inventory 0.0210
0.0653 0.2692
Children 0.0047 Children -0.0317*
0.0046 0.0181
Constant -0.0224 Constant 6.1391***
0.1717 0.2782
N 489
Under-identification test
Anderson canon. corr. LM statistic 6.745
Chi-square(1) p-value 0.0094
Weak Identification test
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 16.38
StockYogo weak ID test critical value 6.713
Source: Probate inventories and genealogies, own calculations. Dependent on son reaching
16 years of age.
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level.
For my other variables of interest, only the highest group of slave ownership had a significant
effect on debt, suggesting the combination of slaves and land ownership mattered for debt. In-
dividuals who were both creditors and debtors had more debt than individuals with only debt,
and additional bonds caused higher debt. The spouse remained significant for debt levels. This
suggests it was individuals with some form of collateral – those who owned land, slaves, bonds,
or who were both creditors and debtors – who had debt. If the individual had a spouse listed,
it meant additional resources, which the creditors could use to assess riskiness and additional
collateral from the combined estate. This is more support for the recent literature on early
credit markets which suggests credit and debt were not used more by the poor, as suggested
before, but by those with the greatest number of assets (see, for example, Muldrew (2012) and
Ogilvie et al. (2012)).
A Hausmann test between the instrumental variable regression and the OLS regression rejected
the null hypothesis (Chi-squared = 253.3, p=0.000) that the estimators are similar in favour
of the instrumental variable regression. The specification tests are presented in Table 6.7. The
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Cragg-Donald Wald statistic (22.392) was greater than the critical value of 16.38, and the in-
strument passed the weak instrument test. This suggests being the eldest son in the family was
highly correlated with owning a freehold farm. Because I only had one endogenous regressor
and one instrument, the specification was just-identified. All these tests together made the
instrument a valid instrument.
By measuring the effect of property rights at a micro level, this chapter has added to the liter-
ature on property rights and economic transactions. The freehold and loan farms had distinct
formal processes for claims, and their legal specifications differed. Despite the differences in
de jure and de facto property rights, the economic outcomes for the two systems did not show
big differences. This supports the existing historiography’s view that the differences between
freehold and loan farms were not as stark, and that settlers relied on de facto property rights
for decision-making. It also means, like De Soto and Lamoreaux’s findings, the local conditions
under which property rights regime was observed mattered. In this case, the settlers viewed
loan farms and freehold farms as equally secure in terms of their property rights, which gave
them the ability to secure equal debts.
6.6 What mattered for debt?
The instrumental variable analysis above gave empirical proof that in colonial South Africa,
secure property rights in land, as measured through two different land ownership policies, did
not make a difference to debt. The less secure de jure property rights of the loan farms were
offset by the perceived secure de facto property rights. This meant that the perceived secure
property rights of both systems caused similar debt levels for individuals, regardless of the type
of property. The problem with this, is if property rights in land were regarded as the same,
and if this did not have an effect on debt, then what did matter for debt? Three possible facets
are considered here. The first is production potential, which at the Cape was closely linked to
slave ownership. The most profitable farmers owned many slaves (Guelke, 1989:79), while small
farmers were unable to benefit from slave ownership (Du Plessis et al., 2015). Slave ownership
was also a vital measure for the credit markets at the Cape, as shown in Chapter 2. Slaves
and overall wealth were highly correlated with debt. This chapter provides further evidence
for slavery’s role in credit transactions. The instrumental variable analysis adds support for
this link between slave ownership and debt in showing that large slave owners had significantly
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more debt regardless of property type.
The second facet which may have mattered for debt is the net value of the estate, or the imme-
diate ability to repay debt. Ogilvie et al. (2012:160) found ‘people borrowed to solve cash-flow
problems, not because they were fundamentally lacking in assets’, and Muldrew (2012) claims
most transactions in the early modern period happened on credit, not with cash. This suggests
individuals with a high net worth, or the ability to service and repay debt regularly, would also
have higher debts. This was also true in the Cape Colony. Figure 6.5 shows the relationship
between net estate value and the debt value of the estates for which the net worth was available.
Anecdotal evidence provides further support. In the diary of Lady Anne Barnard from 1799,
the following note on why she provided credit to others can be found: ‘I give Ross credit on
this business – his good nature makes him pay’. Groenewald (2009), in his study of Hendrik
Oostwald Eksteen’s economic ventures, found Eksteen was successful because he repaid his debt
quickly and was given credit regularly.
Figure 6.5: Net value and total debt values of estates
Groenewald (2009) also provides the third important aspect for debt and credit, namely social
networks. He writes that ‘[Eksteen] soon started building up good networks with the farming
community of the Cape district’ (Groenewald, 2009:23). In Chapter 4 and 5, the elements of
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social networks were considered. Chapter 4 showed how influence or eigenvector centrality was
determined by an individual’s wealth, while Chapter 5 showed the importance of familial trad-
ing and how this changed over time. In Europe, networks have also been shown as important
in securing credit (Ogilvie et al., 2012; Van Bochove and Kole, 2014; Rosenthal, 1994).
6.7 Conclusion
For any economic transaction to take place, well-defined and well-enforced property rights are
required. Economists suspect that property right regimes are rooted in the history of the re-
gion, but it has been difficult to prove the effect of this on economic development empirically.
This chapter studied the effect of property rights on debt at the Cape Colony. The Cape offers
an alternative to the development of de jure and de facto property rights. At the Cape, the
property rights of loan farms were developed from de facto to de jure property rights, while in
other case studies like the United States, Australia and Brazil, they developed from de jure to
de facto property rights. The two land tenure systems of the Cape, freehold and loan farms,
enabled me to study individuals with the different types of property and to compare them one
another. The contribution of this research has been to focus on a microeconomic outcome,
namely individual debt levels, rather than macroeconomic outcomes.
Economic theory would suggest land is only valuable for debt transactions if there is no asym-
metry or uncertainty regarding land rights. Historians of the Cape have suggested the de
facto property rights of the loan farms were the same and as secure as the freehold farms,
even though the de jure rights between the systems differed greatly. The hypothesis was that
individuals with freehold farms had more secure de jure property rights, and freehold farms
should therefore be more valuable for debt transactions. On this basis, individuals with freehold
farms should have more debt. The descriptive statistics certainly supported this hypothesis;
individuals with freehold farms had higher correlations with debt relative to individuals with
loan farms or no farms. However, after accounting for endogeneity concerns regarding the re-
lationship between debt and land rights, the significance of owning a freehold farm for debt
transactions disappeared. The instrument of being the eldest son was used, since eldest sons
had a higher probability of owning a freehold farm. These results support the existing histo-
riography, which suggests that property rights between freehold and loan farms were similar
in de facto regimes, and also that individuals in a society would rather rely on these de facto
rights when considering economic transactions. My results provide empirical evidence for what
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historians have suspected: that the institution of property rights depends on the society in
which it is embedded. Instead of formal de jure rights, how rights are perceived and used by
individuals (de facto) is likely to have a bigger influence on economic transactions.
Property rights remain important for economic growth and development, but more recent re-
search has started to show that it is more complex; local conditions also matter. This chapter
gave another example of how local conditions matter to a property rights system and how such
a system is used. Besley (1992) claimed that ‘formal (de jure) rights might have very little to
do with the ability to exercise these rights (de facto).’ If the answer of institutional economics
is to give de jure property rights in land to individuals, without taking into account the local de
facto conditions, then de jure property rights might not lead to the expected gains in economic
growth. Schlager and Ostrom (1992) already called for investigation into ‘how various types
of institutional arrangements perform comparatively when confronted with similarly difficult
environments’. In line with the literature, this was a first attempt to show the perception of
property rights at the Cape mattered more than the de jure property rights delineated by the
respective laws.
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Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Research
Opportunities
7.1 Conclusions
In this dissertation, I set out to investigate the financial history of the Cape Colony. It was
specifically focused on the Cape Colony’s private credit transactions from 1673 to 1834. Be-
fore summarising the separate chapters, I would like to mention the main contributions of the
dissertation. Firstly, it showed how the widespread credit at the Cape Colony was indicative
not of poverty, but wealth. Debt and credit had been overlooked, or only briefly mentioned, by
previous historical literature. In contrast, I provided a systematic analysis of the private credit
transactions between individuals. Secondly, wealth was highly mobile at the Cape. This was
true whether one looked at overall wealth, land ownership, slave ownership or debt.
Thirdly, it gave empirical support to the existing historical literature that networks mattered
for debt. It was not only the wealthy that were included in this network, but others like the
freed slaves and women as well. Fourthly, the dissertation showed how it takes more than a
century for cultures to integrate, and how trading was reserved for those who had a common
nationality. This was later replaced by within-family trading. Finally, it contributed to the
literature on property rights by showing how the belief in property rights, and how these are
observed by society, is much more important than the property rights defined in law. The
combination of these contributions exhibit how informal trading can easily be underestimated
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by history and economics.
I used two data sources to investigate this private credit market. The first was the complete
MOOC 8 series of probate inventories. Inventories are often used in the study of historical
wealth and consumption, although they are not without limitations. They list, among other
things, the debts and credits of the individual at the time of their death. It was these trans-
actions in which this dissertation took a special interest in. These probates and transactions
offered new insights into how the settlers at the Cape traded with each other, what they traded,
and how reliant they were on each other. This dissertation is the first systematic evaluation of
the entire series of transactions.
The second source I used was genealogical records. Genealogical records offer insight into the
demographic composition of the settlers and provided additional variables that are important
when considering the motivations of debt. These include age, occupation, number of children
and birth order. The first three are often found to be determinants of debt, while the last was
used as an instrumental variable for property rights in the sixth chapter. Matching between
these two data sources also offer new research opportunities, discussed below.
The second chapter in this study used the historiography and commentary from contemporaries
on the credit market and debt levels at the Cape as a starting point. The debt levels of in-
dividuals at the Cape have been described as a leading cause of poverty and are said to have
often reached unbearable levels. Looking at the volume of private credit transactions listed
just in the inventories, one would tend to agree with this opinion. But the volume of credit
transactions is not the only consideration when debt and its economic influence are evaluated.
An international literature has shown that rather than inducing poverty, active participation
in credit transactions was a sign of prosperity and the presence of assets in the economy. This
dissertation re-investigated the Cape’s circumstances with this in mind. The second chapter
contributed to the literature by investigating the role of formal financial institutions in the
Cape society, the role of wealth and assets and what settlers borrowed for. The chapter’s first
contribution was to show that the role of the three main institutions at the Cape (the VOC,
church and Orphan Chamber) were not the largest contributors to the credit market, although
they were involved in larger transactions. Instead, more than 80 percent of private credit and
debt transactions were between male settlers, and secondly between male and female settlers.
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The main institutions were only involved in less than ten percent of transactions. The second
contribution was to show that the settlers borrowed the most with the purpose to purchase
land, often with the use of bonds, or formal loan contracts. Debt was also incurred more for
productive purposes, and not for survival or consumption purposes.
Contrary to other studies, this research found that the age and occupation of an individual did
not determine debt at the Cape. It showed that both young and old individuals had similar
debt levels, while occupations showed little difference in the size of their debts. For example,
farmers and doctors had similar proportions of large and small loans. The second and main
contribution of the chapter was to show debt was correlated with wealth. At the Cape, one
of the main indicators of wealth was the number of slaves an individual owned – wealthier
individuals owned more slaves. More than this, slave ownership showed the highest correlation
with debt, regardless of price changes or the size of the debt. The result remained whether the
individual wealth categories, namely land ownership and slave ownership, were used or whether
these were combined into a wealth index. This suggests that debt and wealth at the Cape were
related, rather than debt and poverty.
This makes the Cape’s credit market comparable to the pre-industrial European credit markets
in two ways. Firstly, in a chronically cash-short society, debt tends to be the main method
of daily trading and becomes a replacement for cash. Secondly, debt was more often a sign of
prosperity, it was related to wealth, rather than the conventional idea that debt caused poverty.
This study was the first to systematically look at these debt transactions at the Cape and at
how the private credit market at the Cape was structured around wealth.
Another aspect important to economic history and development is how wealth was transferred
over generations. Many studies in developed countries have showed how mobility differed over
time and space. In Chapter 3, I investigated how the pre-industrial economy of the Cape af-
fected intergenerational mobility. Building on rich qualitative evidence, my results provide the
first quantitative estimates of the extent of social mobility at the Cape.
The Cape’s historiography is full of support for high social mobility during the eighteenth cen-
tury, while some scholars have said the system of partible inheritance constrained economic
growth and mobility. Chapter 3 found less support for the latter and more for the case of
social mobility. In all four wealth measures used in this study (wealth index, land, slaves, and
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debt), there was significant mobility and little persistence in wealth. This suggests successive
generations were able to generate their own wealth and not rely on the wealth of their fathers.
The result holds if a wealth index for fathers and children were created. Taking social mobility
studies further, I showed that children borrowed in the same patterns as their fathers.
Intergenerational relationships in wealth and debt raised another facet which is important for
debt – social networks. Social network analysis offers new insights into the interaction between
economic actors. This is especially important for the study of informal institutions. Informal
institutions refer to the norms and beliefs in society and are often stable and unchanging in
nature, but is a topic not often researched empirically. One reason for this lack of research is the
lack of data on individual interactions – an area where economic history can offer assistance.
The probate inventories and the credit transactions listed in them are an example of direct
evidence of social interaction between individuals, with direct and measurable outcomes.
The first chapter (Chapter 4) on social networks and debt at the Cape tested whether the same
key important individuals in the historiography of the Cape are also identified when social
network analysis is applied to the data. The results were mixed: some of the individuals who
have been previously identified were also identified here. But the results also identified new
individuals who have yet to receive mention in historical literature. Many of these central indi-
viduals were women, which links this research to previous research on the wealth and influence
of women at the Cape, sometimes referred to as ‘widowarchy’. There were also some slaves
and blacks identified in the network. This chapter furthermore showed how families that were
central in the network remained central for much longer than the individuals who were central.
Although Chapter 2 showed that the three main institutions at the Cape (the Company, church
and Orphan Chamber) did not play the largest role in the market, they did play a central role.
Through these three institutions, many individuals became connected to the larger network of
creditors and debtors, which would otherwise not have been the case.
The second contribution this study made using social network analysis (Chapter 5) was to
study long-run homophily at the Cape. Homophily is the phenomenon where individuals tend
to connect with other individuals who share some background characteristic with them. This
research was a first attempt to empirically test the notion of rapid cultural integration at the
Cape. The results, however, run against the historiography – even after 100 years, trading
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within Dutch and French groups remained high, while trading within the German population
decreased. This research tried to determine why settlers at the Cape traded with each other
in such a way. Two possible explanations for this were explored: increased wealth and familial
trading. The results showed that relatively little homophily existed between different wealth
groups, but that interfamilial trading increased when homophiliy also increased. A limitation
of this chapter was the inclusion of marriage and business relations, which could offer further
support for the hypothesis that homophily was linked to familial trading.
Another indication of wealth was land. Its relation to debt was not directly considered in
Chapter 2. Historians have often found land ownership to be the main collateral used for debt,
which meant it was also assumed to cause high debt levels. This was the backdrop for the sixth
chapter of this dissertation. Land ownership at the Cape had two characteristics which could
be exploited econometrically to test the causal relationship between debt and land: the type of
ownership and inheritance in its patriarchal society.
In the Cape Colony, land could either be owned in freehold, or rented from the Company as a
loan farm. The freehold and loan farm systems were distinct in their de jure property rights,
i.e. the rights defined the law. The freehold farms were more secure in terms of ownership
and transferability, while the loan farms legally remained under the ownership of the VOC and
could legally not be sold. The implementation of the laws, or the de facto property rights were,
however, quite different. In implementation, there was little difference between freehold and
loan farms. In fact, the loan farms are described as similarly secure to the freehold farms, de-
spite differences in their de jure property rights. The inheritance of farms at the Cape was used
here to test the consequences of these different property right systems. First-born sons were
often inherited the freehold farms, while sons born later were given a loan farm. Yet, despite
the differences in de jure property rights, there were no differences in debt levels between the
two systems. This suggests, like De Soto (2001) and Lamoreaux (2011) claimed, that the de
facto property rights were more important for settlers than de jure property rights.
7.2 Possible Future Research Opportunities
During this research, I uncovered not only archival sources, but many other questions which
have yet to be answered about the financial history of the Cape. With this conclusion, I would
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like to mention some of these sources and questions.
The first aspect is the bonds first mentioned in Chapter 2. These formal loan contracts offer
the most information on the interest rates, repayment periods and loan sizes at the Cape. The
information presented here was complied from various sources and interactions with historians,
but only show a small sample of the bonds, namely those that remained unpaid at the death
of the individual. The exact mechanisms and use of these loan contracts remain hidden in the
source material. There is little indication that the various types of bonds were the same, were
used for the same purpose, and were recorded in the same manner, so assumptions had to be
made. If more information, especially regarding interest rates and its effect on the quantity of
credit available, is to be systematically discussed, these bonds should be digitised and studied
thoroughly. Many of these bonds are housed in the Deeds Office archive in Cape Town, South
Africa, notorious for its ill-kept state. Even if the entire series did not survive, the sample that
did may be worth saving and studying.
Another area of financial history at the Cape that has been overlooked is banking developments.
Havemann and Fourie (2014) found that the establishment of the Lombard Bank was a result
of a financial crisis. It resembled a modern-day pawnshop rather than a formal bank, only
granting loans against pledged items. The ledgers of the Lombard Bank contain lists of loan
and the individuals involved, and can be found at the Cape archives with lists of loans and
individuals involved. This institution has only been scantly studied in history – Kantor (1970)
and Arndt (1928) each had less than two pages dedicated to its functioning. The discussion
on pawnbroking in Europe has gained traction in recent years, with an entire session (‘At the
origins of consumer credit: pawn-broking in pre-industrial and developing societies. Economic
concerns and moral connotations’) dedicated to it at the World Economic History Congress
2015 hosted in Kyoto, Japan. More attention should be given to this aspect of South African
economic history.
The probate inventories used here contained vast amount of information on credit and debt
transactions at the Cape. But a complementary source of financial records would be the insol-
vency records. These records could serve as an alternative to the probate inventories: where the
probate inventories have at least some assets, the insolvency records are those of failed farms
and operations. This could present another aspect of the market at the Cape and may shed
more light on the general use of credit and why a large number of transactions never made it to
the courts. The insolvency records, together with the probate inventories, could provide more
138
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
insight into the functioning of credit and repayment.
A final suggestion for a source to use in future research is the auction rolls. The auction rolls
contain information on the prices of household goods the settlers were willing to pay. Auction
prices are often seen as the closest to market prices, as they accurately reflect the supply and
demand of a product. Additionally, these rolls contain the names of buyers and sellers, which
could be used to design a network of participants. This is yet another example of how social
network analysis can aid in understanding the interaction of individuals and its effect on the
economy.
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Appendix A
Data
Two main sources were used in this dissertation. The Cape Colonial probate inventories (MOOC
8 series) were used to collect debt, asset and wealth information, and the South African Family
Registers (SAF) or genealogies were used for information on age, gender, number of marriages
and number of children. This chapter will provide details on how the data was collected and
how the individuals were matched.
A.1 The Probate Inventories
The probate inventories, also known as the MOOC 8 series, were collected by the Orphan
Chamber at the Cape from 1673 to 1834. These ‘after death’ inventories were collected shortly
after death for persons who (1) died intestate, (2) where minors (under the age of 25 and un-
married) were involved, (3) where the heirs were absent from the Cape or (4) if the Chamber
was not excluded explicitly from the will. The Orphan Chamber had the additional purpose of
administering estates where minors were involved until they came of age, and it had to locate
any absent heirs. Only after 50 years did the estate revert back to the state if no heirs could
be found. After 1834, private companies took over this duty as executor of estates from the
Orphan Chamber. This also coincided with the abolishment of slavery in the British Empire
in 1833.
The inventories followed a fixed form for collecting information on the assets of individuals.
An entry always started with the individual’s name and date of inventory taking. This was
followed by a passage on who the person was, their husband/wife and, if minors were involved,
155
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
their names and ages. This was in turn followed by a list of real estates owned and under which
policy these were owned, the location of the farms or properties, their size and value. After
this came a systematic assembly of assets in each room of the house. The slaves and their
names were listed next, followed by the financial assets of the individuals. The financial assets
consisted of all silver and cash, credits (debts owed to the individual) and debts (debts owed
by the individual). The credits and debts referred to all the transactions still outstanding at
the time of death, including the amount of each debt, the second individual involved in each
transaction and the purpose of the debt. In some cases the net value of the estate, after the
subtraction of debts, was also recorded.
The inventories were collected, transcribed, and digitised to PDF by the TANAP project be-
tween 2004 and 2007. After digitisation, they were made available online. As an example,
I present an example of such an inventory, that of Francois Chamfelaer (MOOC8/1.1) here.
Figure A.1 shows the first page of the first entry. The transcribed version of the the same
information is shown in Figure A.2. As mentioned earlier, the information about him says he
was killed by a Khoikhoi, his wife was Catrina Oftings and he had four children. It also shows
the listing of his real estate, highlighted in yellow. He had a farm valued at 2100 gulden (700
rds), all in the False Bay area of Cape Town.
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Figure A.1: Archival form of the first inventory, Francois Chamfelaer from 1673
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Figure A.2: Transcribed inventory of Francois Chamfelaer from 1673
The information in these inventories was captured from the PDFs and converted into Excel,
with a final total of 4 160 inventories. The next step was to convert the different currencies
recorded in them to one single currency. The currency listed most often in the inventories was
the Dutch rijksdaalder (abbreviated to rds). The other currencies used in the inventories were
the Dutch gulden () and the British pound (£). Following Fourie (2013), a rijksdaalder was
worth 48 stuivers and 8 shillings; a gulden was worth 16 stuivers and there were 20 shillings
per stuiver. The exchange rate between the rijksdaalder and a gulden fixed was kept fixed at
1:3 throughout the period. The exchange rate between the rijksdaalder and pound was more
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flexible, and the values were adjusted following Denzel (2010:607). Table A.1 provides the var-
ious years and shillings per rijksdaalder. For the years where no information was available, the
assumption was made that the exchange rate remained the same as the previous period.
Table A.1: Exchange rate between pound and rijksdaalder
Year(s) Shillings per rds
1795 4
1803 1.5
1806–1810 3.2
1811–1815 2.2
1816–1820 1.833
1821–1825 1.5
1825 1.417
Source: Denzel (2010:607)
A.2 Matching to genealogical records
Once this process was complete, the names listed on the inventories, but not the debtors and
creditors, were matched to the genealogical records. These genealogical records were captured
by Cilliers and Fourie (2012). These records traced individuals through paternal lineages to
the first settlers. They provide information on birth, marriage and death dates, as well as
occupations. From this, various demographic variables like age, marriage status,and number of
children were generated for analysis.
The names were first matched between the inventories and genealogies based on death year and
surname, which provided 500 matches. After this initial matching, the names were individually
matched due mainly to changes in the spelling of surnames not accounted for during the initial,
automatic matching. For example, the surname ‘Van Wyk’ was found in the inventories, while it
was spelled ‘Van Wijk’ in the genealogies. With the second round of matching, the individual’s
name, surname, death year and, if available, names of children were used. The final number of
individuals matched was 2 117, and 2 043 probates remained unmatched. A matching rate of
50,8 percent is relatively high for historical records, considering that matching rates are usu-
ally less than 30 percent such as in Abramitzky et al. (2013) who had a 26 percent matching rate.
159
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Appendix B
Network Graphs
This appendix contains all the network graphs for the credit and debt transactions found in the
MOOC 8 series. The periods are: before 1700, 1700–1724, 1725–1749, 1750–1774, 1775–1799,
and 1800–1824.
B.1 Centralities without weights
B.1.1 Eigenvector centralities
Figure B.1: Network of eigenvector centralities before 1700
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Figure B.2: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1700 and 1724
Figure B.3: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1725 and 1749
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Figure B.4: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1750 and 1774
Figure B.5: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1775 and 1799
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Figure B.6: Network of eigenvector centralities between 1800 and 1824
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Table B.1: Top 20 surnames by the genealogical records
Before 1700 1700-1724 1725-1749
Surname Count Surname Count Surname Count
1 VAN RIEBEECK 7 OLIVIER 6 OLIVIER 9
2 TAILLEFERT 3 VILJOEN 6 DE VILLIERS 8
3 BASSON 2 BASSON 5 NEL 5
4 FOUCHE 2 FOURIE 5 CELLIERS 4
5 MOLLER 2 MARAIS 5 DU PREEZ 4
6 ROSENDAAL 2 VAN DER STEL 5 DU TOIT 4
7 VERBURG 2 STEYN 4 FAURE 4
8 BEZUIDENHOUT 1 VAN SCHALKWYK 4 HUGO 4
9 BLOEM 1 DU PREEZ 3 VAN DEVENTER 4
10 CHUBLI 1 ERASMUS 3 POTGIETER 3
11 CLAASEN 1 SMUTS 3 ROOS 3
12 CRUSE 1 SNYMAN 3 VAN DER POEL 3
13 DE VILLIERS 1 VAN RIEBEECK 3 VOSLOO 3
14 DE WEERELT 1 ZAAIJMAN 3 BRITS 2
15 DU PREEZ 1 BEZUIDENHOUT 2 CAMPHER 2
16 EKSTEEN 1 BRAND 2 COETZEE 2
17 ELBERTS 1 CORDIER 2 DU PLESSIS 2
18 GILDENHUIZEN 1 COSTEUX 2 HAUPTFLEISCH 2
19 GOUS 1 DE VILLIERS 2 JANSEN VAN RENSBURG 2
20 HULSENAAR 1 DE WET 2 LE RICHE 2
1750-1774 1775-1800 1800-1824
Surname Count Surname Count Surname Count
1 DE VILLIERS 43 DE VILLIERS 67 DE VILLIERS 168
2 VAN DER MERWE 17 DU TOIT 22 BRINK 43
3 SMUTS 10 VAN DER MERWE 20 HUGO 27
4 DU TOIT 9 VAN DER BYL 15 HAUPTFLEISCH 26
5 HUGO 9 SMUTS 14 BOSMAN 25
6 THERON 9 HUGO 13 LOUW 25
7 BLIGNAUT 8 VAN OUDTSHOORN 12 JOUBERT 24
8 CELLIERS 8 BOSMAN 11 VAN DER MERWE 24
9 MARAIS 8 MARAIS 11 SMUTS 21
10 ROUS(E) 8 ROUS(E) 11 DU TOIT 20
11 VAN DER POEL 8 JOUBERT 10 VAN DEN BERG 20
12 BOSMAN 7 LE ROUX 10 CELLIERS 19
13 FOURIE 7 THERON 10 DU PLESSIS 19
14 DU PREEZ 6 ROUX 9 DE KOCK 18
15 LE ROUX 6 ACKERMAN 8 ROUS(E) 18
16 ROUX 6 DE KOCK 8 MALHERBE 17
17 VAN DER RIET 6 HAUPTFLEISCH 8 THERON 17
18 LOUW 5 LOUW 8 KRUGER 16
19 ROOS 5 PRETORIUS 8 VAN REENEN 16
20 STRYDOM 5 RETIEF 8 DE WET 14
Source: Genealogies, own calculations
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